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This thesis considers the development of political identity in the Mississippi 
Territory, from its foundation in 1798 until the moment it achieved statehood 
in 1817. It focuses on the establishment of local networks of white settlers and 
local politicians, which helped to shape the political landscape of the Territory 
and ultimately dictated the relationship between the Territory and the Federal 
Government. It applies a microhistorical approach, honing in on local 
communities and political events, but draws connections between local issues 
and the national political landscape. In doing so, it challenges preconceptions 
about the aspirations of political networks within the Territory, the influence of 
the national political parties on the frontier, and the nature of citizenship and 
political loyalty on the fringes of the early American Republic.  
The first chapter sets out the unique political framework established in the 
Mississippi Territory, and demonstrates how the first Territorial governor of 
the Territory, a Federalist, utilised that framework to limit democracy and local 
representation in the Territory. In turn, that served as the catalyst for the 
development of local political networks rising in support and opposition to the 
Governor. Those networks aligned themselves with the national political 
parties in order to subvert the Governor and secure their own authority. 
However, the second chapter challenges the notion that Mississippi’s political 
networks can be neatly categorised as “Federalist” and “Republican”. Instead, 
local politicians appropriated those party labels in order to secure influence and 
favour from the federal government and assert their authority on the local 
stage. That assessment is then tested through a case study of the Burr 
Conspiracy, which proves how fractured Mississippi’s networks were, and 
highlights the fragility of the Territory’s loyalty to the Union. 
The third chapter presents two further case studies, focusing upon the 
establishment of two civic institutions at different moments in the Territory’s 
history; Jefferson College and The Bank of the Mississippi. In doing so, it 
demonstrates how political networks evolved from partisan, self-interested 
groups which would sabotage bipartisan movements if they did not 
immediately benefit, to sophisticated networks of businessmen and merchants 
who worked together to set up a stable, secure and profitable bank. Finally, 
Chapter Four discusses land and settlement in the Mississippi Territory, 
exploring how migration shaped political networks, and showing how planters 
and federal officials clashed in their attempts to shape white settlement in the 
region. This culminated in regional divisions which shaped campaigns for 
Mississippi’s statehood, which was only permissible on planters’ own terms. 
Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates how planters and local politicians were 
able to exploit the absence of federal authority and oversight on the early 
American frontier and cultivate unique political identities which furthered their 
own private interests and created a uniquely Mississippian form of American 
identity. 
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The Territories of the United States of America, from their inception to the 
present day, have enjoyed a complicated relationship with the Federal 
Government. Both historically and presently, the Territories sit on the 
boundaries of the Union, neither completely separate nor completely equal to 
the fifty states. In many ways, the original intent of the Territorial System has 
now been lost. It was originally designed, with the inception of the Northwest 
Ordinance, as a means of preparing a region for incorporation into the 
American Union as a fully-fledged state. The Ordinances provided a 
framework by which the Federal Government sought to prepare a region for 
statehood and to cultivate its inhabitants as citizens of a republic. Based around 
several population thresholds, the intention was gradually to introduce 
democratic rights to a territory’s inhabitants, including the right to elect a 
representative assembly and the right to a representative at the US Congress. 
Yet America’s territories today, and by extension its capital in the District of 
Columbia, have never, and may never, become American states. Citizens in the 
Territories and the District of Columbia are only represented by territorial 
representatives in Congress, without the same powers and authority of 
congressmen and senators, and citizens of the Territories do not have any votes 
in the Electoral College. People born within the Territories hold US passports, 
but do not receive the privilege of birthright citizenship.1 In many ways, the 
Territorial System is, and was, a paradox, neither providing full democratic 
rights to citizens nor allowing autonomy and independence. This thesis 
 
1 N. Weare, “Citizenship is a birthright in U.S. territories”, CNN, 19/02/2014, accessed online 
[11/08/19] [https://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/19/opinion/weare-citizenship-birthright-
samoa/index.html] 




demonstrates that, right from its inception, the Territorial System was 
conditioned by regional circumstances and local conflicts, even as it proposed 
a Federal narrative of national constitutional progress and expansion. Officials 
on the ground mediated the meanings, labels, and institutions of Federal power 
as they negotiated new political, economic and demographic landscapes, and 
cultivated new identities at the margins of the republic. To fully understand the 
Territories and their evolutionary complexity, it is necessary to focus new light 
on the powerbrokers in the localities rather than the Federal machinery at the 
centre.2 
The focus of this study is the Mississippi Territory. Founded in 1798, the 
American Revolution was fresh in the memories of politicians, federal and 
local alike. Many of the inhabitants of the Territory were veterans of the 
Revolutionary War, and many more were former inhabitants of the eastern 
states, particularly from Virginia, Georgia and the Carolinas, who had 
emigrated into the Territory. Thus, many residents of the formative Mississippi 
Territory were established citizens of the United States, who had enjoyed the 
privileges that that status bought them since the 1780s. Yet, even with the 
rhetoric of representation and democracy of the American Revolution fresh in 
the memory, inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory enjoyed few of the rights 
enshrined within the US Constitution and Bill of Rights, even if they had held 
 
2 Peter Onuf has described the establishment of the Northwest Territory as a “colonial” 
government, which protected the Federal Government’s property interests while offering 
inhabitants the “promise” of full citizenship. To Onuf, the Territorial system was the 
“embodiment of a vision of a more harmonious, powerful, prosperous, and expanding union.” 
It offered a hopeful vision of American expansion – Thomas Jefferson’s Empire of the 
Imagination before its time, but the system has not always followed through on the deal it 
apparently made with its citizens, which was always a partial phenomenon, particularly in its 
racial dimensions. See P. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987) p. XIII. 




those rights prior to migrating to the frontier. This project explores the impact 
that this paradox had upon identity in the Mississippi Territory. It explores 
how inhabitants, rich and poor, came to terms with their status within the 
American Republic, and demonstrates how they were affected by that status, 
both positively and negatively. Within the Territory, there were times at which 
local politicians brought themselves closer to the Federal Government, both in 
their actions and in their rhetoric, putting their citizenship front and centre of 
debates. However, at other times they separated themselves, exploiting the 
distance between Washington DC and Washington, Mississippi, highlighting 
their uniqueness, and their status as Missisippians. Their decisions and 
positions, the product of interlocking agendas and self-interests, would shape 
the articulation of Territorial identity for decades. 
The Mississippi Territory was founded at a time of political uncertainty across 
the nation. The delicate balance of power between the new Federalist and 
Democratic-Republican parties broadened those aforementioned grey areas, 
and allowed local politicians within the Territory the opportunity to find their 
own means of government and resistance. The first major theme of this thesis 
therefore addresses the ways in which local politicians and the inhabitants of 
the Territory engaged with the federal party-political model, creating their own 
loosely-connected factions which bore the labels of the national parties but 
rarely reflected their ideals and values. Furthermore, at the Territory’s 
inception, the nation was about to rapidly expand, with the Louisiana Purchase 
of 1803 offering a massive geopolitical shift across the continent. Thus, the 
Territory went from being on the frontier to far behind the frontier very quickly 
after its foundation, which compromised the appeal of the region to migrants in 




some ways, while necessitating a full engagement with national trends in 
institutional and legislative development. It ceased to be a destination, and 
became a passing point on the way to new land and new opportunities. This 
had a profound impact upon Mississippian society, ushering in a wave of 
insecurity about the Territory’s place in the nation, as the drive towards 
statehood became a matter of urgency. A second major theme this thesis 
addresses through a new focus on the Mississippi Territory is to explain how – 
contrary to ideals of solid progression – insecurity and instability actually 
permeated political culture. Politicians were insecure in their positions, and the 
alliances and networks they built were unstable and fractious. The Federal 
Government’s control over the region was unstable, just as the Territory’s 
borders with the Spanish were insecure, both of which were exploited by 
politicians and visitors alike. Poor farmers and migrants lived unstable lives, 
their livelihoods and lands constantly at the mercy of the planters who 
controlled the economy and the local government itself. In shaping 
Mississippi’s identity, politics and identity, there was only so much that local 
politicians could control and, as will become clear across this thesis, disputes 
and crises tended to follow one after another, with the Territory’s future in 
doubt on multiple occasions.  
It is challenging to find contemporary maps of the entire Territory as, as figure 
1 shows, only very small areas of the Territory were actually formally 
organised – not only is this a problem for modern historians, but it also tells us 
a great deal about the insecurity of the Mississippi Territory within the nation. 
In 1798, the Mississippi Territory did not leave a huge footprint upon the 
North American map, though it would grow to encompass what would become 




the present day states of Mississippi and Alabama, a huge expanse of land. The 
below map, figure 1, though produced by the State of Mississippi in 1817 after 
it had achieved statehood, gives some indication of the initial size of the 
Territory in 1798 on the Mississippi side – one would have to replicate the thin 
strip of organised land, shown coloured on the map, on the Alabama side to 
understand the true size of the Territory at the time. Maps of the Mississippi 
Territory were, in general, created to facilitate land sales, and, in 1798, the 
Territory itself was still in the early stages of surveying, so was largely 
unmapped. For context, the area below the coloured section representing the 
Territory in 1798 is the Spanish-occupied West Florida to the East and the 
Louisiana Territory to the west. The area above shows Choctaw and 
Chickasaw lands which would be ceded across the Territory’s existence, 
though it was formally ceded to the Territory by the State of Georgia in 1804 
in the wake of the Yazoo Land Scandal.  
 





Figure 1: The State of Mississippi and Alabama Territory3 
Figure 1 shows the number of counties in Mississippi at the point of statehood, 
but at its inception, the Territory only had three. Adams and Pickering 
(renamed Jefferson in 1802) Counties made up the Natchez District, on the 
shores of the Mississippi River, and Washington County sat on the shores of 
the Tombigbee River, eventually becoming a part of Alabama. Natchez, on the 
Mississippi River, was the colonial heartland of the region, and the best-
established settlement. It was the seat of power for the Spanish Governor of the 
region prior to 1798, was the centre of Mississippi society, with many planters 
and notable inhabitants residing within the borders of the town. As such, it 
became one of the most important ports on the Mississippi River, an important 
 
3 Shallus, Francis. The state of Mississippi and Alabama Territory, Library of Congress, USA, 
S.l.: s.n., 181 




stop off for merchants and traders on their way to New Orleans. It was the 
means by which the merchants and planters of Mississippi accessed the 
markets in the major Northern cities of the Eastern Seaboard, and also the 
point of arrival for anyone travelling down the river from St Louis, the popular 
route for many migrants travelling from the North. Thus, over the Territorial 
era, Natchez became home to the establishment of Mississippian society. As 
the Territory grew, so did the Natchez District, with the population dispersing 
into nearby towns such as Greenville and Washington, which would become 
the capital of the Territory shortly after in 1802. It would be years before 
Washington County and the Natchez District would be connected.  
Thus, the Mississippi Territory offers a fascinating insight into the early 
American experience. Focusing on Mississippi’s territorial period enables a 
deeper understanding of how local politicians worked within the margins of 
the Constitution and Territorial Ordinances to manipulate the construction of 
local politics and political identity within Mississippi. Of course, it was not 
simply Mississippi’s territorial status that made it unique – it was not the only 
territory to go through the Territorial process in the nineteenth century – but 
this thesis makes the case that its situational geography made local mediation 
paramount. The Mississippi Territory shared features with its northern 
territorial counterparts (in its constitutional configuration) yet would bear 
many of the institutional hallmarks of the West and the socio-economic aspects 
of the wider South (including its early reliance upon racial slavery). 
Mississippi’s hybridity encouraged numerous internal conflicts among upstart 
political stakeholders, and their localised interpretations and battlegrounds 
would shape the way that they looked east towards Federal authority and older 




states.4 Being so detached from the political heartlands of the Northeastern 
United States, Mississippi was influenced far more heavily by New Orleans, 
and was inherently more sceptical of the federal government. Indeed, every 
territorial governor appointed in Mississippi was an outsider, and as this thesis 
demonstrates, political identity and political culture in Natchez and the 
surrounding areas developed in spite of, and in opposition to, the governor, not 
because of them.   
As has already been observed, more attention has been paid to the Territory’s 
predecessor of sorts, the Northwest Territory, or formally the Territory 
Northwest of the River Ohio, which encompassed the eventual scope of six US 
states – a huge expanse of land. While Peter Onuf’s monograph referenced 
earlier remains the most notable study of the early American territories, a 
number of other works have addressed the constitutional issues raised by the 
Northwest Ordinances.5 These included work by Reginald Horsman, Robert 
Berkhofer and Daniel Barr, amongst others, all of which seek to understand the 
processes and principles of the federal politicians who sought to establish the 
Territorial System.6 The same level of work has not been undertaken on the 
Mississippi Territory, which has generally remained the focus of very local 
studies published within the Journal of Mississippi History¸ especially in the 
 
4 For wider considerations of situational orientation, see for example, K. DuVal, The Native 
Ground (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); M. Baud and W. van 
Schendel, ‘Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands,’ Journal of World History 8 
(1997):211-242. 
5 P. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1987) 
6 R. Horsman, ‘The Northwest Ordinance and the Shaping of an Expanding Republic” The 
Wisconsin Magazine of History, Vol.73, No. 1 (Autumn, 1989) pp.21-32; Berkhofer, Jr. R.F. 
‘Jefferson, the Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the American Territorial System’, 
William and Mary Quarterly, Vol, 29. No. 2 (April 1972) pp.231-262; Barr, D.P. The 
Boundaries Between Us: Natives and Newcomers Along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest 
Territory, 1750-1850 (Kent State University Press, 2006). 




1950s and 1960s, or even more archaic and classic works from the early 
twentieth century.7  
Existing studies of the Mississippi Territory have tended to concentrate 
disproportionately on the role of the governor in fostering identity and 
stability, leaving a disjuncture between scholarship on other territories 
(emphasising wider themes) and that on Mississippi (emphasising top-down 
actions) which this thesis seeks to resolve. The most notable of these is 
undoubtedly Robert V. Haynes’ The Mississippi Territory and the Southwest 
Frontier, 1795-1817.8  It is the most useful reference work on the Mississippi 
Territory, due to Haynes’ in-depth research and knowledge of the archival 
material. Its chronological, narrative approach is an excellent introduction to 
the complexities of the Mississippi Territory, though it is limited in its 
discussion of the experiences of politicians in Mississippi Territory in relation 
to the wider landscape of the early Republic, nor does it seek to study how 
political systems and ideologies shaped the Territory beyond the political 
 
7 Many of these monographs and titles are discussed across the thesis as a whole, but they 
include: W.B. Hamilton, “Early Cotton Regulation in the Lower Mississippi Valley”, 
Agricultural History, 15 (1941); R.V. Haynes, ‘The Disposal of Lands in the Mississippi 
Territory’, Journal of Mississippi History, Vol. 24, No. 4 (October, 1962); James, D.C. 
“Municipal Government in Territorial Natchez, Journal of Mississippi History, Vol. 27, No.2 
(May, 1965); F.L. Riley, Life of Col. J.F.H. Claiborne (Jackson: Publications of the 
Mississippi Historical Society, 1903); G.B. Toulmin, “The Political Ideas of Winthrop Sargent, 
A New England Federalist on the Frontier”, Journal of Mississippi History Vol. 15, No.4 
(October, 1953); J.H. Moore, “Mississippi’s Search for a Staple Crop”, Journal of Mississippi 
History, Vol.29, 4, (Nov, 1967) pp.371-385; W.M. Drake, “The Framing of Mississippi’s First 
Constitution”, Journal of Mississippi History, Vol.29, 4, (Nov, 1967) pp.301-327; W.B. 
Hamilton, “Mississippi 1817: A Sociological and Economic Analysis”, Journal of Mississippi 
History, Vol.29, 4, (Nov, 1967) pp.270-292; W.B. Hamilton, “Jefferson College and Education 
in Mississippi, 1798-1817”, Journal of Mississippi History, Volume 3, No. 4 (October, 1941) 
pp. 259-276; R.C. Weems Jr. “The Makers of the Bank of Mississippi”, Journal of Mississippi 
History, Vol. 15, No.3 (July, 1953), 137-154; R.C. Weems Jr. “Mississippi’s First Banking 
System”, Journal of Mississippi History, Vol. 29, No. 4 (November, 1967), pp.386-408; C.D. 
Lowery, “The Great Migration to the Mississippi Territory, 1798-1819”, Journal of 
Mississippi History, Vol. 30, No. 3 (August, 1968), pp.173-192; A. P. Whitaker, The 
Mississippi Question, 1795-1803 (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1934) 
8 R.V. Haynes, The Mississippi Territory and the Southwest Frontier, 1795-1817 (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 2010) 




sphere. The study implies that the main barrier to prosperity within Mississippi 
was the lack of a strong leader. Thus, there is a distinct argument that it is the 
arrival of Robert Holmes as governor that galvanises the Territory and drives it 
towards statehood.  
In contrast, this thesis demonstrates that, by the arrival of Holmes, Mississippi 
was already well on the way to statehood. That journey was not being led by 
governors, it was being led by local politicians and patriarchs who had 
redefined the Mississippian political system in their own image, and were 
driving it forward through their business endeavours and local networks of 
power. By remaining focussed on high level political activity, one does not get 
an understanding of how seemingly non-political events shaped Mississippi’s 
road to statehood. Jefferson College, the Bank of the Mississippi, or the 
Nicholas Gray affair were not just events which demonstrated the dual roles 
local politicians operated under as businessmen and patriarchs, but underpin 
the entire political system. It was within these events, rather than in the 
Territorial Assembly, that the political identity of Mississippi was truly shaped. 
 Central to nuancing our understanding of the political landscape of the 
Territory is this thesis’s close interrogation of the overly-binary political 
language of “Federalist” and “Democratic Republican”. Close attention to the 
sorts of Mississippi-centred episodes mentioned above challenge a 
characterisation of the Mississippi Territory’s political factions as facsimiles of 
those of the Federal government. Politicians may have defined themselves by 
those labels, but they were not governed by them. Political labels acted more 
like signposts. They were recognisable by migrants and officials arriving in the 
region, suggesting that they might find a political home along the lines of what 




they were familiar with in the states along the Eastern Seaboard. However, this 
thesis demonstrates that the reality was far more complex. Breaking down and 
reassembling these old definitions allows us to reinterpret the political culture 
of the Mississippi Territory, and to see it as more contingent and dynamic. 
Thus, while Haynes’ work remains a useful narrative, this thesis intends to 
build upon it and offer a more nuanced understanding of political identity in 
the Mississippi Territory, and offer a corrective to this binary interpretation 
that links with other repositionings of Territorial development discussed 
below. 
Haynes’s study is the most valuable existing work on the Territory because it 
is precisely that – a work focused entirely upon the Mississippi Territory. 
Other monographs of note generally discuss either one area of the region – 
normally Natchez – or transcend the Territorial era, discussing Mississippi in 
the antebellum period more generally. D. Clayton James, for example, focused 
entirely on Natchez in the antebellum era. As a result, while important and 
relevant issues are discussed, the work is simultaneously too narrow in place 
and too broad in time period to provide genuine insight into the mindsets of the 
individuals whose lives the work focuses on.9 More broadly, Frank Owsley’s 
Plain Folk of the Old South is an example of works which only engage with 
the Mississippi Territory incidentally as part of the wider Deep South, as is the 
case with the majority of studies of migration in this era.10 While these studies 
 
9 D. Clayton James, Antebellum Natchez (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1968). 
10 F.L. Owsley, Plain Folk of the Old South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
Updated Edition, 2008). See also T.D. Clark and J.D.W. Guice, The Old Southwest, 1795-
1830: Frontiers in Conflict (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989); T.P. Abernethy, A 
History of the South Volume IV: The South in the New Nation, 1789-1819 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1961); C.C. Bolton,. Poor Whites of the Antebellum South: 
 




are certainly useful, this thesis intends to highlight the connections and 
disconnections between the micro and the macro, selecting case studies which 
at times present the Mississippi Territory within the wider United States, and at 
others intensely focus upon local networks within the Territory. 
The historiography of the American Territories, however, extends beyond 
Mississippi, to the Northwest, Kansas, and up until the present day, providing a 
number of comparisons and contrasts for this study.11 Donald Ratcliffe’s work, 
which focuses on Ohio’s Territorial period between 1793 and 1803, rekindled 
interest in the Territorial era.12 Radcliffe argues that, in Ohio, partisan politics 
emerged early in the Territorial process and saw politicians bowing to public 
opinion and interest. In Ratcliffe’s view, party politics in Ohio were 
democratic, not elitist, and allowed inhabitants to express their concerns about 
national and foreign policy issues. Furthermore, Radcliffe sees the political 
parties as tying closely to the national Federalist and Republican parties. For 
the interests of this study then, Ratcliffe provides a fascinating contrast. This 
thesis argues that the parties that arose in the Mississippi Territory were 
inherently elitist, and inherently local. A comparison with Ratcliffe would 
appear to demonstrate that there was no singular territorial experience in the 
early American Republic, and helps to demonstrate the unique circumstances 
developing in Mississippi. The Ohio Territory had the benefit of proximity to 
 
Tenants and Laborers in Central North Carolina and Northeast Mississippi (Duke University 
Press, 1994); J.S. Otto . "The Migration of the Southern Plain Folk: An Interdisciplinary 
Synthesis". Journal of Southern History Vol. 51, No. 2 (1985) pp.183–200; J. Atack, "Tenants 
and Yeomen in the Nineteenth Century," Agricultural History, Vol. 62, No. 3, (Summer, 
1988), pp. 6–32. 
11 See, for example, P.T. Ponce, To Govern the Devil in Hell: The Political Crisis in Territorial 
Kansas (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2014) 
12 D.J. Ratcliffe, Party Spirit in a Frontier Republic: Democratic Politics in Ohio, 1793-1821) 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1998) 




urban hubs of the North East. Its inhabitants, whether recent migrants or 
otherwise, developed within a political culture they already knew. Winthrop 
Sargent, first governor of the Mississippi Territory, was appointed due to his 
successes as Secretary of the Northwest Territory. He was, in the Northwest, 
undoubtedly successful and, arguably, popular. As chapter one of this study 
shows, his time in Mississippi was a total failure. Mississippi and its 
inhabitants were used to a more laissez-faire Spanish governor, and many of its 
notable citizens had actively moved away from the Union, only for it to catch 
up to them. In short, they were not accustomed to Federalism. Furthermore, 
they were also relatively political advanced. As Chapter One shows, prior to 
1798, factions and political networks were beginning to take shape, and were 
lobbying for power and influence. This was not a region ready to have the 
democratic rights they expected taken away. Ohio and Mississippi were two 
very different territories. To truly understand eighteenth and nineteenth century 
American Territories, they all must be taken and studied in their own right.  
While both Ohio and Mississippi operated under a similar territorial 
framework in the early Territorial era, the societies that flourished in each 
region were by no means similar. It would be impossible to compare the two 
without acknowledging the impact that slavery had upon the development of 
Mississippi. As has been noted, Radcliffe argues that the political culture of 
Ohio was distinctly partisan and democratic. The flourishing slave society of 
Mississippi effectively ruled out such a prospect within Natchez and the 
surrounding area. As is demonstrated in Chapter Three in the case study of the 
Bank of the Mississippi, political activity and culture was driven not by a 
desire to improve the region, but by a desire to improve the business interests 




of the elite. The presence of slavery drove inequality, making the rich richer 
and the poor poorer. Slavery also dramatically impacted settlement habits 
within Mississippi. Due to the dominance slaveholders had in the market, 
poorer farmers were unable to sufficiently profit of their land to feed their 
families and also make profit. Thus arose the phenomenon of poorer farmers 
improving their land and preparing it for use, then selling it on to richer 
landowners. They would then move on to a new area and begin the process 
again. Thus, unless a large settlement was already present and growing around 
a local slave society, communities could not prosper, denying the opportunity 
for full engagement with the political system. For these reasons, Mississippi’s 
political system could never achieve the level of engagement that Ohio’s 
could. Furthermore, unlike Ohio, Mississippi was surrounded by both sides by 
threats. Both may have had a western frontier, but while Ohio was bordered by 
Pennsylvania to the East, Mississippi faced threats from West Florida.  As is 
shown in chapter two, the dangers Mississippi faced from the east was a major 
influence in its perceived isolation from the Federal government. Inhabitants 
felt a significant lack of support, both from their governors and from Federal 
officials. In all then, the need to discuss the Mississippi Territory in its own 
right is evident – there were simply too many differences between the 
Mississippi Territory and the Ohio Territory to be able to draw reasonable 
parallels and to speak of one single territorial experience in the era of the early 
republic. Studying each Territory individually demonstrates their unique 
characteristics, but it also helps to demonstrate the complexity of the early 
American Republic. 




Beyond Ohio, Edward Baptist’s study of antebellum Middle Florida, though 
encompassing a broader time period up to the Civil War, provides a useful 
comparison considering the geographical proximity to Mississippi.13 
Furthermore, there are further intersections in his study of the role of the Union 
Bank and the importance of land speculation in defining the region. However, 
while the topics are similar, the results in Florida were vastly different to those 
in Mississippi. As this study shows, the Bank of the Mississippi, and the 
success planters had in acquiring land, was the making of the Mississippi 
Territory. Land and economic growth defined the latter Territorial period, and 
enabled Mississippi to achieve a level of maturity that made statehood almost 
inevitable, and saw planters establishing a hugely inequal and inherently elitist 
society in which poorer farmers lost out. In contrast, Baptist identifies over-
speculation and the collapse of banking as the mechanism for creating a more 
democratic society. These failures made it difficult for planters to hold onto 
power, and saw the political parties (more clearly defined in Florida than in 
Mississippi) working to secure the votes of yeomen farmers, bringing them 
into the political fold in a way that was not seen in Mississippi. While the 
chronology of Baptist’s study is not entirely analogous with that of this study, 
it remains a fascinating contrast. Though more closely related to Mississippi 
than Ohio, Baptist’s study lies closer to Ratcliffe’s than this thesis. This further 
demonstrates the need to delve further into Mississippi’s territorial period, to 
understand its unique complexities and what drove such a different political 
culture. 
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Though the historiography of American territories provides plenty of direct 
comparisons with Mississippi, it is necessary to broaden comparisons beyond 
areas that were formally American territories. Brian DeLay and Pekka 
Hämäläinen have both focused upon Texas in their works, with a focus upon 
the US-Mexican War and the experience of Native Americans in the region.14 
Again, the scope tends to be much broader within these works compared to this 
study, but they provide important reference points for the experience of Native 
Americans within frontier regions of the United States. Hämäläinen, focusing 
upon the Comanche Empire, identifies a westward expansion sculpted and 
moulded by the Comanche experience, identifying a phenomenon of “co-
evolution”.15 He identifies Comanches forging positive relationships with 
American settlers, both politically and economically. This provides an 
interesting contrast with Mississippi, further highlighting how geopolitical 
conditions affected the development of states and territories in the American 
South and demonstrating the need to take each region in its own right, rather 
than taking one experience to represent a whole. DeLay’s study has a more 
trans-national focus than this thesis but further serves to highlight the unique 
circumstances that American settlers faced. When compared to the Mississippi 
Territory, DeLay and Hämäläinen present a region in which the United States 
struggled to assert their authority as late as the 1840s. This is a key point of 
comparison to the early sections of this study, which highlight the ways in 
which Americans assumed control of the Mississippi Territory from the 
Spanish between 1795 and 1798. Mississippi’s inhabitants were much more 
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able to use political networks and negotiation to shape the geopolitics of the 
region and, whereas the Comanches played an active part in the process in 
Texas, the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations of Mississippi struggled to 
influence the transition of Mississippi from Spanish to American authority. 
Indeed, as American authority in the region expanded, Native American 
nations would struggle to negotiate the mutually beneficial relationships they 
had previously cultivated with their Spanish counterparts.  
Going further beyond the Territories, Gary Gerstle’s study of the American 
state helps to illuminate how local elites in the American South were able to 
manipulate the federal government to their own ends.16 However, in Gerstle’s 
study it is the wide ranging power of state and local governments which 
facilitated this across the antebellum era. This thesis argues that elite authority 
did not manifest itself through the local and state governments, but through 
local, informal networks of power and through civic institutions including 
education and banking. This study identifies the precursor to what Gerstle 
identifies in the antebellum period – the elite of the Mississippi Territory had 
not yet developed a sophisticated way of exhibiting power through government 
and the law. They did, however, still display similar ambitions, using local 
networks of influence and familial ties to achieve control. They, too, would 
utilise the federal government to achieve their own objectives but, as is seen in 
Chapter One, they did so through broad declarations of party political loyalty, 
not through the framework of government. In summary, this thesis argues that 
the Mississippi Territory offers us more than just a spatial piece of a jigsaw of 
 
16 G. Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the Founding 
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Federal or Southern expansionism: rather, set against existing territorial 
scholarship, it helps us to see how localised political cultures developed that 
mirrored some elements to the North, West, and South, but repudiated others. 
Across these chapters, it should be remembered that the vast majority of 
individuals discussed were planters and slaveholders. Politicians’ and planters’ 
personal, economic motivations are regularly discussed here, and it must be 
acknowledged that all of this was facilitated by the presence of plantation 
slavery within the Mississippi Territory. David Libby’s Slavery and Frontier 
Mississippi, is key in the ways in which it engages with slavery within the 
Mississippi, though it is more broad than simply focusing on the Mississippi 
Territory, and expands far earlier into the colonial era, and later in the 
antebellum period.17 Recent works such as Adam Rothman’s Slave Country 
and Walter Johnson’s River of Dark Dreams,  have helped to redress the focus 
of studies of society in the Deep South, and this project relies upon the vital 
work those historians, and the many others that are referenced across this 
thesis, have undertaken to highlight the role of plantation slavery in creating 
the society and economic model that the planters of the Mississippi Territory 
designed.18 By combining these studies with a more politically focused local 
history, this thesis helps to develop a more rounded picture of Mississippian 
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society. Rothman, Johnson and Libby have shown the importance of planters 
and their economics interests in driving expansion across the American South, 
demonstrating the ways in which their wielding their economic power to 
influence the federal government. When combined with Gerstle’s study 
discussed previously, there is a clear trend in the historiography of the local 
power influencing the federal government. This thesis identifies a similar 
trend, but focuses on the local political level. By doing so, it illuminates the 
early stages of the process which saw planters influencing the expansion of the 
South. Before they could expand their “Cotton Kingdom”, they had to develop 
control at a local level. This thesis identifies how they did so. 
This project has also been inspired by works which have focused on different 
geographic areas, and different subject matters. The work of Kathleen DuVal 
has been particularly insightful, both in her work on The Native Ground, 
focusing upon the Native American nations of the Arkansas River Valley, and 
in Independence Lost, in which she shifts the narrative of the American 
Revolution onto a number of individuals and societies around the Gulf of 
Mexico.19 DuVal’s approach, particularly in Independence Lost, demonstrates 
the merits of reducing the scale of study, showing how individuals, before the 
American Revolution, were able to enhance personal, political and economic 
independencies by exploiting gaps between competing imperial interests. She 
also demonstrates how the new American republic saw the Gulf Coast as its 
own territory, rejecting those who lived in the gaps between those imperial 
interests. Thus, it helps to illuminate the conditions in which the Mississippi 
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Territory developed. It resonates strongly with the first chapter of this study, 
which sees inhabitants coming to terms with the new dichotomy established 
once Spanish influence in the region waned. DuVal demonstrates the power 
vacuum which saw individuals struggling to redefine themselves in the wake 
of the Revolution. This thesis explores how individuals in the Mississippi 
Territory were able to exploit that vacuum, and how they built networks of 
power to fill the gaps. 
The work of historians such as Tim Lockley, Alan Taylor and Watson 
Jennison, amongst others, have demonstrated how effective studies of local 
communities can be, in the ways in which they take local case studies and local 
issues and map them onto the wider political and cultural landscape of the 
American continent.20 They have all demonstrates the power of the slaveholder 
in the South, showing how they used their economic weight to push 
geopolitical ambitions and expand their personal economies. Though this 
thesis focuses more on the political than the economic, it contributes to the 
historiography of planters and slaveholders driving their own personal 
ambitions forward, for political and economic gain. Other works touched upon 
across this project, unsurprisingly, are the political histories of the Early 
Republic, of the political parties and of the ideologies of their leaders, most 
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notably Thomas Jefferson. Again, these are discussed throughout the thesis, 
particularly within the analyses of party politics in the Mississippi Territory 
and of the shaping of settlement in the Territory. Many of these works, such as 
those of Peter Kastor, Francois Weil and Roger Kennedy focus on the 
Louisiana Purchase.21 Kastor and Weil’s work on the Louisiana Purchase, 
though of course not strictly focussed on the Mississippi Territory, help to 
demonstrate the impact that other nations had upon the old Southwest. As has 
been mentioned this thesis focuses upon white settlers, who were committed to 
driving Mississippi towards American statehood. However, these works help 
to demonstrate the other influences on Mississippi which helped to 
differentiate it from other territories, such as those further North. They help to 
identify what made the Mississippi Territory unique among its counterparts – 
the influx of influences from different nations, whether they be French, 
Spanish, Chickasaw or Choctaw. While the focus of the works referenced here 
and this study are different, they collectively demonstrate the ways in which 
the expansion of the American South, through the Louisiana Purchase and 
through the development of the Mississippi Territory, was defined by local 
people, local cultures, and local ideologies. 
Furthermore, Kennedy offers insight into the Federal Government’s attempts 
to cultivate an American identity on the frontier and beyond, and alongside the 
other works mentioned here, provides useful insights into other governments 
and nationalities around the Gulf. They do, however, miss the opportunity to 
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explore the roles of local officials and politicians in response to the Federal 
Government. In all these works, along with the wealth of studies into Thomas 
Jefferson’s vision for the West, the figure of the President looms large.22 While 
they are valuable insights into the vision of the President, they limit our 
understanding of life on the borders of the republic, and of the lesser-known 
actors who shaped the American Territories in their own visions, actively 
embracing or challenging that of the Federal Government. Thus, by taking the 
opportunity to explore these opportunities, this thesis offers a different 
perspective on the growth of the American West. Indeed, this study does not 
“travel” particularly far. For the majority of these studies, the Mississippi 
River is the starting point. They aptly explore the creation of an American 
identity beyond this frontier. This thesis remains focused on the region that got 
left behind. Mississippi was briefly a frontier and the focus of the Federal 
government, but the development of political identity in the Mississippi 
Territory is a story of local politicians operating in a borderlands region that 
was no longer on the border of the United States. The Mississippi Territory 
belongs within the historiography of the Louisiana Purchase and westward 
expansion – it is undoubtedly a part of that history, with the Purchase having 
an unquantifiable impact upon the development of the Territory. However, this 
thesis explores what was left behind by the Territory. It focuses upon 
developing a political identity in spite of a lack of engagement from the federal 
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government, whereas other studies maintain a focus on federal government 
activity in shaping the western frontier.  
If the heart of this study is the way in which partisan identities were 
constructed within the Mississippi Territory, it naturally also reaches towards 
questions about how national identity began to take shape as the territory 
moved towards statehood. A key reference point for this study is therefore 
David Waldstreicher’s In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes, which explores the 
development of national identity in the early American Republic, breaking 
down the ways in which citizens of the United States exhibited their national 
loyalty and identity.23 Waldstreicher’s methodology, in many ways, resonates 
with this study. Rather than building a picture of nationalism from the top-
down perspective of Founders and Framers, the majority of his sources are 
from the lower level, the more active party officials, those who wrote in the 
newspapers for the masses. In that sense, Waldstreicher offers an important 
point of comparison. Yet his work is also based on states, specifically those in 
New England, a vastly different location to the early Mississippi Territory. 
However, despite these geopolitical differences, this thesis finds significant 
commonality with Waldstreicher’s study. He identifies that, contrary to other 
assessments that formal political parties did not coalesce until much later into 
the nineteenth century, the early American Republic was a major era of 
development for national political identity. This is clearly synced with the way 
in which the political organisations of the Mississippi Territory formed early, 
and grew rapidly, even before the Territory was formalised in 1798. 
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Furthermore, Waldstreicher argues that some of the creativity of partisan 
politics was lost as the era of the Federalist party began to fade.24 A similar 
phenomenon could be identified in Chapter Four of this study, when compared 
to the activity discussed in Chapter Two. While political debate was still 
intense from 1812 onwards (particularly when it came to land issues), it had 
lost some of feist of the early period, where debates spilled out into bombastic 
newspaper articles, politically fuelled trials, and even duels. Furthermore, 
political activity in New England and in Mississippi achieved similar 
outcomes, with the earliest political parties forming in Mississippi to drive 
forward an expansion of suffrage and progression to more advanced territorial 
government, echoing the ways in which Waldstreicher identifies political 
engagement with making suffrage for all males inevitable.  
However, it must be argued that this thesis also complicates Waldstreicher’s 
assessment of the development of national identity as well. This thesis does not 
present the same trappings of political identity that lie at the core of his work. 
Although, like in New England, a great deal of political theatrics were present 
within Mississippi’s newspapers, with debates and arguments being 
communicated through the papers of the Misissippi Herald and the Mississippi 
Messenger, oratory, celebration, and festivals were not so much a part of 
Mississippi’s political culture. Furthermore, while this thesis agrees that 
political identities were relatively sophisticated in this period, what was 
generated in Mississippi was not a national identity. It was inherently local, 
arising out of a response to local issues rather than in opposition to issues at a 
national level.  While this thesis certainly identifies similarities between the 
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construction of political identities in New England and the Mississippi 
Territory, it is by no means an exact parallel.     
Beyond the key theme of political identity within the Mississippi Territory, this 
thesis also considers the importance of citizenship in Mississippi, with many 
territorial inhabitants coming to terms with moving from states where their 
citizenship was affirmed into a region where there was no such definition, or 
protection from the US Constitution. The development of ideas of citizenship 
in the early American Republic has received considerable attention within the 
historiography of the American Revolution and beyond. Douglas Bradburn 
identifies a “Citizenship Revolution” in the wake of the American Revolution, 
but argues that the adoption of the constitution and creation was not the 
catalyst for that revolution, and that it did not solve questions of citizenship.25 
Furthermore, Bradburn identifies Federalist attempts to define and impose a 
national standard of citizenship as a seminal moment which brought together 
diverse opposition groups to establish a defined American political identity. 
While Bradburn focuses on the national sphere, his study has fascinating 
parallels to the Mississippi Territory. The Alien and Sedition Acts, defined as 
the catalyst for resistance by Bradburn, did not impact significantly upon the 
Territory, but the parallel with the first Federalist Governor’s attempts to 
impose punitive law codes are evident. As in Bradburn’s study, a defined 
Mississippian political culture arose in Mississippi in opposition to Federalist 
doctrine, which in turn pulled them closer to citizenship within the American 
Union through allegiance with Jeffersonian Republicans. 
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Bradburn’s essay on citizenship in the era of the American Revolution 
provides useful context for this thesis, demonstrating the complexity of 
citizenship was within this period.26 Though it focuses on the Revolution more 
than the early Republic, Bradburn here argues that citizenship was defined by a 
balance between the need for the state to maintain power and the demand for 
popular representation. This resonates strongly with the themes present within 
the first chapter of this study. As Mississippi’s inhabitants grappled with how 
to become citizens while residing within a Territory, their demand for voting 
rights and a representative assembly won out over Governor Winthrop 
Sargent’s prescriptive and punitive law codes. Indeed, as the Territorial 
Governor’s authority wavered between 1803-1809, it could be argued that 
Mississippi’s inhabitants drifted further away from a desire to become full 
American citizens, as the lure of Aaron Burr loomed large.  
The historiography of American citizenship is not solely grounded in the 
Revolutionary era. Rogers Smith, in a study that stretches from the Revolution 
to Civil Rights, identifies the key drivers of citizenship as the elite, creating the 
need for “a population that imagines itself to be a ‘people’”.27 Focusing on the 
Jeffersonian era, Smith demonstrates Jefferson’s policies to have focused on 
citizenship as a mutual obligation, requiring engagement from all inhabitants, 
yet also highlights how exclusive and exclusionary their citizenship was in 
practice. Compared with Bradburn, this provides a useful framework to 
consider how successive Federalist and Republican leaders attempted to shape 
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the Mississippi Territory’s political identity. Undoubtedly, Republicans had 
more success than Federalists, but within this Southern territorial region, 
inclusion in the political process was driven by familial networks and 
geopolitical ties, not by the policies and doctrines of the national political 
parties. Linda Kerber, focusing on the ways the obligations of citizenship 
affected women, identifies five political obligations that define American 
citizenship: loyalty to the state, paying taxes, avoiding vagrancy, undertaking 
jury service and performing military service.28 James Kettner identifies that, 
there was no consistent interpretation of citizenship contained within early 
American laws, and aptly highlights the difficulties in separating out loyalty at 
a local and at a national level.29 Taken together, Kerber and Kettner help to 
demonstrate the difficulties of attaining and sustaining citizenship within the 
Mississippi Territory – there were few opportunities to demonstrate loyalty to 
both Mississippi and to the Union. Chapter Two of this study considers the 
case study of the Burr Affair, which is perhaps the best opportunity to test 
these definitions, but in doing so, Mississippians tended to come up short. 
There was a lax attitude to military service, with local leaders tending to take 
matters into their own hands rather than await instruction from the federal 
level. It is a case study which represents the importance of loyalty and 
citizenship as a two-way system. When Mississippi’s inhabitants went looking 
for support from the federal government, they were often left wanting. Thus, 
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inhabitants became more self-sufficient, relying on local loyalties and 
allegiances, until the federal government was willing to accept them.  
Furthermore, Barbara Young Welke’s study of the role of law in establishing 
‘borders of belonging’ in America helps demonstrate the ways in which white 
Mississippians asserted their control and their “belonging” while excluding 
those who they subjected. This started at the inception of the Territorial era, 
with prescriptive Federalist law codes designed to dampen the democratic 
spirit present in the Natchez District and maintaining the supremacy of a small 
elite. A key technique in doing so, as is echoed in Welke’s work, was 
disenfranchisement. The entire framework of the Territorial Ordinance was 
designed to restrict the franchise, until certain thresholds were met. This 
encapsulates Welke’s argument that law was a tool of subjection, which the 
white elite of Natchez strove to hold onto. As a whole, although these works 
on the topic of citizenship do not focus on the territories, and certainly do not 
delve into Mississippi’s Territorial era, they provide frameworks which help to 
explain the motives and tactics of the white elite Mississippians who lie at the 
heart of this study. They demonstrate that, though Mississippi was far detached 
from the heartlands of the American Republic, the debates and battles over 
identity and citizenship taking place in the North East were also taking place in 
Mississippi, further highlighting the merit of a reappraisal of the Territory’s 
political beginnings.30 
As has already been noted, the focus on this study is upon the white settlers, 
planters and politicians who sought to shape identity in the Mississippi 
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Territory. As such, it is, for the most part, focused upon the town of Natchez 
and the surrounding area, including other notable towns such as Washington 
and Greenville. This is unavoidable for a study of this nature, as planters 
gravitated to the Natchez District as the centre of Mississippian society, and 
the area was home to the Territory’s capital – Natchez, and then Washington. 
Thus, it was the hub of political activity, and where the majority of public and 
private institutions was based. However, other areas of note within the 
Territory will also be explored. Chapter Four focuses upon the divide between 
the East and the West of the region, expanding upon the difficulties politicians 
faced trying to maintain control over such a vast region, and the subsequent 
calls for partition that followed. Throughout the Territorial era, the majority of 
the region was unsettled by the white population. Those rural areas which had 
been occupied by white settlers was often done so by squatters – poor migrants 
who settled on land they had no right to, cultivating and improving it with the 
hope of being offered the chance to purchase it later. As such, those areas were 
unorganised and poorly recorded. Due to the lack of availability of archival 
material for the Territory, focusing upon the Natchez District and surrounding 
areas is the most illuminating approach for a project such as this. 
The sources on which this study is based reflect its emphasis on building a 
new, composite history of the Mississippi Territory, focusing upon different, 
more varied sources than the histories that have come before it. Source 
selection is an issue that has plagued writing on the Mississippi Territory 
across the twentieth century, particularly in the Journal of Mississippi History 
articles referenced earlier.  A reliance upon the same sources, over and over 
again, has resulted in many of works falling into the same anachronisms and 




pitfalls and has obscured historical truths. This is one of key arguments of this 
thesis, and will be explored in Chapter Two, but is important to note here, 
particularly in understanding how this thesis will use those same sources. One 
of the reasons that the Mississippi Territory has gone understudied for long, 
perhaps, is the limited availability of archival material, particularly when it 
comes to understanding local party networks and the more informal 
communications that would have been commonplace across the Territorial era. 
We do not have, for example, complete records of the Territory’s two major 
newspapers, the Misissippi Herald and Natchez Gazette and the Mississippi 
Messenger, which limits our ability to trace themes and developments over 
time.31 While we also have limited collections of the papers of some private 
and public institutions in the Territory, and there are numerous useful 
documents contained within the various family paper collections stored in the 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History, the best surviving collections 
of sources are very much top level documents. The most extensively utilised 
documents are compiled in the Territorial Papers of the United States, 
volumes five and six, published by Clarence E. Carter in the 1930s. They are 
comprised of correspondence to and from Federal politicians, including the 
President and the Secretary of War, as well as relevant records of 
congressional debates, and other miscellaneous correspondence, such as letters 
to and from the Postmaster General.32 These are a vital source for our 
understanding of the relationship between the Territory and the Federal 
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Archives and History, microfilm series 35649. 
32 C.E. Carter (Ed.) Territorial Papers of the United States, Volumes 5 and 6: The Mississippi 
Territory (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1937) 




Government, particularly as they include numerous petitions and 
proclamations from groups of citizens to the government. However, the focus 
of the collection is very much on the Federal, not the local. The Mississippi 
Department of Archives and History’s Territorial Administration Papers 
collection offers a more local perspective on matters, but it remains a very top 
level collection as it is comprised entirely of letters to and from the Governors 
of the Territory.33 As such, there are significant gaps within the archival 
material, which has made tracing local connections and networks difficult. 
Consequently, students of the Territorial era have traditionally relied on two 
classic scholars to fill in the gaps left by the Archives; J.F.H. Claiborne and 
Dunbar Rowland. 
The family name Claiborne is notable for historians of the nineteenth century 
American South, and the Mississippi Territory in particularly. William C.C. 
Claiborne was the second governor of the Mississippi Territory, before 
becoming the first American Governor of New Orleans in the wake of the 
Louisiana Purchase.34 His brother, Ferdinand L. Claiborne, was commander of 
the Mississippi Militia during the War of 1812 and the Creek War, and was a 
notable political presence across the era, as will be explored at several points in 
this thesis.35 J.F.H Claiborne, or John Francis Hamtramck Claiborne was 
Ferdinand’s son, and a notable figure in Mississippi’s history himself, having 
served as a member of the House of Representatives for several years in the 
 
33 Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Series 488: Administration Papers, 1769, 
1788-1817. 
34 D. Rowland (ed), Encyclopaedia of Mississippi History, Volume 1, (Madison, 1907) p.427. 
35 Ibid, pp.423-424. 




1830s.36 In 1880, much later in life, Claiborne published a history of 
Mississippi, Mississippi as a Province, Territory and State, with Biographical 
Notices of Eminent Citizens .37 . Much of the work is based off his family’s 
correspondence, and he had unparalleled access to state and territorial papers, 
as well as the private papers of his contemporaries and oral accounts they 
provided him, many of which are not fully available to modern historians. 
Thus, the account has often been used to fill gaps in our understanding, helping 
to identify individuals and how they aligned themselves within the parties and 
networks of the Territory. This is problematic, and has resulted in certain 
biases and hearsays transferring from Claiborne’s work into modern histories. 
Indeed, Claiborne’s bias must be noted. He entered politics as a Jacksonian 
and, had he been in politics during the time of the Federalists, he would surely 
have been a Jeffersonian, much like his uncle.  As such, much of his account of 
the political history of the Natchez District and Mississippi Territory favours 
the Republican perspective, and can be extremely critical of divisive figures 
such as Andrew Ellicott and Winthrop Sargent. Thus, there is a need to 
reassess our understanding of identity and party networks in the Territory; 
many of the labels that individuals have had ascribed to them no longer fit. 
This is not to say there is not use in Claiborne’s account, however. As it is 
based so heavily upon family and private papers, it can allow a contemporary 
insight into Mississippi’s political figures. Indeed, it allows the historian to 
view the Territory’s key individuals through the lens of a Jeffersonian-
 
36 F.L. Riley, Life of Col. J.F.H. Claiborne (Jackson: Publications of the Mississippi Historical 
Society, 1903); R.V. Haynes, “Historians and the Mississippi Territory” Journal of Mississippi 
History, Vol. 29, No.4, (November 1967) pp.409-428. 
37 J.F.H. Claiborne, Mississippi as a Province, Territory and State, with Biographical Notices 
of Eminent Citizens, Vol. 1. (Jackson: Power and Barksdale, 1880) 




Republican, and can, if used appropriately as a contemporary observer not a 
critical historical study, illuminate a study of identity and politics in the 
Mississippi Territory. 
While Claiborne can be assessed as something of a contemporary source, the 
same cannot be said for the other source upon which many histories of the 
Mississippi Territory have been based. Dunbar Rowland, author of multiple 
works on the history of Mississippi. Rowland was the inaugural Director of the 
Mississippi Department of Archives and History, serving in that position for 
over thirty years from 1902 onwards.38 Throughout that time, Rowland 
developed an unrivalled knowledge of archival material and produced a 
number of works, including The Mississippi Territorial Archives: 1798-1803, 
an important source for the early Territorial period which collated a number of 
useful archival documents, much as Clarence Carter did for the Territorial 
Papers.39 On a similar theme he also edited and published The Official and 
Statistical Register of the State of Mississippi, another useful source for the 
modern historian.40 His most notable work, however, is his two volume 
Encyclopaedia of Mississippi History, which serves as a biographical 
dictionary for important figures, places and events across nineteenth century 
Mississippi History.41 The encyclopaedia is vast and significant reference 
work, and is an important introduction to new scholars of the region, as it helps 
to identify the backgrounds and activities of many significant figures of the 
 
38 P. Galloway, “Rowland, Dunbar”, American National Biography, 
[https://doi.org/10.1093/anb/9780198606697.article.1401163] last accessed 25/07/2019. 
39 Rowland, D. (Ed.), The Mississippi Territorial Archives: 1798-1803 (Nashville, 1905) 
40 Rowland, D. The Official and Statistical Register of the State of Mississippi, Vol. 1 
(Nashvill.e: Press of the Brandon Printing Company, 1908) 
41 Rowland, D. Encyclopaedia of Mississippi History, Vol. 1 and Vol.2, (Atlanta: Southern 
Historical Publishing Association, 1907) 




Territorial era. Within this thesis, the encyclopaedia is utilised as a reference 
work for biographical notes, utilised to note the backgrounds of Mississippi’s 
planters and local politicians. Using Rowland’s work to identify where 
inhabitants of the Territory migrated from, what their family history was, and 
other useful details along those lines, can help infer details about characters’ 
political beliefs, motivations and broadly speaking, their identity. 
However, the Encyclopaedia of Mississippi History has been overused across 
works on the Mississippi Territory. Unfortunately, within the Encyclopaedia of 
Mississippi History, Rowland does not list his sources, so it is unclear where 
many of his assertions come from. The lack of archival material from this 
period has thus resulted in Rowland’s claims being interpreted as fact. 
Historians have not scrutinised the claims made by Rowland when it comes to 
political activity and belief, and this has resulted in lazy connections being 
drawn between local and Federal politics. This thesis is not being contrarian 
for the sake of being so, but highlights that rigorously scrutinising the political 
networks of the Mississippi Territory reveals a great deal about both the real 
relationship between the Territory and the Federal Government, and the 
relationships between local networks of planters and politicians in the Territory 
itself. Whereas there has been a tendency amongst local studies to make claims 
about individuals’ identity and loyalties based upon unreliable sources, this 
thesis has not followed unquestionably in those footsteps, and has approached 
issues of categorisation and identity with rigour and caution. 
This thesis focuses on several case studies, or flashpoints, from across the 
Territorial era which illuminate the experience of life within an early American 
Territory and the development of identity within it. In doing so, it contributes 




to far more fields of American history than a conventional, chronological 
history of the Territory would. The case studies discussed range from incidents 
which lasted months to events that sparked debates which smouldered away 
for several years. These have been woven together into the wider narrative of 
the Mississippi Territory to demonstrate how the Territory and the political 
debate within it evolved around the individuals who attempted to shape the 
identity of the region and its inhabitants. The topics discussed are somewhat 
weighted towards the first part of the Territorial era. This is somewhat 
inevitable due to the unrest and instability of the period between 1798 and 
1809 in which the Territorial had three permanent governors and two interim 
ones, as opposed to the period between 1809 and 1817 when the Territory had 
one governor throughout. In line with this methodology, the thesis engages 
with existing scholarship in the context of the specific debates and flashpoints 
addressed, rather than providing a comprehensive overview at the outset.  
Ultimately, at its core, this is a study of politics and identity on the edges of the 
United States. It is a definitively local study, focusing on local communities 
and tracing the development of political networks within the Mississippi 
Territory. However, in doing so, it illuminates our understanding of the wider 
American South, and of the ways in which the American Republic expanded 
over the nineteenth century. In terms of that identity, it proves that it was not 
the politics of the Federal Government who disseminated an American spirit 
and identity, but its local officials; the surveyors such as Isaac Briggs and 
Andrew Ellicott, and the commissioners such as Nicholas Gray. Yet it was not 
a Federal identity which blossomed on the frontier of the Mississippi Territory, 
but one that was created within the power vacuum of the lower Mississippi 




Valley. Certainly, it bore some of the hallmarks of an American identity, 
harking back to the American Revolution and putting independence and 
democracy at the centre, yet its character was uniquely Mississippian. It was an 
identity that was defined by Mississippi’s status on the fringes of the Republic, 
cultivated by politicians who were capable of speaking the language of the 
Federal Government, but acting as self-sufficient, self-serving planters.  
 





The Formation of Local Government and Political Networks 
 
Writing from a temporary camp seven miles outside of Natchez in September 
1797, Andrew Ellicott informed the United States Secretary of State that, in the 
process of establishing an American government in the Mississippi Territory, 
“the voice of the people for want of an elective representation is lost.”1 Ellicott, 
a United States commissioner appointed to draw the boundary between the 
United States and Spain along the Mississippi River, had voiced an opinion 
that would be echoed by political figures at both local and national levels 
throughout the early 1800s. Local politicians and their representatives to the 
federal government constantly struggled against the image of the wild frontier, 
where the inhabitants were not ready to engage with the American republican 
experiment. Central to this depiction of the Mississippi Territory was its 
foundation as part of the United States, and the United States government’s 
policy towards its territories. This chapter will explain how Mississippi 
governance evolved, and what viewpoints and imperatives competed in the 
process of forming and expressing political identities in the early years of the 
Territory. It begins by discussing the context in which the Mississippi Territory 
was created, through analysis of the Northwest Ordinance and the ways in 
which that framework was transferred over to the Mississippi Territory, before 
analysing the early political history of the Mississippi Territory, both before 
and after the arrival of the first American governor of the Territory. It then 
concludes with a case study of Governor Winthrop Sargent’s administration, 
 
1Andrew Ellicott to the Secretary of State, 24th September, 1797, in C.E. Carter (Ed.) 
Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume 5: The Mississippi Territory (Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 1937) pp.3-8. 




assessing his leadership and the responses of local politicians to his 
governance, tracing the establishment of Mississippi’s political networks 
across the era. This chapter will demonstrate that, due to the uncertain 
inception of the Mississippi Territory, the development of an American 
identity within the Mississippi Territory was slow to develop, with stumbles 
along the way, thanks to the lingering involvement of the Spanish 
government.This would have meaningful implications for how future regional 
claims and issues were framed and redressed. 
Before one can assess the role of lawmakers within the Mississippi Territory 
and the creation of a political identity, one must understand the Northwest 
Ordinances as a framework for the government of the region and understand 
how the Ordinances which governed the United States’ Territories 
differentiated them from the rest of the nation. In the aftermath of the 
American Revolution, the fledgling states and government almost immediately 
looked westward, with a burgeoning expectation that their nation would 
expand across the continent into the Ohio Valley and the Great Lakes region. 
Not only did the West provide an opportunity for expansion and settlement, 
but it also offered the chance to greatly reduce the national debt through land 
sales. Yet, in the formative years of the Republic, the federal government 
lacked both the power and authority to control, defend and administer this 
land. Within the Articles of Confederation, written in 1777 and becoming the 
de jure constitution in 1781, there was provision for Canada’s admittance into 
the Union, though there was no allowance for any new states, colonies or 




territories.2 Thus, there was a need for new legislation which would permit the 
government to organize the territories, establish some form of government on 
the frontier, and even prescribe for eventual statehood within the region. 
Several years of congressional committees and debates culminated in the 
creation of the Northwest Ordinance in 1787, arguably the most important 
piece of legislation passed by the Continental Congress.  Although created for 
the Northwest Territories, the Ordinances would become the foundation of all 
territorial governments to come, and among the first test cases was Mississippi. 
Indeed, the act of Congress establishing the government of the Mississippi 
Territory legislated that, ‘the people of the aforesaid territory shall be entitled 
to, and enjoy all the singular rights, privileges and advantages granted to the 
people of the United States, north-west of the river Ohio, in and by the 
aforesaid Ordinance.’3 Understanding the Northwest Ordinances and their 
prescriptions is thus critical to interpreting the framework of political life 
established in the Mississippi Territory. They provided a learning experience 
both for the Federal Government and for the first Federal office holders in the 
Mississippi Territory, who had significant involvements in the Northwest 
Territories. At its inception then, the Mississippi Territory carried tensions and 
paradoxes that reflected its organisation as a replica of the Territory that came 
before it, in spite of the particularities of its geography and cultural heritage. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the lower Mississippi Valley is not touched upon in the 
vast majority of the historiography relating to the Northwest Ordinance of 
 
2 Transcript of Articles of Confederation (1777), 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=3&page=transcript [last accessed 11/02/2018] 
3 An Act for the Government of the Mississippi Territory, in C.E. Carter (Ed.) Territorial 
Papers of the United States, Volume 5: The Mississippi Territory (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1937) pp.18-22. 
 




1787. Instead, its focus has tended to be upon Thomas Jefferson’s role in the 
creation of the legislation, its meaning for Congress and the United States 
going forward, and its direct impact on the creation of new states in the 
Northwest Territories. Peter Onuf, for example, has focused on the drafting of 
the Ordinance and “how its meaning was contested and redefined by 
subsequent generations,” and discusses the Ordinance’s effect upon distinct 
regional identities in the Northwest.4 But the Ordinance must also be seen to 
have had a significant effect upon the development of the southern territories 
as regions of the United States. The precedents set in 1787 had a significant 
impact upon the Mississippi Territory, much in the way that Onuf argues is the 
case further north. Onuf assesses that, thanks to the Ordinance, the creation of 
the states of the Old Northwest became intrinsically linked to the foundation of 
the United States as whole, and its settlers saw themselves as active 
participants in the development of the republic from a vision to a reality.5 In 
this way, whilst failing to discuss the southerly states, Onuf provides a useful 
framework for examining the impact of the Ordinance in the lower Mississippi 
Valley. This study therefore takes the opportunity to test Onuf’s claims about 
the Northwest Territory in a distinct regional context, far removed from the 
original model.  
Several other works on the Northwest Ordinance tend to focus upon the 
lawmakers themselves, most notably Thomas Jefferson. Berkhofer, for 
example, bases his study of the Northwest Ordinance around a comparison 
with the Ordinance of 1784, a product of a committee headed by Jefferson, 
 
4 P. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1987), p.xvii. 
5 Ibid, p.141. 




who was the author of the plan.6 He argues that aspects of the Northwest 
Ordinance stemmed from a fear that those in the west would grow isolated 
from central government, and thus be separated from the nation, perhaps 
growing closer to other imperial powers in the region.7 This is particularly 
pertinent for the region under discussion in this study; the Mississippi Territory 
faced Spanish influences from both the east and throughout the territory itself, 
and there remained a considerable French population in Louisiana to the west.   
The scholarship on governance and political identity in the Northwest Territory 
highlights a set of discrete but connected issues that bear comparison with 
what would unfold in the Mississippi basin. Berkhofer’s focus on Jefferson 
also highlights questions of governance and republicanism which are of benefit 
to this study. “For governments to remain republican,” Berkhofer notes, 
“Jefferson and others believed the size of the state must be small enough to 
preserve the homogeneity of the interests, opinions, and habits of the 
citizens.”8 Thus, whilst the lower Mississippi Valley is not under consideration 
in Berkhofer’s study, it raises many relevant questions to be explored. 
However, when it comes to land acts, Berkhofer entirely ignores the Land 
Ordinance of 1785 within his study, an important act which detailed the 
creation of land offices and the sale of land in the frontier regions. Reginald 
Horsman has also focused upon individuals within the federal government and 
their role in the Ordinance, whilst attempting to highlight its continent-wide 
 
6 See R.F. Berkhofer, Jr. ‘Jefferson, the Ordinance of 1784, and the Origins of the American 
Territorial System’, William and Mary Quarterly, Vol, 29. No. 2 (April 1972) pp.231-262. 
Whilst Berkhofer does not discuss the Ordinance in reference to the lower Mississippi Valley, 
which further highlights the need for such a discussion, his conclusion on the relationship 
between the federal government and settlers in the west is useful for this study.  
7 Ibid, p.244. 
8 Ibid. 




implications.9 He further stresses the fact that Congress feared an inability to 
control the western reaches of its territories, culminating in a loss of allegiance 
to the United States. Yet at the heart of Horsman’s argument is the idea that the 
Northwest Ordinance was not sufficient in itself to govern the land to the west, 
nor would it have provided the power to defend those lands under the Articles 
of Confederation; the Northwest Ordinance highlighted the need for a new US 
Constitution in 1787. Ultimately, it would be the Ordinance which provided 
the framework for westward expansion, and the new constitution which 
provided the power and security for it to succeed.  
However it is also necessary to look beyond the immediate comparisons 
between the Northwest and Mississippi Territories and assess the Mississippi 
Territory in the broader context of American political development. As a 
whole, this thesis documents how the local government of the Territory grew 
from a small, restricted, limited body with no elected assembly into a much 
more self sufficient Territory, with a representative assembly and the ability to 
campaign heavily for statehood. Gary Gerstle has demonstrated how, despite 
the limitations placed upon the federal government at its inception, the states 
retained a great deal of power, arguing that they became “miniature 
Leviathans,” with broad and not clearly defined authority and power.10 In 
doing so, and by focusing on the powers of the state to police its citizens, he 
demonstrates a paradox at the heart of the US founding, with a federal 
government designed around liberal ideals, despite those values not existing at 
 
9 R. Horsman, ‘The Northwest Ordinance and the Shaping of an Expanding Republic’, The 
Wisconsin Magazine of History, Vol.73, No. 1 (Autumn, 1989) pp.21-32. 
10 G. Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the Founding 
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the state level. This is highly pertinent to the Territorial system, where it was at 
a local level that harsh restrictions were placed upon the populace. In 
Mississippi specifically, harsh law codes were put in place in the early period 
and power rested entirely in the hands of five appointed, not elected, officials. 
In Gerstle’s study, it is the US Constitution that enabled the federal 
government to use differing strategies to control the states – so to, was the case 
in the Territories, with the Ordinances providing the structure by which the 
government could limit the power of the Territory, and accept it as a state on 
the nation’s own terms. 
Brian Balogh has also focused on the issue of authority, though it focuses more 
on the central government than that of the state.11 He shows that, in the early 
republic, the concept of self-government was designed to empower American 
citizens to control and exploit those outside the American system, thus 
demonstrating why the Constitution protected those privileges. However, in 
order to show the importance of power sharing between the federal and the 
state, Balogh categorises the Territories as areas in which the federal 
government was the only body of authority and had a monopoly on power. 
This chapter contends that this was not entirely the case – while the federal 
government may have final word on how the Territory developed, it was 
certainly not the only form of power exhibited within the region. Thus, the fact 
that the studies mentioned above focus on the relationship between the state 
and the federal government, helps to demonstrate the need to look beyond that 
relationship and into how power was shared within the Territories. 
 
11 B. Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-
Century America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009) p.199. 




Both these works contribute to the wider field of American Political 
Development (APD). Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, founders of the 
Studies in American Political Development journal identify a process of 
“intercurrence” across US history, in which “relatively independent institutions 
moving in and out of alignment with one another” as being the drivers of 
change in the American political system.12 This certainly echoes the history of 
the Mississippi Territory, which saw the political of the Territory and the 
central government coalescing at times and moving apart at others. APD also 
offers numerous other lenses by which one can explore the Mississippi 
Territory’s political trajectory, focusing on the ways in which the rights of its 
inhabitants developed. Johann Neem’s analysis of Thomas Jefferson’s 
statecraft argues that Jefferson believed that American citizens should have 
opportunities to develop the capabilities necessary to enjoy the full use of their 
rights – he did not intend for the state to create citizenship and declare its 
people “free”, but for the state to provide opportunities for citizens to establish 
their freedom and enjoy the rights it granted.13 Neem’s assessment is 
particularly pertinent for this chapter, which sees Mississippi’s inhabitants 
working to align with Jefferson’s Republicans, in order to secure the rights to a 
legislative assembly.   
J.M. Opal’s work on the development of Andrew Jackson’s political thought 
also offers insight for this study. Opal recounts Jackson’s frustration with the 
limits of American citizenship in the Mississippi Territory, with particular 
 
12 K. Orren and S. Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) p.96. 
13 J.N. Neem, “Developing Freedom: Thomas Jefferson, the State, and Human Capability”, in 
Studies in American Political Development, Vol. 27, (April 2013), pp.36–50. 




reference to Jackson’s attempts to sell slaves within the Territory.14 While the 
focus of the article is upon how these limitations shaped Jackson, they provide 
an insight into how citizenship worked within the Territory – it was heavily 
confined by federal regulation – federal statutes and treaties with American 
nations mandated that, despite Jackson’s protestations, American citizens 
within the Territory could not simply travel wherever their business took them, 
and were constrained by treaties signed by a government far away. Returning 
to Jefferson’s impact on the Territory, Stephen Engel’s study of hostility 
towards the judiciary provides another lens through which to assess the activity 
displayed in this, and the subsequent, chapter. This chapter shows how the 
judiciary and governorship of the Territory went hand in hand, with both 
appointed by the central government. Engel demonstrates how Jeffersonian 
scepticism of the judiciary developed due to Federalist principles that limited 
the autonomy of the states – one can certainly see parallels in how the first 
judges of the Mississippi Territory behaved. Engel’s study demonstrates the 
issues found in the Mississippi Territory were not unique, and shows how the 
scepticism shown by the Territory’s inhabitants towards a Federally appointed 
judiciary and governorship was emblematic of sentiments developing across 
the republic.15 Mark Graber, too, focuses upon the Federalist tendencies of the 
judiciary, though demonstrates that judges were far more sensitive to political 
sentiment than Engel would suggest. This again, chimes with the ways in 
 
14 J.M. Opal, “General Jackson’s Passports: Natural Rights and Sovereign Citizens in the 
Political Thought of Andrew Jackson, 1780s–1820s” in Studies in American Political 
Development, Vol. 27, (April 2013), pp.69-85. 
15 S.M. Engel, “Before the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: Regime Unity, Loyal Opposition, 
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which judges operated in the Mississippi Territory, particularly in the tenure of 
the third governor, Robert Williams.16 
Taken as a whole, American Political Development helps to provide further 
context for the creation of the Mississippi Territory, and offers useful points of 
comparison in aspects of the formation of the Territory, even if the focus is 
often on the later nineteenth century and beyond.17 APD demonstrates that the 
institutions of American government, as Orren and Skowronek argue, are 
constantly shifting, moving together and apart, and creating friction on a 
regular basis. This is important context for the Mississippi Territory and for 
this thesis, which attempts to trace political relationships, both through 
personal networks and the institutions forged within them. Ultimately, it helps 
to demonstrate Mississippi’s place in the nineteenth century as an early 
example of many of the political debates that would take place in states, 
territories, and in the central government, across the period.  
***** 
Whilst much of the Ordinance, and the subsequent document entitled ‘An Act 
for the Government of the Mississippi Territory’ in 1800, concerns the tricky 
issue of settling land disputes in their respective regions, they also lay out a 
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detailed structure of government which was designed to ease the inhabitants of 
the Territory into the Union.18 Sections three to seven of the Ordinance outline 
how the Northwest Territory, and therefore the Mississippi Territory, would be 
governed. Central to the Ordinance are detailed stages of government which 
would allow the people of the Territory to be introduced to American 
democracy slowly, and not before they were ready in the eyes of the federal 
government. The territorial government would be led by a governor, appointed 
directly by the President for a period of three years unless dismissed early by 
Congress. The governor would be provided with a freehold estate of 1,000 
acres for the duration of his time in office and expected to reside within the 
district throughout his term of office.  The governor would be supported in his 
work by a secretary, appointed by Congress for a term of four years and 
granted a freehold of 500 acres, and three judges, ‘any two of whom to form a 
court, who shall have a common law jurisdiction… and their commissions 
shall continue in force during good behaviour.’ Thus, initially, the Mississippi 
Territory would have no say in its government, with power entirely in the 
hands of five appointed officials.19   
Although these officials would be required to reside within the territory, they 
were not required to be from the region in question. Whilst those appointed 
would likely have government experience in some form or another, initial 
appointees were therefore almost exclusively northerners, with little 
 
18 For the text of the Act outlining Mississippi’s structure, see C.E. Carter (ed.), The Territorial 
Papers of the United States, Volume V: The Territory of Mississippi, 1798-1817 (Washington: 
1937) pp.18-22. 
19 Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787; National Archives Microfilm Publication M332, roll 9; 
Miscellaneous Papers of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789; Records of the Continental and 
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knowledge of life in the southern United States. Furthermore, this system was 
designed with the presumption that the frontiersmen of the Northwest 
Territories and the Mississippi Territory were not fit to take part in their 
government, with the notion that the elite should rule and the rest should 
follow, as displayed by Mississippi’s first governor across this chapter. Of 
course, the power of these individuals had to be curtailed in some way, and this 
was achieved by restricting their legislative abilities: 
The governor and judges, or a majority of them, shall adopt and publish in 
the district such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as may be 
necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district, and report 
them to Congress from time to time: which laws shall be in force in the 
district until the organization of the General Assembly therein, unless 
disapproved of by Congress; but afterwards the Legislature shall have 
authority to alter them as they shall think fit. 
By declaring this, Congress dictated that the territorial judges and governor 
could not enact any original law; they were only permitted to adopt laws that 
were already in existence within one of the states of the Union. This would be 
overseen by Congress, who had to approve every appropriated law. However, 
full oversight would only be achieved if citizens of the territory reported any 
irregularities to Congress directly. This would prove difficult to maintain as, at 
least initially, inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory were not even granted 
the right to elect a delegate to attend Congress.20  
Thus, the original structure of territorial government was distinctly lacking in 
local representation, or even any form of elected representation. It was, 
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ultimately, a colonial form of government in anything other than name, albeit 
with a defined trajectory towards democracy. The Ordinance mandated that 
only once ‘five thousand free male inhabitants of full age’ inhabited the district 
would they receive the authority to elect a representative for their county or 
township to represent them in a general assembly. The Assembly would 
consist of one member for every 500 free white males, until there were twenty-
five representatives, at which point the number and proportion of 
representatives became regulated by the territorial legislature. Members of the 
general assembly would then put ten names forward to Congress, who would 
then select five of them to form a legislative council, acting as a second house 
in a territorial bicameral system.21  
Indeed, keeping track of the population of the territory was integral to the 
success of the territorial system. The Ordinance mandated that: 
whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants 
therein, such State shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of 
the United States, on an equal footing with the original States in all respects 
whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and State 
government: Provided, the constitution and government so to be formed, 
shall be republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in these 
articles; and, so far as it can be consistent with the general interest of the 
confederacy, such admission shall be allowed at an earlier period, and 
when there may be a less number of free inhabitants in the State than sixty 
thousand.22 
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In the case of the Northwest Territories, the federal government had a very clear 
idea of how the future states would look. There would be no fewer than three 
and no more than five, and the lines of division were clearly drawn.  
There was no such coherence when it came to the Mississippi Territory, 
however, and this offered opportunities for individuals to exploit the vacuums 
of organised power and authority within the grey areas of the Territory. Rather 
than creating a reliance upon Federal officials, as was the federal plan, it actually 
empowered local politicians to improvise or impose their own frameworks of 
government. Arguments over whether the Territory would remain as one when 
it achieved statehood or whether it should be divided persisted across the period, 
and much of this was down to a question of migration. This issue will be 
explored in much greater depth later in this chapter, though it highlights the 
lingering, overarching influence of the Northwest Ordinances, and the federal 
government, on the development of the Mississippi Territory. 
The Northwest Ordinance, then, was the basis of the act which governed the 
Mississippi Territory, shaping both its foundation and its future development. 
This chapter will now assess how the local government and influential citizens 
of the Mississippi Territory interacted with this governing doctrine and, in doing 
so, discuss how this affected the identity of the Territory. Did the governance of 
the Territory help to bring citizens into the Union and inspire a burgeoning of 
American national identity in line with the north-eastern states, as was the plan 
with the Territorial model, or did it cause the Territory to remain separated and 
divided, forging only regional ties? Whilst the political history of the Mississippi 
Territory has been discussed in existing literature, no work has tied the political 
narrative to the question of the territory’s identity and its place within the Union. 




At this point, it is worth returning to the historiography of the Mississippi 
Territory in comparison to that of the Northwest Ordinances, in order to 
understand how the existing scholarship has characterised the Mississippi 
Territory’s political inception. As mentioned in the introduction, Robert V. 
Haynes’ study refreshed scholarship of the Mississippi Territory, despite its 
antiquated origin.23 Whilst books published both before and after it do feature 
the Territory’s history, it has not been the focus of scholarship for many years. 
Prior to this, the most detailed study of the politics of the region was Arthur 
Preston Whitaker’s 1934 study, though the book only discusses the period up 
until 1803 and is concerned with the Federal Government and its relationship 
with the French and Spanish empires in the region, rather than the local political 
climate. While it remains a useful resource, it is somewhat antiquated and 
unsurprisingly top-down in its approach – the majority of the key characters at 
a local level are barely even mentioned.24 Indeed, the political history of 
Mississippi has fed into recent major economic studies, it has remained on the 
periphery.25Adam Rothman’s study of slavery’s expansion into the American 
west provides a greater insight into the development of the Mississippi Territory 
than any of the aforementioned studies, tying it in with the creation of the Deep 
South, and discussing the Territory’s increasing reliance on slavery. Slave 
Country is an important work in the history of the Deep South and its role in 
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establishing a slave economy in the United States, placing the region in the wider 
context of the politics and geography of the early republic in a way that Haynes 
does not. In addition, it does provide insight into the political culture of the 
Mississippi Territory, though this is from an economic perspective, rather than 
as a study of politics and identity in the area. Thus, no recent study has 
effectively assessed the development of political ideology and identity in the 
Territory, and this provides an opportunity to triangulate scholarship to better 
understand regional evolution on the borders of the Union.26 
Whereas there has been a lack of monograph-length studies into the topic in 
question, many articles were published in the mid-twentieth century in the 
Journal of Mississippi History which approached the politics of the region from 
many perspectives. Many misuse sources, come to incomplete conclusions or 
merely serve as a narrative or as a collection of sources, and ultimately, their 
assessments of political identity have been almost always localised and 
regionalised, and not connected to wider trends, in contrast to what this study 
offers. With regards to this chapter, articles by D. Clayton James and George B. 
Toulmin on the municipal government of territorial Natchez and the political 
views of Winthrop Sargent respectively are useful accounts, though such works 
are, almost without exception, local studies with limited purviews which do not 
offer any particularly meaningful conclusions.27 
 
26 Other books which have featured the political history of the Territory include P.J. Kastor, 
(ed.) The Louisiana Purchase: Emergence of an American Nation (Washington: CQ Press, 
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(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000). 
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Having outlined the structural framework of the federal Ordinances and the 
themes highlighted in Mississippi scholarship, the development of political 
identity will now be assessed through analysis of several key moments in the 
political history of the Territory. Covering the period from the formation of the 
Territory to the constitutional convention which established Mississippi’s 
statehood, it will be shown that local politicians, both senior and junior, engaged 
and aligned with the national political parties whilst also defending their local 
interests at all times, ultimately creating a far more complex political identity 
than has previously been acknowledged. 
***** 
The Mississippi Territory’s transition from Spanish to American ownership 
was borne out of confusion and miscommunication, and it had Andrew Ellicott 
at its heart. In 1795, the United States and Spain signed the Treaty of San 
Lorenzo, colloquially known as Pinckney’s Treaty, recognising the boundary 
between Spanish Florida and the United States as the line of the 31st parallel 
and ensuring a peaceful border between the two nations.28 The region in 
question, sandwiched between the Mississippi and the Chattahoochee rivers, 
had been contentious ever since the United States had claimed it in 1783, as it 
was also claimed by the Spanish following Britain’s evacuation of the area in 
1781.29 In signing the treaty, the Spanish ceded the affluent and bountiful 
Natchez District to the United States, a region in which merchants and planters 
 
28 ‘Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation Between Spain and The United States’, 
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of both American and Spanish descent were profiting off the vast swathes of 
high quality land.30 Indeed, as will be discussed in a later chapter of this 
project, the Treaty of San Lorenzo coincided with the arrival of Eli Whitney’s 
cotton gin in the region, which would transform the economy and the 
landscape forever.31 
In part because of this, although the treaty was signed by both parties in 1795, 
Spanish officials in the region almost instantly regretted their decision and 
delayed the transition of power. Sent to the region by the United States Senate 
as a US commissioner to negotiate the boundary line, Andrew Ellicott instantly 
proved to be a divisive figure who contributed to the delay in the treaty 
becoming reality.32 A man remembered as a troublemaker of great repute, 
notable for his short lived role as surveyor and designer of the city of 
Washington, Ellicott did not hold the Natchez District in particularly high 
regard, writing that the people of Natchez were: 
The most abandoned villains who have escaped from the chains and 
prisons of Spain and been convicted of the blackest crimes. Natchez, from 
the perverseness of some of the people, and the ebriety of the negroes and 
Indians on Sundays, has become an abominable place.33 
This was clearly not the hardy American yeomanry idealised in the westward 
projection of US republicanism. Ellicott’s view epitomised a particularly 
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Federalist approach to the lower Mississippi Valley, which held those on the 
frontier to be far less capable citizens than those residing on the eastern 
seaboard. Regardless of his views of the people, Ellicott clearly saw 
opportunity in the Natchez District. Instead of undertaking the task of 
surveying the 31st parallel as required, Ellicott took it upon himself to assert 
the authority of the United States over the region. Most prominent amongst his 
extra-curricular activities were his actions of 22nd February, 1797, when 
Ellicott led a small armed force to Bayou Pierre, (about 60 miles north of 
Natchez by Secretary Timothy Pickering’s estimations) and on to Natchez, in 
order to attempt to force the evacuation of the Natchez District’s fortifications 
by Spanish troops.34 Ellicott had been instructed by President John Adams to 
accept the evacuation of Natchez, but the bellicose nature of Ellicott’s 
operation allowed the strained relationship between the United States and the 
Spanish to deteriorate further.35 The gambit backfired and Ellicott failed to 
oust the Spanish Governor Manuel Gayoso de Lemos from Natchez, despite 
the somewhat unconvincing explanation that he was simply intending to 
commence the surveying of the boundary as outlined in the 1795 Treaty. 
 
34 ‘Report of the Secretary of State to the President of the United States, of the proceedings of 
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However, a more significant and enduring consequence of Ellicott’s arrival 
was that his assumed authority rubbed off on the inhabitants of the Natchez 
District. Elicott’s abuse and exaggeration of Federal authority and the power 
invested in him by the Federal Government can be seen as a harbinger of 
things to come across the Territorial era, with Federal representatives 
repeatedly exploiting the often vague instructions provided to them in order to 
sculpt their own authority within the Territory.  J.F.H. Claiborne, nephew of a 
future Mississippi Governor and the first genuine chronicler of the Mississippi 
Territory, noted that: 
Remote from the seat of government, with no mails, no political influence, 
no advisers, citizens alternatively of the British and Spanish governments, 
a completely isolated and helpless people, they took it for granted that a 
man who came with a military escort, with the flag of the United States, 
and who called the Spanish Governor to answer for every act he performed, 
must be a very great personage, invested with extraordinary powers…. And 
it began to be hinted that this very officious gentleman held in his pocket 
the commission of Governor.36 
Ellicott was undoubtedly a clever individual, and was able to 
disseminate the idea that he was a legal representative of the United 
States, despite his role being nothing of the sort. Thus, Ellicott’s role in 
the formative years of American ownership of Mississippi cannot be 
understated. Legally or not, Andrew Ellicott brought American 
democracy and government to Mississippi, and it was through Ellicott 
that the inhabitants of Natchez first experienced the United States, and 
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formulated their political opinions through this lens. As will be shown 
therefore, whether a citizen approved or disapproved of Andrew 
Ellicott’s actions significantly shaped their political views in the years 
to come. 
After Ellicott’s somewhat forceful attempts to drive the Spanish from Natchez, 
the struggle between the United States and the Spanish took on a more 
ideological turn, and as such, one can begin to see the growth of support for a 
pro-American faction within the Natchez District throughout 1797. 
Correspondence between Ellicott, the inhabitants of the Natchez District, and 
Secretary of State Timothy Pickering highlights the perceived increase in 
support for the American cause, with Ellicott writing that at least nine tenths of 
the inhabitants of the district were “warmly attached to the interests of the 
United States.”37 It was not long before, thanks to the intrigue of Ellicott, this 
increasingly divisive and ideologically driven debate turned violent, and in the 
spring and summer of 1797, there was increased violence and uproar on the 
streets of Natchez, until a committee of American sympathisers was formed 
and negotiated a peace with Gayoso.38 The terms of this agreement were 
submitted to the United States Congress both by the Committee of Inhabitants 
and by Governor Gayoso. Under the terms of the agreement, the citizens 
pledged to help control the populace of the District and adhere to Spanish 
Laws, in return for the acceptance by Gayoso that the District should be seen 
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as neutral, and that the local militia would not be summoned except in the 
event of Indian attack or a riot.39  
Whilst the agreement between Gayoso and the Committee of Inhabitants has 
been recognised in narratives of the Natchez District in this era, its wider 
significance has been somewhat underplayed.40 This is the first example of a 
section of the Natchez elite forming a committee for political purposes and 
such committees would play an important role in the early years of the 
Mississippi Territory’s existence within the United States. This set a precedent 
which allowed the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory to either directly 
engage with the governor or go beyond the existing structure and appeal 
directly to Congress. However, it is vital to note that this was not a 
representative body, reflecting the limitations of the Territorial model and 
demonstrating that the Mississippi Territory would remain in the hands of the 
few, not the many. Members of the committee were, in the first instance, 
elected by “the leading inhabitants of the District.”41 When the committee was 
formed in order to cease the unrest across the District in 1797 through 
negotiation, the group did not necessarily need to be elected. However, having 
proven the concept of a committee to be an effective method of controlling the 
populace, efforts would be made to replicate this in later years. Thus, this 
incident should be seen to have been an important moment in the political 
history of the Mississippi Territory, in that it created the opportunity for 
 
39 Memorial to Congress by Permanent Committee of the Natchez District, 23/10/1797, in C.E. 
Carter, Territorial Papers of the United States, Volume 5 (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1937) pp.9-16. 
40 The formation of the committee of inhabitants was far from straightforward and has often 
been misunderstood by historians. Ethan Grant, for example, has conflated this committee with 
one composed of the enemies of Andrew Ellicott who could be known as the Committee of 
Safety. Grant, ‘Anthony Hutchins: A Pioneer of the Old Southwest’, p.417. 
41 Haynes, Mississippi Territory, p.17. 




influential figures in the Mississippi Territory to shape their own destiny by 
being an effective political force in contrast to the model of external imposition 
dictated by the Ordinances. 
The committee formed to end the violence of the spring was a unified body 
comprised of both Ellicott and his supporters and those who were suspicious of 
his motives. However, by the late summer of 1797, the situation in the District 
was moving towards an inevitable conclusion, after Gayoso was promoted to 
the position of Governor of Louisiana in June, effectively removing him from 
the equation in Natchez and highlighting the beginning of the end for the 
Spanish occupation of the region.42 The result of this was political infighting 
amongst the Natchez elite, and the committee which had signed the agreement 
with Governor Gayoso split into two warring factions.43  As Haynes assesses, 
the split began over three major issues: “cumbersome debts, conflicting land 
claims and identification of officials to administer the new regime.”44 This 
divide between the inhabitants of the Natchez District would shape the 
political history of the entire territorial era.  On one side stood Andrew Ellicott 
and his supporters, the other could be identified as supporters of Thomas 
Green and his family, represented by his son-in-law Cato West, and the 
“temperamental and volatile” Anthony Hutchins, the figurehead of the 
faction.45 This divide has generally been understood as being between wealthy 
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merchants, on the side of Andrew Ellicott, and planters on the other, though as 
this chapter will explore, there are more complex relationships in effect.46 
The ‘Permanent Committee of the Natchez District’ wrote to Congress in 
October 1797 informing them of the agreement made that summer between the 
committee and Governor Gayoso, and claiming to be the “the legal 
representatives of the inhabitants of the District of Natchez and the guardians 
of that neutrality”.47 However, the signatories of this committee were not those 
who originally met with Gayoso. Whilst the original committee was formed of 
Anthony Hutchins, Bernard Lintot, Isaac Gaillard, William Ratliff, Cato West, 
Joseph Barnard and Gabriel Benoist, neither Hutchins nor West were 
signatories on the letter of the Permanent Committee to Congress. They were 
instead replaced by, among others, Peter Bryan Bruin, a controversial, pro-
Ellicott Federalist who would later have Articles of Impeachment brought 
against him while serving as a territorial judge.48 Having been excluded from 
the Permanent Committee, Haynes notes that, “Hutchins secured permission 
from Acting Governor Minor to hold a special election,” which would take 
place on the 2nd September and create a “Committee of Safety” and an agent to 
treat with Congress.49 What Haynes does not touch on is the more nuanced 
reason for Minor’s agreement. Stephen Minor, the Secretary of the Natchez 
District under Governor Gayoso and his replacement as governor, was the 
region’s largest plantation owner, largely responsible for the thirty-three-fold 
 
46 D.J. Mitchell, A New History of Mississippi, (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 
2014), Chapter 3. 
47 Memorial to Congress by Permanent Committee of the Natchez District, 23/10/1791, in 
Carter, Territorial Papers, Vol. 5, pp.9-11.; 
48 ‘Mr. Poindexter’s Motion for an Impeachment of Judge Bruin of the Mississippi Territory’, 
in Early American Imprints, Series 2, no. 16521 (Washington: A & G Way Printers, 1808) 
49 Haynes, Mississippi Territory, p.18. 




increased production in cotton in the district since 1793, and Anthony Hutchins 
was the first planter in the region to attempt to grow cotton in the area.50 The 
link between the two is evident, and highlights that the election of a Committee 
of Safety was not made in order to demonstrate the inhabitants’ fondness of the 
democratic process, but for self-interested planters who wished to protect their 
interests. Despite Ellicott’s attempts to disrupt the election, it went ahead and 
an eight person committee was created, headed up by Thomas Green’s son 
Abner, and Cato West. It appointed Hutchins as an envoy to Congress, calling 
for the extension of popular government to the entire Natchez District.51 It is 
worth noting that this incident, and the creation of the two rival committees 
which both attempted to dominate Natchez politics, is significant in the history 
of the Territory as a whole. As will become evident throughout this chapter, 
the establishing of political committees would remain an important form of 
political opposition throughout the territory’s existence. It became a way of 
subverting the norms and frameworks of the American republic, particularly 
when it came to the restrictive and prohibitive Northwest Ordinance, which 
would inhibit the inhabitant’s right to elected government.  
Ultimately, the significance of these two factions comes down to their stance 
over how the Mississippi Territory ought to be governed once it became a 
territory of the United States. Both the Permanent Committee and the 
Committee of Safety attempted to highlight their influence and authority to 
Congress, with the Committee of Safety representing themselves as the only 
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democratically elected body.52 In contrast, Ellicott, in a letter to Timothy 
Pickering, highlighted his allies, as “the most respectable inhabitants” of the 
district and directly attempted to undermine his opponents by stressing that the 
Natchez District was not fit for popular government. In an attempt to discredit 
his opponents, he wrote: 
This, like all other new countries, is settled by people of the three following 
discriptions [sic], Viz. persons of ambition, and enterprise, who have 
contemplated an encrease [sic] of fame, and wealth, others who have fled 
from their creditors, and some, (not a few), from justice… If such a 
settlement, where a large proportion of the inhabitants are deeply involved 
in debt, should have the sovereign power of legislating for themselves… 
the creditors would certainly be much injured, if not ruined, gentlemen of 
wealth, probity, and information neglected, if not persecuted, and to 
complete the misfortune, public confidence annihilated.53 
Ellicott’s message was entirely unambiguous, and his prejudices were clear. 
Allowing the inhabitants of the Natchez District to elect their own government 
would be a disaster, he argued, both for the United States and for the 
merchants and creditors who helped to support the economy. Indeed, a 
government structure akin to the Northwest Ordinance would protect both their 
interests and his own, as a Federalist appointed by John Adams, whilst 
compromising the interests of the planter faction who wished for greater 
devolved power and engagement with the political system.  
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Ellicott saw the establishment of the American territorial government as an 
opportunity to entirely discredit his opponents. Perceiving Anthony Hutchins 
to be the greatest threat, he went on the offensive. Prior to the writing of the 
letter to Pickering, in the aforementioned election of the Committee of Safety, 
Ellicott had been selected to be a commissioner to ensure the legality of the 
election, yet had entirely refused to engage with the intention of putting a halt 
to the election.54 Furthermore, he blasted Hutchins, labelling him as the leader 
of “the party of British interest” and “the most inveterate anti-American in the 
District.” 55 Returning to his letter to Pickering, Ellicott opened up his 
accusations to the Natchez planters as a whole, essentially detailing the cause 
of the division – the issue of land and debt: 
If such a settlement, where a large proportion of the inhabitants are deeply 
involved in debt, should have the sovereign power of legislating for 
themselves – In such a case, the creditors would certainly be much injured, 
if not ruined, gentlemen of wealth, probity, and information neglected, if 
not persecuted, and to complete the misfortune, public confidence 
annihilated. 56 
The implication was clear and forthright; to hand the right of representative 
local government to the planters would result in significant loss of stature for 
capable, intelligent and honest men. At any rate, he argued, it would be 
unconstitutional to allow a local government to meddle in merchants’ account 
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books, and it would be impossible to form a competent government of 
characters such as Hutchins.57 
Furthermore, the issue of slavery is prevalent in Ellicott’s argument.58 
Government according to the regulations of the Northwest Ordinance would 
have prohibited slavery in the region. Whilst this would have been agreeable to 
Ellicott, as he notes, it would not have been acceptable to either the planters or 
the merchants of the Natchez District, where the entire economy was based on 
slavery, especially once cotton supplanted all other crops. Especially 
significant, in terms of this study, is how Ellicott described the institution: 
“Slavery though disagreeable to us northern people.” The implication being 
that slavery was disagreeable to respectable characters, thus further reducing 
the character of those in Natchez. Indeed, this must be seen as hugely 
significant for the relationship between Federalist officials and planters in the 
Mississippi Territory, for later non-southern figures shared in the assessment 
and had to adjust to it in a way that was needless for politicians and federal 
agents in the northern territories, where social and economic landscapes 
differed. The distrust and disapproval of northern politicians towards southern 
society and their plantation system helped to create significant friction between 
the two groups. This was most evident in the transitional years, particularly 
between 1798 and 1803, and Ellicott’s persistent involvement and influence 
within the Federalist party was integral to this. 
As the foregoing suggests, even before the region became part of the United 
States, the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory were fractured into two 
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factions. Although little discussed in existing literature, these proto-factions 
mirrored the divisive national party-political climate in 1797. In Mississippi, as 
highlighted by Andrew Ellicott, the merchant faction was inclined to limit the 
extent of democracy in the region and leave power in the hands of the few, 
ideally with key officials shipped in from the North. This corresponded exactly 
with the beliefs of the Mississippi Territory’s first American governor, 
Winthrop Sargent. In contrast, one can also see the connection between the 
views of the Green/West/Hutchins faction and the rising Democratic-
Republican party on the national level. They represented a planter class which 
saw great opportunity in the Mississippi region, and desired protection from 
speculators and land companies who hoped to profit off the ‘empty’ land of the 
Mississippi region. As was discussed early in this chapter, this faction partly 
grew out of distrust of Ellicott himself. They appreciated what Governor 
Gayoso had done for them, in granting planters concessions and stability, and 
were less inclined to dismiss his friendship than those who went along with 
Ellicott. As Claiborne notes, Anthony Hutchins, the leader of this faction, 
believed Ellicott to have been a “mischief maker, hostile to the interests of the 
District, and of misrepresenting the views of the government.”, whilst others 
believed he represented the “sentiments and wishes of the American 
Government.” 59 From this, one can clearly see that the Territory was 
transitioning closer to the American government before 1798, and was already 
dividing into political camps, largely due to the rifts established by Ellicott.  
This latter point is particularly prescient in light of the infamous Yazoo land 
scandal. Whilst the scandal will be focussed upon in greater detail in a later 
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chapter of this study, it is important to note the impact it had in the very early 
years of this period. Planters, such as Hutchins and West, had a great deal to 
lose from the controversial deal, which saw the state government of Georgia 
sell land in what would become the Mississippi Territory to four private land 
companies. Whilst the issue of land speculators was always on the horizon for 
planters in the Mississippi Territory, concern must have grown exponentially 
when General George Mathews arrived in Natchez. Mathews, a notable land 
speculator, had made his name as Governor of Georgia and it was he who 
signed the notorious Yazoo Land Sales into law.60 Although it is not clear how 
much knowledge he had of the Yazoo Grants’ illegality, Mathews was clearly 
complicit in the controversy. Evans, writing in the 1920s, speculated that 
Mathews was not guilty of anything other than “a culpable weakness”, 
however it should be noted that, as an agent of a land company, his role was 
likely greater than simply as a signatory.61 Whilst it is not immediately clear 
when he arrived, he had established himself in Natchez long enough that, by 
April 1798, letters addressed to him by the Secretary of State were making 
their way to Natchez. Such letters reveal his intention – to become the first US 
Governor of the Mississippi Territory. In one such letter, Secretary Pickering 
made this explicit, writing, “I do not know who he [President Adams] will 
name, but I know you have friends to recommend you, and it will give me 
pleasure to see you at the head of the government.”62 Such news would have 
cast fear into the hearts of the planters of Natchez. Not only was Andrew 
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Ellicott clearly influencing the direction of the future Mississippi Territory, but 
a land speculator known to be an agent of the New England Company 
appeared on the verge of being the first territorial governor.63  
Yet the Yazoo Scandal left a long shadow, and Mathews would never achieve 
his ambitions. Although Mathews was initially nominated to the position by 
John Adams, the name was withdrawn before it could be voted on in the 
Senate. Pickering sent a conciliatory letter to Mathews noting, “strong 
objections being made… and a negative likely to take place in the Senate – to 
avoid so unpleasant an event, the President preferred withdrawing your 
names.” Pickering continued, “the capital objection to you… was that you 
were deeply interested in the claims of the company holding under the Georgia 
sales of the lands Comprehended in the new government.”64 After this, 
Mathews would never hold office again, and would remain out of the public 
eye for the foreseeable future. To some extent then, this was a short term 
victory for the Hutchins-Green faction, in that the Senate recognised the 
conflict of interest that would have been created, and thus forced the President 
to appoint a more impartial candidate. The Yazoo Grants would have a 
dramatic impact upon issues surrounding land speculation for years to come, 
but in denying a notorious land speculator the governorship, planters’ interests 
were somewhat protected. This reprieve would allow planters to slowly 
assume control of the Mississippi Territory’s government, particularly due to 
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their engagement with Winthrop Sargent, the man who rose to the position in 
Mathews’ stead. 
To this point, it has been shown that the factionalism which would shape the 
political history of the Mississippi Territory was present before the United 
States even took over the government of the region. The key figure in this 
entire process was the meddling Andrew Ellicott, around whom the two parties 
formed. Ellicott and his allies painted their enemies as sympathisers with both 
the British and the Spanish who threatened to undermine the entire political 
process, whereas Hutchins, Cato West and their company believed themselves 
to be the only group fighting for democracy and the right to representative 
government, something they believed to be enshrined within the fabric of the 
new republic. Having seen off the threat of an administration led by George 
Mathews, the Committee of Safety was somewhat optimistic about the 
opportunities that status as an American territory would provide the 
Mississippi Territory. However, as will now be shown, their fight for fair and 
equal representation would not be solved in 1798. 
***** 
For all the factionalism and debate taking place within the Natchez District 
prior to 1798, the United States operated within a distinctly Federalist moment. 
It was a Federalist government who enacted the creation of the Mississippi 
Territory, set out its governing laws in line with the Northwest Ordinance and 
appointed its officers. Thus, a Federalist was appointed as its first governor, 
and Andrew Ellicott, as the only experienced and trusted government agent in 
the area, was asked to “encourage unanimity and a suitable Spirit among the 




inhabitants at the Natchez [sic].”65 He would be, in theory, the link between the 
people of Natchez, the new governor and the Federal Government as a whole. 
The concept of a “suitable Spirit” here is also important in assessing the ways 
in which the Territory was viewed by the Federal Government – the 
inhabitants had to be cultivated and groomed in order to belong in the Union. 
In practice, Ellicott spent his time professing to know the ins-and-outs of the 
region, and undoubtedly soured attitudes of the Federalists towards the 
inhabitants even further. The appointment of the Governor was not a 
straightforward process. The requirements of the role were diverse; it required 
“a man of energy, of application to business, and a military [this was 
underlined] character.”66 The first choice, General George Mathews, was an 
obvious fit. He had experience as a governor, and as a military commander, 
though his private enterprises made him ineligible in the eyes of the Senate.  
The man who was shipped into the role as the inaugural Governor of the 
Mississippi Territory, and given the responsibility of establishing the American 
government there, was Colonel Winthrop Sargent. A firm Massachusetts 
Federalist with a puritan upbringing, he had studied at Harvard College and 
served in the Revolutionary War before becoming a surveyor and politician.67 
His primary experience for the role came as secretary of the Northwest 
Territory, thus making him one of the most knowledgeable politicians in the 
nation when it came to enforcing the Northwest Ordinances. Indeed, as the 
second-in-command to Governor Arthur St. Clair, he often served as acting-
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governor during his leader’s regular trips away from the region, providing him 
with a great deal of experience as the leading official in a United States 
Territory.68 Not only did this background provide him with the experience 
necessary to perform the role, but it also shaped his beliefs and perceptions. In 
order to assess the implications of his appointment for the Mississippi 
Territory, but also to understand the unprecedented events of his tenure, it is 
important to study his political and personal views. 
However, this is not necessarily a straightforward process. As Benjamin 
Pershing noted, although Sargent occasionally made contributions to journals, 
he never documented his political ideas in one place.69 As such, formulating 
his political positions requires study of his correspondence and personal papers 
throughout his political career. Indeed, one can utilise Sargent’s past career to 
inform us of his views while in the Mississippi Territory, due to the fact that he 
was unwavering in his views; this was potentially a significant problem 
considering the undeniable differences between the Northwest and Mississippi 
Territories. As Toulmin asserts, Sargent’s “puritanical background never left 
him despite his long residence on the outskirts of the infant republic.” Sargent 
was obstinate in his refusal to accept that a democratic spirit and a desire for 
engagement with the democratic system could blossom on the frontier, 
regardless of whether it was the Northwest or Mississippi Territory.70 Indeed, 
as will be shown throughout the rest of this chapter, Sargent demonstrated a 
distrust and disapproval of individuals in the Mississippi Territory, and worked 
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to limit the powers of representative government for as long as possible. In this 
sense, Sargent was as staunch a Federalist as could be found, and this 
mentality would undoubtedly clash strongly with the inhabitants of Natchez, 
who were increasingly politically aware and seeking elected government.  
Sargent’s vocal declarations of his disregard of the frontiersmen of the 
Northwest Territory simultaneously highlight his belief in the merits of the 
Northwest Ordinance. On more than one occasion, he proffered these opinions 
to his colleagues. In 1790, he wrote: “The Power of making laws…,’ even 
under the most particular Restrictions, can not in my Opinion with Propriety be 
at present delegated by us either to a Set of Men of our own choosing or, that 
may be publicly elected in Town Meetings… Great commercial Towns or 
Cities may some times I think be indulged with certain known and fixed 
Privileges in this Way, but they should always be expressly defined, in extent 
and Limitation.”71 Sargent clearly believed that the inhabitants in the 
Northwest Territory were not capable of forming a government, even if they 
were handpicked by the Governor, let alone elected by their peers. 
Furthermore, his support of the Ordinance extended beyond the issue of 
elected and representative government. Writing to St Clair in 1793, he 
highlighted his belief that the “blessing of Trial by Juries… is perverted to a 
Curse” in Hamilton County. With regards to the inhabitants themselves, he 
wrote that, “licentiousness is their Characteristic and the magistrate who shall 
dare enforce the laws which are adopted will of course become the Object of 
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their highest Displeasure.”72 Clearly, his lack of faith in inhabitants of the 
frontier extended to the basic right of trial by peers, another right enshrined in 
the US Constitution which did not extend to the territories.  
The Northwest Ordinance was designed to allow for progression. Its stages 
were designed to allow inhabitants to earn the right to elected and 
representative government, and to be involved in the legislative and judicial 
process. However, Sargent, as has already been implied, was unwavering in his 
doubts. Writing three years after he denied the peoples’ right to ‘The Power of 
making laws’, he declared that “the people of Wayne and the three Western 
Counties may be taken by the hand Sir and led to be every thing the United 
States would wish them.”73Again, he stressed that the people of the Northwest 
Territory had to be sculpted into US citizens and were not ready to engage with 
the republic. There was certainly a positive tone to Sargent’s message, but he 
was determined that the people would still require cultivating – he perceived 
his role to be handholding and guiding the people to become citizens, refusing 
to accept that they could do so under their own power. This is particularly 
important to note with the Mississippi Territory in mind. As we have already 
seen, even before Sargent became governor in 1798, there was a clamour for 
democracy and equal and fair representation. The Northwest Ordinance was 
accepted by the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory in part because it 
allowed progression; so long as the Territory kept growing, inhabitants would 
gain greater rights and eventually be accepted into the Union with statehood. 
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Sargent, it appears, pushed back against this progression and seemed to believe 
that frontier territories were not ready for full access to the Constitution, 
ultimately implying that Sargent was, in this sense, not overly supportive of the 
model employed by the Ordinances – he was reluctant to encourage the 
development of the Territories that the framework laid out.  
Furthermore, one particularly controversial stance perpetuates much of 
Sargent’s writings. He was quick to criticize and castigate anyone who 
opposed him, whether they be inhabitants seeking extra powers, or fellow 
federal politicians he clashed with. In 1799, as Governor of the Mississippi 
Territory, he wrote that the assertion that citizens should elect their own militia 
commanders and officers was only a belief held by “some wicked and 
designing men.”74 In 1798, after arriving in Mississippi, he referred to his 
opponents in Natchez as “discontents” and “unprincipled Scoundrels.”75 
Earlier, in 1795, he attacked those he disapproved of, warning that the power 
to legislate should be kept out of the “Hands of designing or ignorant Men.”76 
In 1800, he referred to a Congressman, Thomas Davis of Kentucky, as 
“abusive and full of falsehood” when he was accused of poor governorship.77 It 
is a mantra repeated throughout his writing, and it is particularly significant. 
Not only did Sargent hold views that directly opposed those of many 
frontiersmen, but he was unwilling to listen or negotiate. This self-righteous 
conviction resulted in trouble in the territories, where citizens felt restricted 
and repressed, but it also spelt trouble for the wider political sphere.  
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Sargent never attempted to convert his opponents to his way of thinking; he 
simply believed that he was right and that they should fall into line, reflecting 
the Calvinist roots of his political thought. Yet what is even more striking is 
that Sargent was apparently unaffected by the unpopularity caused by his 
oppressive views on representative democracy on the frontier. Two years into 
his tenure as the Mississippi Territory’s governor, he wrote to John Marshall, 
stating that he accepted, “that I am not “over anxious of popularity” according 
to my acceptation of the Expression- no man however more ardently desires 
the approbation of the Wise and the Good more than myself, but I shall never 
be so far Degraded, as to become the Machine of the Multitude.”78 George 
Toulmin has noted that highlights a key problem with Sargent’s governorship, 
and how his attitude ran contrary to the “democratic spirit” prevalent in the 
Mississippi Territory, however it also be taken as representing a key failing of 
the Federalist Party doctrine as a whole.79  
Ultimately, what is clear is that Winthrop Sargent was, in terms of his political 
experience and views, a strong candidate for the role of Mississippi’s 
Territorial Governor as far as President John Adams would have been 
concerned. He had exhibited competent leadership in the Northwest Territory 
and represented the views of the Federalist Party as a whole. However, certain 
mitigating factors must be taken into account. It is important to note the 
differences between the Mississippi Territory and the Northwest Territory, 
both in terms of geography and politics. Whilst the Mississippi Territory, had it 
become a state without divisions, would have been the second largest state 
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behind Virginia (before Virginia itself was divided during the US Civil War), 
the Northwest Territory was vast beyond compare; in modern day terms, it 
spanned the area of five modern states.80 Yet, the size of the territory was not 
the only differing factor between the Northwest and Mississippi Territories. 
Whilst, as has been repeated, the overarching political systems were the same, 
the regions were made up of different people, with different economic 
interests, as well as different native American nations and different European 
imperial interests threatening the autonomy of the United States.  
The contrast between the people of the two territories and their economy are 
inextricably linked. In the Northwest Territory, slavery was banned, whereas 
the Mississippi Territory was wholly dependent upon it. In part due to the 
aforementioned difference in scale, the population dispersion was extremely 
different. In the Mississippi Territory, the population was heavily centred upon 
Natchez and the surrounding area, resulting in the Natchez District becoming 
the cultural, economic and political centre of the region. Indeed, there were 
only two formally organised counties in the Mississippi Territory upon its 
inception – Adams and Pickering Counties.81 In contrast, there were thirteen 
incorporated counties in the Northwest Counties, established in the 
governorship of Arthur St. Clair, many with significant towns as their county 
seats.82 As such, the population was far more dispersed than in the Natchez 
District. Indeed, the territories also attracted different immigrants to them. 
Frank Owsley’s classic thesis on the Old Southwest showed that there was a 
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trend in the destinations of migrants from the eastern seaboard in the early 
American republic.83 According to Owsley, broadly speaking, migrants 
travelled in columns across the country. Thus, those migrating to the 
Northwest Territory would largely have travelled from the north-eastern states, 
whereas those travelling to the Mississippi Territory would have departed from 
the southern states, such as Georgia and the Carolinas. Whilst this will be 
explored in greater depth in later chapters on migration and settlement, it is 
important to note that this did not only create differences in terms of the 
ideology and identity of new settlers in the territories, but it also impacted 
upon the economy of the regions. 
Winthrop Sargent was never going to be comfortable in the Mississippi 
Territory. What is more, Sargent never wanted this role, as Timothy Pickering 
well knew. In a letter informing Sargent of his appointment, he wrote: “This 
appointment, I doubt not, will derange your plans for your future passing of 
life: but it may only be a temporary interruption.”84 Sargent did not see the 
Mississippi Territory in his plans; he wanted the governorship of the 
Northwest Territory to himself. He did not waste any time in documenting his 
disapproval for the new office. Before even having left the Northwest 
Territory, he acknowledged that the new venture was a unknown quantity to 
him, writing: 
From the best intelligence I have been able to procure there prevails in the 
country of our destination, a refractory and turbulent spirit, with parties 
headed by men of perverseness and cunning They have run wild in the 
 
83 F.L. Owsley, Plain Folk of the Old South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
Updated Edition, 2008) p.31. 
84 The Secretary of State to Winthrop Sargent, 04/05/1798, in Carter, Territorial Papers V, 
p.27. 




recess of government, and every moment’s delay in the adoption of rules 
and regulations after the ordinance shall be promulgated most be 
productive of growing evils and discontents.85 
Sargent’s prejudices, therefore, were shining through before he even arrived in 
the Mississippi Territory. He was ready to arrive with a firm hand and to bring 
order to the wild frontier. Yet, as has been shown, the Natchez District was 
actually relatively developed, and was able to productively engage with the 
former Governor Gayoso. In this sense, therefore, despite him being the model 
of a Federalist of the frontier, Sargent was a poor fit for the Mississippi 
Territory. Indeed, according to J.F.H. Claiborne, his contemporaries knew so, 
stating that his appointment was questioned by many who knew of both his 
nature and that of the territory: the “opposition to the nomination was not 
sectional… put [sic] personal, based on his utter incompatibility in tone, 
temper, sentiments and manners with the people he was sent to.”86 As such, 
trouble was somewhat inevitable throughout Sargent’s tenure. It has been 
shown that there was a rise in political consciousness in the build up to the 
establishment of the Mississippi Territory. Whilst it is true that the act 
governing the Territory didn’t provide its inhabitants with much autonomy, or 
indeed any way of engaging with the government in its first incarnation, 
Sargent’s appointment was as much as a check on democracy as the act itself. 
Thus, studying the early American Territories offers an opportunity to study 
the limitations of the Federalist Party model on the frontier. Despite essentially 
holding every single position of power among the Party and its allies in the 
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Mississippi Territory upon its inception in 1798, the Federalist Party failed to 
assert authority within the Mississippi Territory and failed to garner any 
respect for their centralised forms of government. In appealing to, and 
attempting to foster, a sense of national mission or national identity, 
Federalists exposed themselves as being incapable of accepting the unique 
characteristics of the individuals Territories, and were unable to adapt their 
policies and their views to the circumstances faced by individuals there. The 
resistance they faced on the frontier must be viewed as being integral to their 
ultimate decline within the United States – as the nation grew, the Federalist 
Party was unable to win favour and new supporters, ultimately limiting their 
support to the North East and dooming their electoral prospects further afield. 
***** 
If Sargent already questioned his appointment before his tenure began, the 
circumstances he faced upon his arrival can only have made things worse. He 
arrived in the Mississippi Territory after a long journey down the river from 
Cincinnati suffering from illness, and without the requisite judges required to 
govern. In a different letter to Sargent, Pickering acknowledged that he would 
be without the full trappings of government as set out in the act establishing 
the Mississippi Territory; only two judges were appointed, neither of whom 
had any formal legal expertise. Furthermore, one of the judges was Peter Bryan 
Bruin, a chief supporter of Andrew Ellicott, and a significant target of the ire 
of Anthony Hutchins and the Committee of Safety.87 This was a debilitating 
blow to Sargent, and he bemoaned his fortune to Pickering: 
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My present State of health which for a considerable Time past has been 
extreme [sic] bad causes me some uneasy Apprehensions however for the 
immediate full Discharge of my Duties- and for the Absence of the Judges 
and Secretary I have much Regret-… ‘twill therefore I apprehend be 
unfortunate for our Government should the Executive be constrained to 
visit the Mississippi Territory without the Judges- The people have been 
long anticapating [sic] that which is not in the Governours [sic] power to 
bestow.88 
The desire in question was, in all likelihood, quite simply a government. The 
Mississippi Territory had been lacking in an effective form of government 
since Gayoso had departed the region, and the delay in appointing Sargent 
(after George Mathews was rejected), as well as his illness and infamous 
stubbornness, did nothing to speed up the process. The lack of a judiciary put a 
halt to Sargent’s plans altogether, making a difficult job even harder. 
Over the course of Sargent’s years in office, the relationship between his 
administration and the people of the Natchez District and the wider Mississippi 
Territory deteriorated to such a point that his position became untenable. 
Sargent’s failure to adjust his views and his processes in order to remedy the 
grievances of the local populace ultimately led to the confrontational political 
identity of the Mississippi Territory that is at the heart of this project. Winthrop 
Sargent, however, completely failed to see this political growth. If Sargent had 
a damaging preconception of the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory before 
his arrival, his opinions only got worse over the months following his arrival in 
Natchez. “They have such Variety of Interests, and Opinions,” he wrote to 
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Senator James Ross of Pennsylvania, “that I almost despair of reconciling them 
to each other, or Concentrating all their good Will to our Government.” His 
wording here is particularly interesting: Sargent suggests the failure of the 
entire Territorial process here, arguing that the fundamental objective of the 
system – the reconciliation of the people and the Federal Government - was 
impossible. He continued: “amongst them some most unprincipled Scoundrels. 
– The worst Construction is insidiously given by them to every act of the 
General Government, and my Character and Conduct not unfrequently most 
grossly Misrepresented…”89 Sargent actively engaged in the process of 
painting a picture of anarchy to the federal government. He frequently 
attempted to sour the government against the people of the Mississippi 
Territory, perhaps in an attempt to restrict their democratic rights and hold 
onto the position he held as one of the very few legislative officials in the 
region. Of course, Sargent may also have been painting such an unpleasant 
picture of his situation in order to make any of his achievements seem more 
impressive, though this seems somewhat unlikely considering his inability to 
make any progress whatsoever. However, it is important to consider the 
relationship between governor and citizens from the other perspective. In terms 
of understanding the Mississippi Territory’s ideological development and the 
growth of its political culture, it is necessary to consider the Sargent 
administration from the aspect of the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory – 
if not a truly bottom-up viewpoint, at least the perspective of the Natchez elite, 
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who would help to shape the political climate of the Mississippi Territory for 
the duration of the period. 
The important actors in Sargent’s administration remained the inhabitants of 
the Natchez District that had been factionalised during the waning years of the 
Spanish occupation of Natchez. However, although Anthony Hutchins, 
Thomas Abner Green and Cato West remained influential among planters and 
Peter Bryan Bruin had risen to a position of authority on the other side, 
Andrew Ellicott was withdrawing from his politicized role. In May 1798, 
Ellicott had finally departed Natchez to commence his duties as a surveyor of 
the boundary line between Spain and the United States, a role of even greater 
significance since the US had finally began to assume control of Natchez.90 
Yet his influence persisted. Claiborne notes that one of Sargent’s first actions 
as Governor, two weeks after he arrived at Natchez, was to visit Ellicott’s 
camp on the boundary, in order to ascertain “his opinion of the leading people 
of the district, and his advice in regard to appointments.”91 This was, perhaps, 
unsurprising. Sargent clearly did not trust any advice he would receive from 
those inside Natchez, so it made sense to approach a fellow educated, northern 
Federalist for advice. Yet, this was a grave mistake for Sargent; Ellicott was a 
partisan trouble maker, who had been actively opposed by a large portion of 
the District. What is more, Sargent’s prior actions had made such a meeting 
even less acceptable to the people; only a week earlier, he had informed them 
that he intended to delay making any appointments until he had had the 
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opportunity to get to know the inhabitants better.92 Claiborne suggests that the 
result of this was that the Mississippi Territory’s inhabitants were “thoroughly 
united” against Sargent’s administration, though this goes too far.93 The 
Hutchins-Green-West faction became firmly opposed to Sargent’s 
administration through association with Ellicott, whereas Ellicott’s allies must 
have been content. What is more, Ellicott’s supporters, such as Bruin, would 
soon be in positions of power and influence. Thus, Natchez’s inhabitants were 
not united, but instead were even more divided than ever, as Sargent observed.  
Ellicott’s influence upon Sargent was almost immediate, right down to the 
language he used, repeating Ellicott’s own phrases, such as describing 
inhabitants as “the most abandoned villains” to the Secretary of State on more 
than one occasion.94 Despite this, Sargent’s first appointments were somewhat 
conciliatory, with the appointment of Cato West as a militia commander in the 
Natchez District, along with other members of his faction in lower positions, 
suggesting that he intended to use West and his influence to control the 
population.95 However, many of these individuals refused their commissions 
immediately, and West resigned his commission in 1799.96 This refusal to 
engage with Sargent’s government, despite the invitation, is integral to this 
study. It enabled Sargent to perpetuate the idea that his opponents were not 
mature enough, nor capable enough, to engage with the American government, 
and therefore any potential development of representative government ought to 
be denied to them. However, the rejection of the opportunity to engage with 
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Sargent’s government was actually a response to his own actions. There is 
little evidence that Sargent would have welcomed representative government 
once any targets were met – social reform and increased migration do not 
appear to have been at the forefront of his mind.  
Despite the fact that the Northwest Ordinance and the subsequent Act for the 
establishment of the Mississippi Territory laid all power in the hands of five 
individuals, their powers were still restricted. Although they had a monopoly 
on legislative power, Sargent and his judges could not create original laws, 
instead only being able to adapt laws that existed in other states. On the issue 
of law and government, Sargent’s writings suggest he did not believe the 
inhabitants of Natchez would accept any at all: 
The Task of the Judges and myself will be more and more arduous as they 
shall delay coming to the territory; released from Spanish Bondage, this 
Country would have received with Rapture, any Code of Laws from the 
United States, but being almost in a State of Nature, since their 
Emancipation, the very mildest statutes, I am apprehensive may be 
Considered as oppressive, - I shall, however… Continue to use my best 
endeavours, at all times to Conciliate them to Good Government, and the 
National Interests, remembering always my duty, to the Sovereign 
Authority97 
The comparison made by Sargent here cannot be overlooked; by describing the 
inhabitants as being in a “State of Nature”, he drew upon Hobbesian language 
often used to describe the Native American nations of the American frontier. In 
doing so, he further depicted the Territory’s inhabitants as being incapable of 
entering into the Union. Indeed, even if Sargent believed any laws would be 
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deemed oppressive, this did not prevent him from establishing some of the 
most severe law codes possible. What is more, Sargent, together with his 
judges once they had arrived, conspired to circumvent the Ordinance upon 
which the Mississippi Territory was founded. As such, Sargent established his 
own law code, which was not based upon any existing state legislation as it 
ought to have been, and in the words of Claiborne, was “repugnant to the 
established principles of the jurisprudence derived from the common law of 
England.”98 Sargent also added increasingly high fees upon passports for 
entering and leaving the Territory, as well as marriage and tavern licenses.99 
The former was particularly problematic for the Mississippi Territory and its 
economy. With high costs incurred upon entering and leaving the Territory, it 
became exceedingly difficult to transport goods to and from the region. The 
most efficient method of transport was by river and ocean, yet this would 
require travel down the Mississippi River to New Orleans, occupied by the 
Spanish and then the French, before goods would re-enter the United States in 
the North. Thus, a fee for exiting the Mississippi Territory meant there were 
three different taxes upon goods. Anthony Hutchins, unsurprisingly, made his 
feelings on the matter explicit to Sargent, but it must also be assumed that 
Sargent lost the affections of many Ellicott supporters over these high import 
tariffs, as many amongst that faction were merchants.100  
On top of these overly harsh import penalties, Sargent’s law codes themselves 
became a major topic of frustration among the Natchez elite. As Haynes 
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correctly assesses, the lack of proper legal training of both Sargent and his 
judges resulted in a lack of knowledge of other states’ laws, which contributed 
heavily to the creation of an original law code, rather than adoption of an 
existing one.101 Yet, if Sargent believed he could get away with this due to the 
lack of cohesion and legal knowledge among the Natchez District, he was 
mistaken. Building upon the Committee of Safety established under the 
governorship of Miguel Gayoso, the opposition to Sargent established a new 
committee, designed to overthrow Sargent by highlighting the flaws in his 
government to Congress. Led by Hutchins and West, the group’s task was 
aided by the division of the Natchez into two counties; Adams and 
Pickering.102 The significant difference between the two counties was that 
Natchez was in Adams County, thus making the region somewhat urban by 
comparison. Merchants gravitated to Adams County, whereas the more rural 
Pickering County was home to many of the affluent plantations of the 
Territory, and therefore the planter faction led by the Green family, including 
Cato West. This, in theory, set up Adams County and Pickering County as 
polar opposites, one as a base of support for Sargent and one as a base for his 
opponents.  Yet, as James has highlighted, Sargent’s support in Natchez did 
not equal support across Adams County. Although Natchez was the hub of the 
Territory, property values were much lower in the urban centre than they were 
in the rural plantations of Adams County. Thus, the votes of Sargent’s 
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supporters were not enough to prevent the Grand Jury from being flooded with 
Sargent’s opponents from outside Natchez.103 
With their newly created base of support within Pickering County and the 
outskirts of Adams County, the new Committee, dubbed the Committee of 
1799, perceived itself to be the only representative voice of the people of the 
Mississippi Territory with Cato West as the committee chairman. The events 
that followed adjusted the political landscape of the Mississippi Territory, and 
changed its direction for the following years. Over the course of 1799, 
Sargent’s relationship with the inhabitants of Pickering, and to a lesser extent, 
Adams County, completed collapsed. Yet, the first opposition to Sargent did 
not come from Pickering County at all. Indeed, perhaps the greatest indictment 
of Sargent’s attempts to govern was that the first major complaint delivered to 
him came from the Grand Jury of Adams County, supposedly the heartland of 
his support base. Presented to Sargent directly, the presentment wrote: 
“whereas a law directing the manner in which money shall be raised and levied 
to defray the charges which may arise within the several Counties is in several 
instances oppressive and may be attended with the most baleful consequences 
– We consider it as an imposition upon the good Citizens of this Territory and 
protest against the same.”104 The letter went on to present 20 grievances to 
Governor Sargent, ranging from a complaint about land speculators acquiring 
land and then leaving it empty, to the fact that “the Citizens of this Territory 
should be taxed according to limits and not according to the number or 
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property which may tend to the great injury of the poor.”105 Most damning, 
however, is their accusation that those who created the codes of law for the 
Territory made no effort to acquaint themselves with the region, and did not 
pay attention to the local circumstances and interests of the people: 
It was not a matter of choice our coming into this Territory as belonging to 
the united States – We were found here by them a useful industrious and 
we flatter ourselves not an unenlightened set of people much prejudiced in 
favor and wishing to become subjects of the U States a people descended 
from the same stock possessed of the same principles and animated with 
the same desire of freedom and expecting to enjoy in the fullest extent the 
same previledges [sic] and immunities in common with the rest of our 
fellow Citizens – We remark that in the formation of new Territories 
heretofore made the Inhabitants may be said to have had a vote in the 
government…106 
The Grand Jury of Adams County had not held back. They railed against 
Sargent’s strict law codes, and highlighted their case for representative 
government. Indeed, they make reference to the fact that it was the Federal 
Government migrating to the Mississippi Territory, not the other way around – 
Sargent and the government were the interlopers, not them. Furthermore, they 
describe themselves as a plurality, a unified set of people with a common 
interest, in stark contrast to Sargent’s analysis of them.  The presentments 
highlight the widespread dissatisfaction with Sargent’s governorship, and 
highlight that the political situation in the Territory was not neatly divided 
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across county borders, as Haynes has suggested.107 This was not simply 
Republicans rallying against a Federalist governor. It was a frontier territory 
that was not yet divided along party lines rallying against a government which 
did not provide them with a representative democracy and employed an 
unconstitutional law code against them. Both groups also drew pointedly upon 
the same political language bequeathed by the American Revolution to make 
their cases, highlighting their desire to subvert the suggestion that 
Mississippi’s inhabitants were not ready to become American citizens. 
The presentments of the Adams County Grand Jury were, unsurprisingly, 
followed up by a similar presentment from Pickering County. Interestingly, 
whilst the Adams County presentment was signed by the collective jury, the 
Pickering County document lists each individual separately, as three jurors 
refused to sign. The list of names reads as a register of the supporters of Cato 
West, with himself, Thomas Green, and many other prominent ‘Hutchinites’ 
signing.108 A shorter document, it contains much of the same spirit as the 
Adams County letter, with an important addition: they highlight their status as 
American citizens, begging Congress to “permit us to be enrolled under the 
endearing appellation as Fellow Citizens as we are Strenuously resolve to 
merit and Support the Character of Good Americans.”109 Together, these 
presentments represent the people of the Mississippi Territory working within 
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the confines of the limited legal system they had access to in order to highlight 
the particularities of their American identity. Whilst the work of Cato West’s 
Committee of 1799 has received greater attention in other works, these 
presentments are an important example of frontiersmen exercising knowledge 
of the American political and judicial systems to resist a governor who did not 
represent them and sought to restrict their inclusion in the American republic. 
Thus, even though Sargent repeatedly attempted to stress their inability to self-
govern and engage in democracy, he actually forced them to actively engage 
with the system in whatever way they could.  
Whereas the Grand Jury of Pickering County ended their presentments with a 
claim of their American identity, Cato West’s Committee of 1799 put it front 
and centre. The formation of the Committee itself further demonstrates the 
ability of Sargent’s opponents to work within the frameworks laid out by the 
American territorial system. Coming two months after the Presentments of the 
juries appeared to have fallen upon deaf ears, its first actions were to appeal 
directly to Governor Sargent, and subsequently the territorial judges, to 
demand change: “Let the laws be cut down to a constitutional standard,” they 
wrote, “or rather let the Laws be adopted agreeably to the ordinance of 1787, 
and let them be administered with firmness, tempered with clemency and 
humanity.”110 Furthermore, they highlighted their anger that Andrew Ellicott 
had been given such influence upon the political appointees of Sargent, and 
demonstrated another act of legal and peaceful resistance: resigning from 
positions of authority within the territorial militia, as West himself had done. 
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Ultimately, the Committee pled for Sargent to alter his mindset, suggesting 
that the result would be that “the germ of Patriotism would expand.” 111 This 
“germ of patriotism” was at the heart of the Committee’s second letter, sent a 
day later to both Sargent and his judges, in which they referred to the federal 
government as “the Government we loved.”112 It is in this letter that the 
Committee highlighted the illegality of the law codes, and implied that they 
were willing to take more severe measures should Sargent remain unwilling to 
adjust the codes “in conformity to the Ordinance.”113 Despite the fact that 
Sargent consistently attempted to downplay the intelligence of the inhabitants 
of the former Natchez District, it is clear that the opposite was true. The 
Committee of 1799 demonstrated itself to be literate, aware of the law, and of 
the Northwest Ordinance, in a way that it is not clear that Sargent ever was. 
Furthermore, by refusing to engage with the inhabitants, he drove them to 
become even more engaged with the American system than they would 
normally have been.  
The petitions of the Committee fell on deaf ears, with Sargent and the judges 
denying all charges and insisting upon the legality of his law code, but it was 
the Committee which ultimately won the debate.114 Not only were Sargent’s 
code overly oppressive, but they did contravene the Northwest Ordinance. Of 
twenty five laws put forward to Congress by the Committee of Inhabitants, 
seventeen of them were either fully or partially repealed. In a resolution of 
Congress on 9th May 1800 several laws, including the controversial “Law to 
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regulate taverns, and retailers of liquors, and concerning Indians”, which 
allowed the governor to overcharge for tavern licenses, were repealed. The 
declaration noted that it appeared that “the said Governor and Judges not 
confining themselves to the authority vested in them by the ordinance 
aforesaid, have, instead of adopting, existing, laws, enacted, those which are 
new.”115 So in this practical sense, Cato West and his company were 
victorious. Yet, for the purposes of this study, it is more important to assess 
how West’s Committee sought to gain victory by highlighting their American 
spirit and identity, in the face of Sargent’s attempts to diminish it. West pitted 
backward-facing legal prescriptions against a forward-looking emphasis upon 
patriotism and a future within the United States, and came out on top.  
Once the Committee failed to receive a satisfactory resolution through directly 
appealing to Sargent, their next step was to subvert him entirely. They 
nominated Narsworthy Hunter, an influential inhabitant of Pickering County, 
as a “special agent” to travel to the federal government, “in full confidence that 
he will execute the trust reposed in him”.116 Hunter’s role was to directly 
appeal to Congressmen who would support the cause of the Committee, with 
two in particular in mind, Thomas Davis of Kentucky and William C.C. 
Claiborne of Tennessee, two young Democratic Republicans. This association 
with the Republican party had led various historians, such as Haynes and 
Clayton James, to assert that the Committee of 1799 was a partisan, 
Republican group. However, caution should be applied here: the Committee 
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engaged with these individuals as they were opposed to Sargent, John Adams 
and the Federalist Party as a whole. Rather than directly aligning with the 
Republican party, Cato West and his committee were working with whomever 
they could find to support their case, and it would be premature to link the 
divisions between supporters and opponents of Sargent at the local level to the 
growing divide between the Federalists and Republicans on the national stage. 
This is supported by the events of the subsequent years, which will be 
discussed in a subsequent chapter, when the local factions of the Mississippi 
Territory divided once again over local issues. The policies and ideologies of 
the Republican Party were more beneficial to rural southerners on the frontier, 
but the Committee of 1799 represented a rejection of the Federalist Party, not 
an embrace of the Republican Party. The petitions to Congress represent a plea 
to be viewed as American, not a plea to be viewed as Jeffersonian. 
Despite this, the embracing of an American identity by the Committee was 
explicit. The petitions go as far as to relate their plight to the beginning of the 
American Revolution by referring to the fact that they were being taxed 
without any form of representation: 
Your petitioners beg leave to remind Your Honourable Body that many of 
the Citizens of this Territory have fought and bled in the cause of America; 
a Cause which had for its Origin, the usurped power of Britain, to compel 
Americans to obey Laws and pay taxes which had not their own consent117 
Furthermore, they highlighted that, “It is the birth right of every Citizen to 
have a Voice by himself or his representative in the framing of Laws and 
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imposing of taxes.”118 Here, they also stressed their American spirit, reminding 
Congress that many of the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory were 
American citizens who had travelled to the Mississippi Territory in the years 
since the Revolution, having fought and died for America’s independence. 
This did contract the message conveyed by the Grand Jury of Adams County 
discussed earlier in this chapter, that the US Government had migrated to the 
Territory, not vice-versa, but this was a strength, not a weakness. The 
multifaceted rhetoric of the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory reflects the 
region’s position – they were Americans, but they were Mississippians first. 
They had been part of the Union and knew what it meant to American and, in 
some senses, they believed they knew more about what it was to be American 
than Sargent himself. They further bemoaned that it was undemocratic for 
power in the Territory to solely rest in the hands of four men. Men, who, they 
argued did not have “the qualifications, directed and prescribed by the Wisdom 
of the Ordinance, in order to blend their interest with that of the permanent 
Citizen – No lands in their own proper right are held by them.”119 In writing in 
such strong tones, they wholeheartedly rejected the depiction that had been 
painted by Andrew Ellicott and Winthrop Sargent that they were unfit to 
represent themselves. They highlighted their American identity and fought 
back against the implication that they were “soured with the general 
government;” indeed they anchored all their hopes in it. 120 Thus, this petition 
represents an awakening of sorts amongst the inhabitants of the Mississippi 
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voting blocs to restrict the power of Governors in the region, but this is the first 
example of them engaging directly with the Federal government. Clearly, 
identity was at the heart of this debate, in part thanks to the language first 
employed by Andrew Ellicott. There was no hope of gaining autonomy or 
representation without first embracing their American identities. As such, it 
must be argued that, even though Sargent attempted to diminish the American 
spirit and repress their right to democracy, this actively had the opposite effect, 
causing the Mississippi Territory to become more American in the face of such 
oppression. 
Although the Committee of 1799 was able to successfully highlight the 
American democratic spirit in the Mississippi Territory, it was still impossible 
for them to gain the right to an elected assembly due to the restrictive 
population threshold; 5000 free, white, male inhabitants were needed. It has 
already been noted that one of the many complaints with Sargent was that he 
withheld the undertaking of censuses in order to track the population of the 
region. Despite this, the inhabitants pushed for the right to an elected assembly 
anyway: “We, therefore, pray your honorable body to extend to us the second 
grave of government contemplated under the ordinance.”121 This, they argued, 
was necessary as Sargent refused to engage with them, even when they 
communicated their grievances to him directly. Yet, as the table below shows, 
the Mississippi Territory contained under 8,000 inhabitants including women, 
children and enslaved. 
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Figure 2: Population statistics in the early years of the Mississippi Territory122 
 
Without the full data, it can be argued that, according to the Northwest 
Ordinance, the Mississippi Territory was not yet ready for the right to elections 
by law. However, Narsworthy Hunter provided Congress with inflated 
population statistics, and this was enough to convince Davis and Claiborne to 
push a bill through Congress.123 
This, of course, was much to the displeasure of Sargent, writing to President 
Adams, “that the numbers in this Territory did not according to the ordinance 
entitle them to a Legislature”.124 He was technically correct, but it is somewhat 
ironic that he would bring up the Northwest Ordinance despite him actively 
flouting its laws in the establishment of his law codes. Yet, the Committee of 
Inhabitants had been successful in subverting his authority, and was granted 
 
122 Dunbar Rowland, The Official and Statistical Register of the State of Mississippi, Vol. 1 
(Nashville: Press of the Brandon Printing Company, 1908) pp.241-242. Only the statistics for 
Adams and Jefferson County are relevant here. Pickering County was renamed Jefferson 
County in the years following the Election of 1800. Washington County became an official 
county in 1800, comprising the region generally known as the Tombigbee District.  
123 Haynes, Mississippi Territory, p.44. 
124 Winthrop Sargent to John Adams, 20/06/1800, C.E. Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers of the 
United States, Vol. 5, pp.105-107. 




the right to a legislature elected by the people, which had the right to advise 
and consent on all nominations to the office by the Governor. The Governor 
also lost “the arbitrary power of making law… with the right by a two-thirds 
vote of overriding the objections of the Governor to any law they might chose 
to enact.”125 Sargent’s humiliation was made even greater when Anthony 
Hutchins, Cato West and Thomas Green, along with five of their supporters, 
filled the eight seats on the legislative council from Pickering and Adams 
counties.126 
***** 
Ultimately, however, the Territory was still not united, and as the Territory 
grew, new political divides arose. In 1800, Washington County was 
incorporated into the Mississippi Territory, on the shores of the Tombigbee 
River, as far removed from Natchez as could be. Their experience will be 
discussed in far greater depth in the fourth chapter of this thesis, but it worth 
noting here. They were also entitled to a seat in the elected assembly, and 
returned the local patriarch, William McGrew.127 The residents from 
Tombigbee also sent a petition to Congress, in which they wholeheartedly 
contradicted the Committee of Inhabitants from the western counties. They 
railed against the “self assumed authority” of Cato West, and rejected his 
petition to Congress as being unrepresentative. Furthermore, they agreed that 
Sargent had implemented high taxes, yet they did not support West’s adoption 
of “No Taxation without Representation”. In fact, they argued that 
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Mississippi’s population consisted of a “heterogeneous assemblage of persons 
who have been mostly educated under monarchical governments, unacquainted 
with the beautiful fabric of the American constitution, and of Americans who 
have long since been disused to a system of representative legislation”. This, 
they argued, meant that Mississippi was not ready for a second grade of 
territorial government, as they lacked men of sufficient character to represent 
them.128 The district’s major concerns were over the issue of land disputes, 
which had also been addressed by the Committee of 1799 but will be discussed 
in a later chapter. However, for the purposes of this study, the stance of the 
Tombigbee District raises interesting questions over the political identity of the 
Mississippi Territory outside of the confines of the old Natchez District. It 
strengthens the argument that the Mississippi Territory was not yet attached to 
political parties on a national level – patronage and patriarchy still played a 
major role, in terms of how elections were decided and how political factions 
were created. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the history of the Mississippi 
Territory should be seen in two phases – the formative years, in which it solely 
comprised of the Natchez District, and the rest of the period, once other 
counties started to be created and the Mississippi Territory could no longer be 
seen as one homogenous body.  
It has been the purpose of this chapter to consider the development of an 
American identity in the formative years of the Mississippi Territory, and a 
focus upon the Natchez District is essential in doing so. Throughout this 
chapter, it has been shown that the growth of representative democracy in the 
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Mississippi Territory was constantly challenged by key individuals in the 
region’s history, who sought to restrict the power of the inhabitants of the 
Natchez District by labelling them un-American, and “running wild in the 
recess of government.”129 Yet, this should be seen as more indicative of the 
attitude of the Federalist Party towards the people on the frontier of the early 
American Republic, rather than actively reflecting upon the inhabitants of the 
Mississippi Territory. In the years following the events of this chapter, Andrew 
Ellicott continued to defend his and Sargent’s policies, arguing to James 
Madison that they had, “been abused, and injured by a faction in the 
Mississippi Territory. - I call it a faction, because with a few exceptions, it is 
composed of the most abandoned, and profligate part of the community, and 
consists of british subjects, discontented americans, and fugitives from 
justice.”130 Yet such words increasingly fell upon deaf ears. As will be shown 
in the next chapter of this study, Cato West and his faction would rise to be 
democratically elected and influential figures throughout the period, and 
continued to shape the history of the Mississippi Territory. 
This chapter has demonstrated that at the heart of the Territory’s rejected of the 
Federalist policies and attitudes of Sargent and Ellicott was a populace that 
was learning to express themselves in terms of their burgeoning American 
spirit and identity. American identity should not here be mistaken for political 
identity, which is at the heart of this project, but this depiction of a burgeoning 
American identity was one aspect of the wider political identity developed 
across this era. Indeed, in many ways, a portrayal of American identity 
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unlocked local politicians’ ability to cultivate the region’s political identity.  In 
the face of the aggressive attitudes of these federally-appointed individuals, the 
inhabitants of the old Natchez District formed committees designed to 
negotiate for change as one united body, which successfully allowed them to 
negotiate with the Spanish Governor Gayoso, to positive effect. In the long 
term, such committees became even more significant, allowing the inhabitants 
of the Natchez District to subvert their oppressive local government to engage 
directly with the federal government. This was a peaceful process, and showed 
a populace that wished to negotiate in order to achieve the basic rights of 
democracy. This was in the face of the aggressive attitude of Governor 
Sargent, who constantly intended to repress a democratic spirit, and repeatedly 
lambasted the inhabitants of the Natchez District as criminals and fugitives. 
Thus, whilst the Federalist authorities attempted to discredit and to control 
them with harsh tax and penal policies, these citizens actually demonstrated 
more willing to work with the American federal government. Thus, it is 
evident, that even with the only the slightest trappings of full republican 
government, citizens on the fringe of the American republic were able to 
actively engage with, and embrace, the federal system.  Their language implied 
that they were becoming inherently American, but this was not yet apparent in 
their parties, their labels or their policies. 
An aim of this chapter was to assess whether settlers in the Mississippi 
Territory saw themselves as active participants in the political process, pushing 
the development of the American republic from a vision to a reality. As noted 
early in the chapter, Onuf identifies this as being a key characteristic of settlers 
of the Northwest Territories. In the case of the Mississippi Territory, the reality 




is much more muddled. Settlers certainly took it upon themselves to drive 
forward the political development of the Mississippi Territory – the political 
activity demonstrated throughout this chapter makes that apparent. Yet it is the 
motive behind that political activity that shows the difference between 
Mississippi and the Northwest Territory. They did not take it upon themselves 
to usher in the Federal Government’s vision of an American republic – instead, 
they were trying to bring about democracy in the Mississippi Territory to 
expand their own forms of power. The Federal Government provides the 
means for them to do so.  
it has not been the intention of this study to argue that these events brought the 
Mississippi Territory in line with the federal government. There was still a 
disjuncture between national party politics and the local politics of the 
Mississippi Territory. Rather than rebelling against the Federalist Party as a 
whole, the inhabitants were rebelling against their depictions by individuals 
representing the Federalists. If Claiborne is to be believed, they did not even 
find quarrel with Sargent, but instead with his taking on of Ellicott’s advice, 
which saw him attempt to hold the Mississippi Territory in a state of 
“vassalage.”131 As will become clear throughout the subsequent chapters of 
this study, the assessment that this created a united Democratic Republican 
Party in the rural areas around Natchez is utterly inadequate; the following 
years saw further divisions between the people of the Mississippi Territory, 
with Cato West unable to retain his position as de facto leader of a united 
group of inhabitants. As the Mississippi Territory grew, and the population 
spread over a wider area, the alliances which were formed in the formative 
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years of the Mississippi Territory split into smaller groups, leading to a far 
greater deal of infighting and division. Whilst Cato West and his supporters 
did align themselves with the Democratic Republicans of Congress in order to 
overthrow Sargent’s law codes, and certainly showed themselves to be eager to 
engage with the American political system as a whole, it would be wrong to 
assert that this brought the Mississippi Territory in line with the party political 









Political Loyalties and the Burr Conspiracy 
Thomas Jefferson’s rise to the presidency in the election of 1800 is generally 
seen as having been a seminal moment for the Mississippi Territory as well as 
for the United States as a whole. Although the Mississippi Territory was 
established in 1798 in a uniquely Federalist moment in United States history, it 
would soon be profoundly shaped by the Republican Party. In 1800, vast areas 
of the Mississippi Territory remained unorganised and unsettled. The land 
encompassing the official territory was barely a third of the area it would 
become. The region was, in theory, the perfect testing ground of Thomas 
Jefferson’s vision for westward expansion and an agrarian republic, which 
would stimulate migration and strengthen the United States’ grip on the 
frontier. Adam Rothman highlights that Jefferson’s Republicanism was both 
conservative and progressive. Conservative in the sense that “it intended to 
keep the country’s social structure at an agrarian state of development, 
delaying its inevitable march towards a more decadent, industrial society,” yet 
progressive in that “it demanded the transformation of the western 
“wilderness” into a commercially oriented agricultural society.”1 This was 
designed to attract migrants from the eastern seaboard into areas such as the 
Mississippi Territory in order to help develop a society more loyal to the 
United States. However, across histories of Jefferson’s westward vision, the 
Mississippi Territory has often been overlooked. As the Louisiana Purchase 
pushed the frontier westward, it has generally been assumed that the Territory 
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had fallen into line with the United States and that its inhabitants had become 
loyal American citizens. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that that was not 
the case, and to challenge some long held assumptions about the early 
American territories. 
The Mississippi Territory was slow to accept an American identity, and its 
political elite retained characteristics and intentions which were unique to the 
region, with local concerns and private ambition trumping federal loyalty.  
Whilst the ramifications of this for scholarship of the Mississippi Territory are 
evident, this should also inform research into other American territories, and of 
westward expansion more broadly. The previous chapter of this thesis 
challenged the assumption that the dethroning of Governor Winthrop Sargent 
was the result of a burgeoning of party sentiment, with his opponents turning 
to, and joining, the Republican Party. It argued that, while Sargent’s 
administration did see the division of the political class of Natchez into two 
factions, these factions were not truly Republican or Federalist (as these labels 
were interpreted in Washington). In this chapter, this notion will be developed 
and elaborated upon. Rather than chronologically assessing the political history 
of the Territory, it will focus upon a case study which characterises the 
political climate of the Territory: the events surrounding the so-called Burr 
Conspiracy in 1806-7. This approach allows a far more nuanced study tracing 
the development of political identity from the establishment of territorial 
Mississippi to the establishment of the State of Mississippi, and presents an 
opportunity to examine a moment in Territorial history where the nation’s 
focus was upon the Territory, and allows us to examine how local politicians 




responded to that challenge.2 Rather than the overly neat categorisations of 
Republican or Federalist (as applied in existing scholarship of this early period 
of the Mississippi Territory), close attention to points of political tension help 
to expose the more complex divisions in the region. Indeed, we might 
legitimately question to what extent inhabitants should really be seen as 
recognisably American at this point. Outside of the Mississippi Territory, the 
concept of national identity and loyalty has been challenged by historians in a 
far greater way, that is instructive perhaps thanks to the useful prism of the 
Louisiana Purchase.  
The Louisiana Territory and, by extent, West Florida, underwent more 
dramatic geopolitical shifts than the Mississippi Territory in 1803 and this is 
reflected in the historiography of these regions which has, in recent years, 
shifted to questions of loyalism and identity over empires and geopolitics. 
Perhaps the most important recent study of identity and loyalty in the Old 
Southwest is provided by Peter J. Kastor, who assesses the borderlands region 
between Spanish, French and American territories in the region.3 Kastor 
identifies a “weakness of nationalist sentiment” across inhabitants of the area 
and assesses that their identity can be far more correctly assessed as localist, 
and this did not begin to transform into any form of pro-American nationalism 
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until the War of 1812.4 Indeed, this argument is supported by Andrew 
McMichael, who argues that, in the examples of Louisiana and West Florida, 
the, “multifaceted nature of loyalty, as well as the mutability of national 
loyalty and identity on the Gulf Coast borderlands, and the degree to which 
political nationalism – inasmuch as it existed – relied on local issues and the 
promise of prosperity rather than loyalty to any single political entity.”5 This is 
an issue that is further supported by Sylvia L. Hilton, who argues that “many 
Americans clearly thought that their loyalty could be legitimately transferred to 
whichever power best protected their interests,” and that loyalty in this region, 
at least as far as the Spanish were concerned, was a question of free choice.6 
In the aforementioned works, the Mississippi Territory is included implicitly, 
rather than explicitly. There is a general sentiment that loyalties, localism and 
identity in the Mississippi Territory were far more defined than in bordering 
areas, which is reflected across histories of the Mississippi Territory. As has 
already been shown, these questions are generally considered in a party 
political context, and U.S. identity is generally assumed. However, this thesis 
will demonstrate that the Mississippi Territory belongs firmly within this 
narrative of uncertainty in the Old Southwest. From 1803 until the conclusion 
of the War of 1812, the survival of American identity in Mississippi was much 
more fluid than has previously been shown, in step with the flexible political 
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beliefs of its politicians. Central to McMichael’s argument on West Florida 
and the Louisiana Territory is David Potter’s assertion that it is an error to 
assume that “the identity of people in terms of their national identity... 
transcends all other identities.”7 Potter’s thesis was based on the assessment 
that loyalty should not simply apply to ideas of nationhood, but also relates to 
more personal and private matters such as family, self-worth, prosperity and 
community.8 With this in mind, one cannot assume the loyalty of the 
politicians of the Mississippi Territory simply because they engaged with the 
American political system, but we must also explore how private interests 
shaped their loyalties and identities.  
The primary focus of this chapter is to challenge the view that politicians in the 
Mississippi Territory were genuine members of the national Federalist and 
Democratic-Republican parties in the aftermath of Sargent’s governorship and 
up to the beginning of the War of 1812. In contrast to any other works on the 
Mississippi Territory, it is based upon the assumption that Mississippi’s 
politicians were not loyal to any national political party, an important 
distinction in the approach taken here. In doing so, it is necessary to consider 
how to accurately place individuals into groups. As the purpose of this project 
is to demonstrate that personal ambitions, economic gains and familial bonds 
were more significant factors than political factions, the terms Federalist and 
Republican are no longer appropriate terms to describe Mississippi’s 
politicians. Whilst these party signifiers are still relevant to Governors Sargent, 
Claiborne and Holmes as they were generally appointed after having served in 
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the federal government elsewhere, to use them for figures such as Cato West, 
William Dunbar or Cowles Mead is inappropriate. Instead, these terms should 
be understood as having been appropriated and localised by politicians in 
Mississippi. These remained as important signifiers for newcomers into 
Mississippi’s society, helping them to identify the dominant political and 
societal networks in the Natchez region. Furthermore, this chapter will 
demonstrate that even dedicated Republicans such as Robert Williams could 
lose sight of their party identities within the political climate of the Mississippi 
Territory. On more than one occasion, Robert Haynes refers to political labels 
becoming “shibboleths rather than guideposts,” when referring to occasions 
when the supposed Republican Party divided, and does at times acknowledge 
the importance of family ties.9 However, he does not go far enough when 
trying to explain these political divisions. Haynes is wedded to the idea of 
Republicans and Federalists, but recounts multiple occasions between 1801 
and 1808 when the Republican party was completely divided. Indeed, he goes 
as far as to describe moments where political alignments were “based more 
upon personalities than principles” and more on “familial relationships than 
political ideologies or economic interests” than party affiliation.10 Yet these 
remain temporary moments in Haynes’ narrative. Rather than seeing these as 
temporary issues and secondary ones to party affiliation, they should be seen 
as a more fundamental problem within the party system in Mississippi, and as 
a result it must be questioned whether the terms Republican and Federalist 
should even be used at all. 
 
9 R.V. Haynes, The Mississippi Territory and the Southwest Frontier, 1795-1817 (Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 2010) p.80, p.87, p.177 
10 Ibid, p.63, p.80. 




In order to understand the significance of this political phenomenon, and to 
understand what these partisan labels meant within the Mississippi Territory, it 
is important to understand how local factions operated in other areas of the 
early Republic and the extent of their partisanship. One must, also, identify the 
characteristics of the national political parties and how far their influence 
extended outside of their political heartlands. The most immediate point of 
comparison, as was outlined in the introduction, can be found within the Ohio 
Territory. Within Ohio, factions rose in replication of the national political 
landscape and, importantly, were inclusive of the wider public beyond the 
elite. Donald Ratcliffe identifies a party structure which replicated its federal 
counterpart, enabling migrants to find their ways to parties they recognised and 
were comfortable with. 11  As this chapter demonstrates, political factions 
within the Mississippi Territory operated in a similar fashion, displaying 
signposts and signifiers to recruit migrants looking for a new political home. 
However, within Mississippi, these signposts were appropriations by 
inherently local organisations, which did little to progress the interests of those 
on the fringes of their parties. 
Thus, considering how Mississippi’s politicians cultivated support and 
expanded their influence, it is important to consider whether the means by 
which they did this was “borrowed” from other sources. This chapter explores 
how politics was played within Mississippi’s newspapers, with barbed political 
attacks wrapped upon within allegories and fables. Newspaper writers would 
recast Mississippi’s politicians as folk heroes or historical figures, not simply 
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for entertainment, but providing newcomers with ways of identifying the 
factions and what they believed. As Waldstreicher shows, newspapers also 
were key political tools in the North East. Indeed, New England’s newspapers 
would take inherently local events and redefine them as national events, 
allowing the populace to partake in displays of both local and national political 
action simultaneously.12 Clearly, there are parallels here with tactics employed 
in Mississippi, but the goals were somewhat different. Waldstreicher identifies 
how partisan factions used local events to influence the national debate, 
whereas in Mississippi, politicians manipulated national (and historical) events 
to define local support and influence local activity.  
In recent years, the Federalist-Republican party system has received renewed 
attention in the historiography.13 Ronald Formisano has argued that a national 
system of party politics did not exist.14 He argues that, before the 1830s, 
partisanship at the federal level did not constitute a party system – they were, 
to all intents and purposes, “proto-parties”, as this thesis argues was the case in 
Mississippi.  A key characteristic that Formisano identifies is the lack of 
engagement of political leaders, who were quick to attack rivals but not truly 
engaged in the mechanics of party politics. A similar argument is put forward 
by James Sharp, further arguing for the existence of “proto-parties” instead of 
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establish party machines in the early Republic.15 Reeve Huston has actively 
challenged Formisano’s perspective, arguing that, even if political parties did 
not develop uniformly across the nation, their foundation can certainly be 
attributed to the 1790s, not the 1830s.16 Huston contends that, while earlier 
political parties may not have been as disciplined as those in the 1830s, they 
certainly functioned as a party machine – the 1830s saw innovation on existing 
themes, not complete invention. Other historians, including Kerber, Jeffrey 
Pasley and Douglas Bradburn have taken the Federalist-Republican model as a 
unequivocal aspect of the early Republic.17 Indeed, Bradburn highlights the 
inevitability of the two party system, as even something that was 
acknowledged by contemporary politicians, quoting Delaware’s Samuel White 
arguing that the “United States are now divided, and will probably continue so, 
into two great political parties.”18 Bradburn also considers why there were only 
two, not more, political parties, using a theory of “path dependence” and 
tracing it back to the Constitution of 1787 itself. This, in itself, demonstrates 
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the benefit of exploring Mississippi’s factions – as this chapter demonstrates, 
there were three unique factions vying for power within Mississippi, even if 
two claimed the same Republican heritage.  
While this thesis does highlight that Mississippi’s factions shared 
characteristics with the models that Formisano and Sharp identify, it is not its 
intention to argue that Federalists and Republicans did not exist throughout the 
Republic. Indeed, a core tenet of its argument is that Mississippi’s politicians 
exploited and worked within the boundaries of a present party political system. 
It was that party political framework that allowed Cato West and his 
Committee of 1799 to gain support in his efforts to remove Winthrop Sargent 
from office, and with two parties claiming support from Jeffersonians, it is 
difficult to contend that the national parties were not powerful and desirable 
points of reference.  
Though this chapter highlights the development of a party model, this did not 
lead to an increase in democracy, as it had in Ohio. Indeed, Johann Neem 
identifies that a party structure is not necessarily a good indicator of 
democracy, instead identifying the capability of citizens themselves as the 
most important factor.19 Focusing on Massachusetts, Neem demonstrates how 
grassroots organisations came proxies for party competition in the period 
following the Revolution.20 As this chapter demonstrates, the rival factions of 
the Mississippi Territory did establish organisations to promote learning and 
intellectual development in the Mississippi Territory, in line with Neem’s 
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assessment in Massachusetts. Unlike in Massachusetts however, this was not 
alternative to party politics in Mississippi, they were apolitical organisations, 
committed to the wellbeing of the Territory rather than for political gain. 
Furthermore, they existed alongside parties, rather than replacing them. 
Certainly, membership did reflect party political loyalties, but it would be 
going too far to identify these organisations as proxies for political parties.  
Albrecht Koschnik’s work on associations in Philadelphia also provides a 
useful framework for considering Mississippi’s political networks.21 There are 
certainly parallels – Koschnik identifies Federalists, particularly once they fell 
out of power, turning to cultural institutions to continue to serve the public. 
This aligns with the creation of the Mississippi Society for the Dissemination 
of Useful Knowledge, which has been defined as a Federalist organisation. 
However, this chapter contends that Mississippi’s institutions were more 
muddled. The membership of the Mississippi Society was established by local 
network, and by local allegiance, rather than political leaning. Indeed, Kerber 
notes a Federalist fear of the western wilderness, yet Mississippi’s Society 
actively engaged in efforts to expand and survey the border – even if 
Federalists were prone to establishing cultural institutions, that of Mississippi 
is not instantly comparable.22 Taken together, Koschnik and Neem provide 
helpful points of comparison for the Mississippi Territory, but in Mississippi, 
political parties and their counterpart cultural organisations developed earlier, 
quicker and more expediently. They were less ways of circumventing 
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restrictions on parties to exert political pressure, but rather ways of expanding 
politicians’ authority outside corridors of power, and for driving forward the 
“improvement” of the Territory. These civic organisations, as explored in this 
chapter, were not auxiliaries for political parties, but were reflective of the dual 
role of Mississippi’s politicians as political actors and local cultural elites. As 
this thesis will go on to demonstrate, it is not always straightforward to 
intertwine these roles.   
Across this historiography, it is clear that the local factions that formed in 
Mississippi were not completely unique to that region or era. Tyler Anbinder 
and Andrew Heath, focusing on New York and Philadelphia respectively in the 
mid nineteenth century present organic political factions which politicians 
attempted to control through various means of restricting and providing access 
to the political system. They present the political systems in their locales as 
being dependent on the ability of the populace to organise effectively.23 Huston 
has also focused on antebellum New York, demonstrating how Anti-Renters 
were able to effectively form around the issue of rent and in opposition to 
landlords, which resulted in their ability to affect elections and elect officials 
into the local assembly.24 What is apparent is that there was much less of a 
framework in Mississippi to be able to restrict political activity, particularly in 
the early era. Winthrop Sargent and his successors were in no position to 
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restrict the ways in which local patriarchs built their networks and, as political 
factions became more sophisticated, there was little to no way of anyone 
outside the major networks organising significant opposition.  
Ultimately, there are aspects of the Mississippi Territory’s political factions 
that fall in line with trends identified within the historiography, but also 
significant areas of divergence, particularly when compared to other territories. 
Indeed, even if the Territory’s political circumstances were not entirely unique 
in the Early Republic, that is telling in itself, showing a remarkable level of 
political sophistication, with networks that developed quickly in the ambition 
of achieving political dominance. The political transformation that occurred 
between 1798 and 1817 is comparable with processes that were still underway 
in the 1830s in other areas of the United States.  
***** 
During William C.C. Claiborne’s governorship, he marvelled that the 1802 
elections to the territorial assembly resulted in the region being “disturbed by 
party divisions infinitely more rancorous than any I have witnessed in our 
Mother States.”25 The mention of party divisions, and the rhetoric of the “party 
spirit”, is not uncommon in this period, and there are many references to such 
activity in the Mississippi Territory. Understandably, this party spirit has been 
interpreted as being between Federalists and Republicans, which caused much 
of the division and partisanship which plagued the early Mississippi Territory. 
It has given weight to the assumptions which will be discussed in this chapter 
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that the factional divides in Mississippi were between the two political parties. 
However, these assumptions must be challenged. The presence of Federalists 
and Republicans in the Mississippi Territory was not the cause of factional 
disputes in the Mississippi Territory, but instead was the consequence of 
existing rifts and divisions across the Natchez District. These political 
affiliations were mechanisms, not identities. That is to say, these divisions 
already existed, and the labels of Federalism and Republicanism have been 
ascribed by historians to divisions which were less political and more 
economic, cultural and, perhaps most importantly, personal. By assessing the 
motivations behind political actions, rather than following superficial evidence 
of party affiliation, this thesis aims to show how territorial politics and 
identities were layered onto national labels. Claiborne’s use of the term 
“Mother States” is also interesting. It suggests that he did not view the 
Mississippi Territory as a genuine part of the Union, but as a ‘child’ that had to 
be nurtured into the Union. With this in mind, it’s important to consider any 
supposed affiliation to national political parties in a similar way.  
Claiborne’s claims of party division reflected a longer period of assessing 
Mississippi’s political climate. Writing to James Madison upon his arrival in 
the region in 1801, he wrote: “I am authorized to suppose, that the warmth of 
Party, has of late, considerably abated in this District.”26 It is interesting to note 
that Claiborne had been led to believe that factional politics had subsided in 
the Mississippi Territory since the departure of Winthrop Sargent. It suggests 
that Claiborne believed that factional politics in Mississippi was caused by 
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individuals and personality, not traditional party political division. To add 
further weight, Claiborne’s later suggestion that the factional divide was far 
greater than any he had seen in more established regions of the United States 
suggests that the factions of the Mississippi Territory were somewhat different 
in character. Elaboration was provided in a letter penned in January 1802, 
where he wrote of “Some few domestic factions & private parties,” that were 
established before he came to office and that he could “act independent of any 
of them.” 27 While it could be interpreted that Claiborne meant that 
Mississippi’s factions were more aggressive and volatile than any he had seen 
before, this shouldn’t be assumed. Having served in the federal House of 
Representatives since the late 1790s and borne witness to the acrimony and 
unrest surrounding the Election of 1800, it is extremely unlikely that Natchez’s 
factions had anything to offer in political terms that he had not already seen. 
Instead, it was the nature of factional dispute that was unique, in that it was 
based around far more private and personal goals, as well as focusing on 
individuals. The “parties” that Claiborne spoke of were not in the traditional 
sense (as has previously been supposed). They were, at best, imitations of the 
political parties at a national level, with Mississippi’s networks associating 
with, or appropriating the ideas of, the Federalist and Republican parties so as 
to legitimise their actions to newcomers to the Territory and to Federal 
politicians.  
Yet historians highlighting the party political nature of sectionalism in the 
Mississippi Territory have pointed to the fact that, in 1802 and 1803, two rival 
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organisations were established. One, the Mississippi Republican Society, was 
established by Cato West and Thomas Green in November 1802 and was 
theoretically designed to “spread the true faith” of Republicanism.28 However, 
any real surviving evidence of the society’s activities is lacking. Indeed, the 
only primary evidence supplied is a letter from one of the organization’s 
founders in 1859.29 Other than that, claims of the society’s purpose go 
unreferenced, and it has been too easily taken at face value. It is wrong to 
suggest that the Mississippi Republican Society was evidence of dedicated 
Republicanism in Mississippi. In 1859, the Republican Party was a different 
entity entirely, and to rely on evidence from such a different political era is 
wholly insufficient. As this chapter will demonstrate, the activities of the 
Green-West faction cannot be aligned with legitimate Democratic-
Republicanism, but rather as a local network of powerful planters and 
politicians seeking to assert their dominance over the Territory. The 
appropriation of the Democratic-Republican label may have helped to 
introduce newcomers into their faction, or was supposed to help them gain 
political influence at the national level, though as will be shown, this was not 
always successful. It is far more likely that the Mississippi Republican Society 
was a means of attempting to expand their influence over the region. It is no 
coincidence that its formation coincided almost exactly with the arrival of 
William Claiborne to serve as Governor. Rather than being a vehicle to spread 
Republicanism across Mississippi, the Society was a means to curry favour 
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with a new Republican governor and establish the Green-West faction as the 
most influential group in the region. 
The second organisation, the Mississippi Society for the Acquisition and 
Dissemination of Useful Knowledge, was supposedly set up by Natchez 
Federalists in opposition to the Republican Society.30 However, this is also a 
stretch. Incorporated in November 1803, the individuals involved in the 
creation of the society tended to be supporters of Winthrop Sargent, but there 
is little evidence to suggest the organisation was politically motivated. While 
one cannot take the Republican Society at face value, we can take the 
MSADUK at something resembling that.  At its heart was William Dunbar 
who, as will be shown shortly, cannot easily be defined as a Federalist. With 
regards to his role within the Society, Dunbar was a planter, merchant and 
amateur scientist. Having settled in Natchez as early as 1783, he was one of the 
region’s greatest planters and “gained an international reputation for his 
cotton.”31 Dunbar spent much of his later life in regular correspondence with 
Jefferson, and the two could genuinely be considered friends. This faction of 
Federalists should not be characterised by being obstructionist to the 
government, as Dunbar was a confidante of Jefferson and was key in supplying 
him information on the geography, climate and biology of the Southwest.32 
Indeed, though historians such as Haynes are keen to highlight Dunbar’s 
federalism, there are only really three key characteristics: friendship with 
Andrew Ellicott and Winthrop Sargent, his occupation as a merchant and the 
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wealth that came with it, and residence in Natchez, the heartland of the pro-
Sargent faction. Haynes notes that Dunbar, as with many of Sargent’s allies, 
“generally gravitated” to him from friendship with Ellicott – hardly a great 
endorsement of his political devotion.33 He was a signatory on a letter to 
Sargent in March 1801 from inhabitants of Natchez thanking him for his 
service as Governor and extolling the virtues of his administration, and was 
elected to the legislature to represent Adams County and Natchez in 1802, 
briefly serving as Speaker of the House in 1803, but his political views are not 
overtly present across his day-to-day affairs.34  
Other members of the MSADUK included Isaac Briggs, Chief Surveyor of the 
Mississippi Territory until 1806, multiple authors (both writers of fiction and 
scientific) and a number of affluent merchants and planters who had 
established themselves in the Natchez Region. What united the Society was an 
interest in nature and science and improving the quality of Natchez society. 
They were also largely bonded by proximity and friendship with Dunbar, 
highlighting again the importance of personal networks.35 Yet there was also 
evidently an element of the Society which was genuine for the ‘dissemination 
of knowledge’. For example, Abner Green was a member of this Society, yet 
he was both a prominent opponent of Winthrop Sargent and a member of the 
Green-West network through blood, closely related to Cato West through 
marriage.36 To traditional historians of the Territory, Abner Green was a 
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Republican, suggesting there was very little political affiliation in the 
organisation. Thus, there is little available evidence to suggest that the 
organisation was overtly Federalist and, once again, this assumption has been 
made because of prior assertions of the character of individuals involved. 
Importantly, the intentions of the Society seemingly run counter to the 
traditional attitude of Federalists with regards to Natchez. Whilst the 
organisation was certainly for the benefit of the elite of Natchez, it did not 
necessarily have an elitist outlook. Rather, the MSADUK was a considerably 
local organisation, intended to improve the status of the Mississippi Territory, 
perhaps in order to provide increased influence on the national stage. The first 
chapter of this study demonstrated the extent to which Federalists treated the 
frontier with disdain, yet this Society was dedicated to improving the society 
and culture of the Natchez District, with inherently more trust and belief in the 
people of the Mississippi Territory than Federalists generally allowed. The two 
societies mentioned here may well have been formed in opposition to each 
other, but their disagreements relate far more to issues between Dunbar and his 
network and the West-Green faction than issues between Republicans and 
Federalists. 
Of course, this is not to say that politically motivated factions did not exist 
within the Mississippi Territory. The Mississippi Territory was a deeply 
divided region, with political disputes and partisan actions regularly occurring, 
and we cannot necessarily treat supposed Federalists and Republicans as two 
sides of the same coin. It is, however, important to find a more effective way to 
define the partisan networks which have been defined as political parties. The 
supposed Federalist faction, for example, was more defined and united than the 




equivalent Republican one. In the years following Winthrop Sargent’s 
administration, his supporters became a minority in the Mississippi Territory, 
with Sargent’s opponents taking steps to minimise their legitimacy 
immediately. Pickering County was renamed Jefferson County and the 
territorial capital was moved to Washington, still in the Natchez District but 
away from the town of Natchez, which was seen as being the heart of 
Federalism in the region.37 As the minority faction, it is understandable that its 
members remained more united as they attempted to regain control over small 
parts of the territorial legislature, and there are no distinctive moments where 
the pro-Sargent network fractured or collapsed, perhaps due to the lack of 
authority they were able to exert.  
To define that pro-Sargent faction as Federalist is to go too far.38 Certainly, 
Winthrop Sargent was a Massachusetts Federalist, but his supporters had a 
plethora of other motivations for siding with him rather than mere political 
ideology. It would be more appropriate to define them as quasi-Federalists, in 
that they certainly self-defined as Federalists, but the actions and ambitions of 
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these individuals in Mississippi did not truly represent the intentions of the 
national party, as will be explored throughout this chapter. Central to this idea 
is the issue of patronage and personal networks. The key members of this 
faction were often related via marriage rather than political belief. Seth Lewis, 
for example, who was Chief Justice under Sargent and later attorney-general of 
the Territory, married into the family of Isaac Guion, a member of the US 
Army and a noted New York Federalist who developed a friendship with 
Sargent once he had settled in Natchez, and it appears that Lewis’ political 
leanings stemmed from there.39 As it transpired, neither Lewis nor Guion 
seemed overly perturbed by serving in a Republican administration, as they did 
under Robert Williams during a particularly acrimonious period in 1807.40 
George Poindexter, the supposedly Republican delegate to Congress, referred 
to the two as “enrolled among the participators of the Arbitrary measures, and 
frauds of Winthrop Sargent.”41 This is indicative of the prevailing attitude in 
the Mississippi Territory, that personal networks established political identity 
more than loyalty to political parties.  Lewis, it should be acknowledged, did 
note that he “was known to be a Federalist” in his memoir, but this is 
characterised by others less by his politics and more by his friendship with 
Sargent and, in 1807, “his enmity to the present administration, and to the 
person of the President.”42  If true, this is actively contradicting the attitude of 
William Dunbar, who is generally viewed as a leading Federalist. Thus, 
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disliking President Jefferson was by no means a hallmark of Federalist identity 
in the Natchez region.  
Mercantile activity was another key determinant of political affiliation, as 
shown again in the case of William Dunbar. It has already been demonstrated 
that the pro-Sargent faction rose from the merchants of Natchez who had 
previously been opposed to the Spanish government and the roots of the 
supposed Federalist faction of Natchez should really be seen as mercantile and 
economic interest, rather than political belief. Indeed, Seth Lewis had been a 
merchant in Tennessee before having been driven out of business and turning 
to a career as a lawyer, and it can be supposed that his allegiances in the 
Mississippi Territory were formed then.43 Other supposed representatives of 
the Federalists in Natchez were merchants first. Abijah Hunt is defined as a 
“staunch, outspoken Federalist” by Haynes, and was mortally wounded in a 
duel by George Poindexter, who is defined as an “outrageous anti-Natchez 
politician”.44 However, Hunt never served any political role, outside briefly 
serving as postmaster, and the selection of his personal papers that remain in 
Mississippi do not suggest any great political motivations outside of his rapidly 
developing business ventures.45 Indeed Haynes’ claims that Hunt had always 
found Poindexter “repugnant” are derived from Mack Swearingen’s 1934 
study of the early life of Poindexter, a study which is somewhat lacking in 
source material and comes to overblown conclusions. As a source, it lacks 
sufficient evidence to make character judgements on Hunt.46 This is somewhat 
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symptomatic of Mississippi’s early historiography – assumptions have been 
repeated over and over again, despite never truly having been backed up. 
Hunt’s status as a “staunch Federalist” is often repeated, yet never really 
defined. The often useful Encyclopaedia of Mississippi History, produced by 
Dunbar Rowland, defines Hunt as a “strong partisan” who “sided with the 
Federal party”, yet it is his wealth and mercantile expertise which is 
highlighted, and the Encyclopaedia does not provide further references.47 
Based upon primary material available on Abijah Hunt, it must be assumed 
that his political affiliations were defined by business ventures and personal 
networks established in Natchez. He is another of the signatories on the 
aforementioned letter to Sargent, yet his lack of traceable political activity, 
beyond hearsay, suggests this may have been a personal relationship rather 
than a public one.48  
It is also important to consider the extent to which the supposed Federalists of 
the Natchez District actually demonstrated Federalist opinion in their politics. 
Sargent, as the embodiment of a traditional Federalist view, believed that 
government in the Mississippi Territory should be small and kept out of the 
hands of the local inhabitants. Yet, supposed Federalists in the General 
Assembly in 1804 actively campaigned for, and secured, measures which 
extended the franchise and reapportioned representation across the government 
of the Mississippi Territory. They requested of Congress that: 
…part of the ordinance which requires a free-hold in fifty acres of Land as the 
qualification of an elector of a representative may be so altered so that, having 
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been a citizen of one of the United States, and having resided in the Territory one 
Year next preceeding [sic] an election… or, if not a citizen.. having resided two 
years in the Territory... and having paid a County or Territorial tax… may be the 
qualification required.49 
It is curious that Haynes acknowledges this yet does not question whether or 
not the individuals he attributes as Federalists actually acted as such. Indeed, 
he even highlights that the Natchez merchants who conspired to pass this 
motion forged a temporary alliance with political enemies to do so.50 The 
legislation that these quasi-Federalists helped to enact in 1804 was the 
antithesis of longstanding Federalist policy. The acts were self-serving on a 
local level, helping to strengthen their own political networks and allowing 
their geopolitical base of Natchez to thrive. Once again, local and personal 
networks trumped any affiliation to the national party political organisations. 
This is integral to the understanding of these quasi-Federalists in the 
Mississippi Territory. Prioritising mercantile activity does not indicate a lack 
of Federalist ideology, as it was also a key facet of the Federalist party at the 
national level as well. What is more significant is the way in which this 
economic activity was more important to the members of Mississippi’s 
“Federalist” network than politics. As has been shown, the actual politics of 
Natchez’ “Federalists” were not in line with those of the national party.  
The quasi-Federalist merchants of Natchez were defined by their personal 
networks and interests, but were at least a united body. Even between 1801 and 
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1807, when the Territory had been dominated by opposing factions for over 
half a decade, Lewis, Guion and their faction clearly maintained a network of 
cooperation. They were ready to exploit weaknesses in their opposition during 
the dispute between Cowles Mead and Governor Williams in the wake of the 
Burr affair, which will be discussed in greater depth across this chapter, and 
were effectively able to maintain a degree of representation in the legislative 
bodies of Mississippi. Robert Weems notes that two Federalists, Winthrop 
Sargent and Abijah Hunt, were instrumental in establishing the Bank of 
Mississippi. This, he assesses, is due to the bipartisan nature of the venture; it 
was important to have Federalist representation to aid the process.51 However, 
it would be more useful to see their involvement in light of their status as 
businessmen and merchants – they were wealthy and had strong business 
acumen, which were necessary attributes in order to guarantee the success of 
the Bank. It’s also difficult to see how Winthrop Sargent could have been 
brought back into the fold of Mississippi government if this was a political 
decision. The Bank of Mississippi is a useful way of highlighting the 
endurance of the wealthy, merchant, quasi-Federalist faction of Natchez. The 
presence of individuals such as Sargent, Guion and Lewis, who brought their 
brand of federalism from outside Mississippi, gives this faction a veneer of 
legitimacy, making it easier to misassign their motivations or factional origins.  
In stark contrast, members of the so-called Republican Party in Mississippi 
were by no means united. Across the period, there are examples of 
Republicans casting their opponents as members of a “junto” 52 and each group 
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proclaimed themselves to be the true Republican faction in attempts to 
discredit opponents. The previous chapter of this study has already 
demonstrated that opponents of Sargent, in a faction led by Cato West, utilised 
the national Republican Party as allies as they tried to overthrow their 
Governor. This was a marriage of necessity rather than ideology. Indeed Seth 
Lewis noted that “as Mr. Jefferson had come into power by the triumph of 
Republican principles these men had all at once, forsooth, become first rate 
Republicans, at least so they proclaimed themselves.”53 This was a group 
bonded by familial ties rather than political views, and it became the 
foundation of the quasi-Republican spirit that developed across the period. 
Cato West, the individual at the heart of the anti-Sargent movement, came into 
that position through marriage. He was married to the daughter of Thomas 
Green, and was by that marriage the brother-in-law of Abner Green. Abner 
Green was married to Mary Hutchins, daughter of Anthony Hutchins, an 
Adams County planter who was at the heart of the anti-Ellicott faction of the 
Spanish occupied Natchez District. West rose to prominence off the back of 
Anthony Hutchins’ influence after Hutchins took a step back from political life 
in his old age.54 This faction maintained strength even after Cato West’s 
political influence waned by virtue of the fact that Cowles Mead married Mary 
Green, daughter of Abner Green, and went on to become Governor Williams’ 
Secretary, a position that West had previously held under Claiborne.55 Thus, 
one of the primary factions of Republicanism in Mississippi, and there were 
many, was borne out of a feud which pre-dated the Territory itself between 
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Hutchins and Ellicott and its endurance signals that marital links and patronage 
were more important in upholding such factions than the spirit of 
Republicanism itself. Whereas the roots of the mercantile faction of Natchez 
were in support of Andrew Ellicott and Winthrop Sargent, the faction that has 
been identified as Republican was born out of opposition to those individuals.  
The Green-West faction may have been dominant but was only one of many 
groups claiming to represent Republican ideals in the Mississippi Territory 
post-1801. After the appointment of Claiborne as governor and the 
accompanying decline of Sargent as a figurehead for the opposing faction, the 
anti-Sargent faction divided, perhaps without a figurehead of opposition for 
them to target. Importantly, the resulting divided groups remained definable by 
family ties and geographical links. This division first arose in 1802, between 
supporters of Claiborne and his brother, Ferdinand L. Claiborne, and the 
Green-West faction, over the foundation of Jefferson College and the location 
of the territory’s capital. These events will be explored in much greater detail 
in the third chapter, as they provide an important insight into the private versus 
the public in the Mississippi Territory, but it should be noted how the supposed 
Republican party fractured so dramatically over the importance of location.  
The second instance of factional division came during the events of Robert 
Williams’ governorship, and was perhaps more significant thanks to its 
similarities with the Winthrop Sargent affair. The remainder of this chapter 
will be focused upon those events, and the Burr controversy. These events, 
beginning in 1806 and rumbling on until 1808 were defining moments in the 
history of the Mississippi Territory, and highlight the extent to which assigning 




the tags of Republican and Federalist to individuals in Mississippi in this era, 
is utterly invalid.  
The below table, figure 3, is not intended to be an exhaustive list of the 
factions of the Mississippi Territory, and as this thesis demonstrates, those 
factions were incredibly fluid. Instead, it contains the individuals most 
frequently referenced in this chapter and across the work more broadly, simply 
categorising them into one of the three major factions for ease and as a 
reference point. The term “Establishment” is used to identify those who 
supported the governor of the day, whether that be Claiborne or Robert 
Williams, his successor. Those highlighted in green are individuals directly 
linked to the Green-West faction and Anthony Hutchins, either by blood or by 
marriage. It should be noted that some individuals are named more than once. 
Andrew Marschalk, for example, the editor of the Misisissippi Herald, wrote in 
support of both Winthrop Sargent and William Claiborne, so cannot be easily 
identified as being tied to either faction, and Ferdinand L. Claiborne was a 
staunch supporter of his brother, William Claiborne, but aligned himself with 
the Green-Wests once Robert Williams began his tenure as Governor.56  
Quasi-Federalist Quasi-Republican 
  Green-West Establishment 
Winthrop Sargent Anthony Hutchins William C.C. Claiborne 
William Dunbar Cato West Ferdinand L. Claiborne 
Andrew Ellicott Thomas Marston Green Robert Williams 
Seth Lewis Abner Green Andrew Marschalk 
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Andrew Marschalk Cowles Mead William Lattimore 
Abijah Hunt  Mary Hutchins James Foster 
Isaac Briggs Mary Green Harry Toulmin 
Isaac Guion Thomas Calvit Thomas Williams 
John Girault George Poindexter   
Robert Dunbar Mordecai Throckmorton   
Peter Bryan Bruin David Ker   
John Steele Narsworthy Hunter   
William McGuire Ferdinand L. Claiborne   
Daniel Tilton Samuel Terrell   
 
Figure 3: Notable Members of Political Networks within the Mississippi Territory 
c.1798-180957 
 
Thus, the factions of the Natchez District and the Mississippi Territory as a 
whole were not so defined or politically motivated to be able to neatly define 
them as Republican and Federalist. Indeed, they themselves manipulated and 
appropriated these labels for their faction’s benefit, either to gain influence on 
a more national stage or to make themselves more identifiable to new 
migrants. Whilst they can broadly be categorised as a Natchez-based 
mercantile network and a more rural, family-based faction of planters, they 
were also fluid. Ferdinand L. Claiborne is a key example of a supposed-
Republican who formed a key part of the Claiborne supporting faction of 
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‘Republicans’ in 1802 yet shifted to be a key member of the Green-West 
faction, once Cowles Mead was its figurehead. This suggests that these 
factions were less defined by what they stood for than what they opposed, 
which is also reflected in the way that local newspapers became notorious for 
attacking political opponents, as will be shown. The supposedly Republican 
faction has been identified as such because they turned to Republicans at a 
Federal level in opposition to Winthrop Sargent. The pro-Sargent mercantile 
faction were united by their loathing of individuals such as Cato West and 
Cowles Mead, and were willing to align with traditional enemies such as 
Robert Williams to that end, and the awkwardly named Green-West-Mead 
faction, including Ferdinand and Poindexter, were united by their fervent 
opposition to Robert Williams, a governor who was significantly backed by 
Thomas Jefferson to the extent that he was re-appointed by Jefferson even in 
the face of such opposition. Thus, for the remainder of thesis, those previously 
defined as Federalists will be redefined as a faction of Natchez merchant elites, 
and those previously defined as Republicans will be classified on a more ad-
hoc basis. Whilst the initial incarnation of the anti-Sargent faction can be easily 
defined as the Green-West faction, other groups must also be considered. 
These range from a pro-Claiborne faction, a pro-Williams faction and an anti-
Williams faction, which encompassed parts of the Claiborne and the Green-
West faction. At times, they were also a Greenville faction, or a Washington 
faction. Indeed, a separate group of Tombigbee-based partisans must also be 
considered. To prescribe definitive terms at this stage is to downplay the 
fluidity and complexity of the partisan networks of the Mississippi Territory. 
By escaping Federalist and Republican political labels, it is possible to achieve 




a more nuanced assessment of politics in the Mississippi Territory. It allows us 
to reassess personal motivations and networks in order to understand loyalty 
and citizenship in the Mississippi Territory. As this chapter will go on to 
demonstrate, by stepping away from these definitions, one is able to 
understand responses to a crisis such as the Burr Conspiracy in a new, clearer 
manner.  
In the wake of the Sargent affair, the Mississippi Territory transitioned into a 
new era of government under the governorship of the Virginian-born 
Republican William C.C. Claiborne. A member of the House of 
Representatives representing Tennessee from the age of 22, he was a young 
and enthusiastic member of the party, much admired by Jefferson.58 As was 
mentioned in the previous chapter, he was one of the Congressmen that the 
quasi-Republican faction headed by Cato West turned to in protest of Sargent, 
so Claiborne seemingly had a vested interest in the Mississippi Territory and 
was known to its inhabitants. However, his governorship, and the peace and 
prosperity it brought, was cut short by major geopolitical shifts in the lower 
Mississippi Valley. In 1803, the Louisiana Purchase redefined boundaries, 
borders and frontiers, adding over 800,000 square miles to the territory of the 
United States right on the doorstep of the Mississippi Territory, bringing new 
opportunities and perils to settlers and migrants.59 The economic and private 
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impact of the Purchase will be explored later, but it also had huge political 
ramifications in that Governor Claiborne was appointed the first governor of 
the Orleans Territory, encompassing New Orleans and the surrounding area, in 
November 1803, acting as a provincial governor before the territorial system 
was established.60 A new governor would not be appointed for over a year, 
leaving Claiborne’s secretary, the notorious Cato West as acting-governor in 
Mississippi. 
West’s tenure was brief and provides for more interesting study when it comes 
to the dynamics between public and private interest in the Natchez District, as 
many issues were infrastructural and forced politicians to weigh up the 
personal economic benefits against the political implications for the territory.61 
However, it is necessary to discuss the dynamic between Claiborne and West 
in more detail here in order to understand how the political networks of the 
Mississippi Territory impacted the region’s society, as well as to further 
understand the limitations of the Republican moniker. In the same letter to 
James Madison quoted above in which Claiborne hoped for the abatement of 
party spirit, he acknowledged the presence of a pamphlet written by former 
Governor Winthrop Sargent, defending his actions and attacking the “conduct 
of the President in relation to Mr Sargent,” as well as “misrepresenting” 
Claiborne’s character.62 It resulted in the Territorial Assembly resolving, in 
defence of the Territory, that “A great majority of the citizens of this territory 
are much attached to the U.S.. and equally so to a free government: that they 
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will never be reconciled to oppression or confide in the man who oppresses 
them: hence arose their great desire for a legislative assembly of their own, and 
the removal of W. Sargent.”63 This was, perhaps, an indication to Claiborne 
that party sentiment had not at all subsided in the region as he had been led to 
believe. Indeed, the General Assembly also informed Claiborne that “the 
political situation of the country in every view is much worse than before” the 
publication of the new laws of the Mississippi Territory established by 
Governor Sargent.64 Evidently, in the eyes of the General Assembly, Sargent’s 
partisan lawmaking would take much longer to resolve than Claiborne 
anticipated. 
Yet neither the pamphlet, which was designed to secure Sargent’s base of 
support among Natchez merchants, nor Sargent’s laws, were the main source 
of partisan struggle for Claiborne, which in fact came from within his 
supposed base of support. The Territorial Assembly had become increasingly 
partisan in the wake of Sargent’s dismissal. Disputes between the legislature 
and the judiciary came to a head, resulting in the dismissal of Seth Lewis and 
the subsequent appointment of the well-respected Thomas Rodney as a 
Territorial judge. The historical record is somewhat lacking in evidence of the 
source of this dispute, though it appears to have been related to the perennial 
problem of land claims and disputes.65 It was also around this time that the 
counties of the Territory were renamed, with Pickering County, named for the 
 
63 D. Rowland, Encyclopaedia of Mississippi History, Vol. 1, (Madison, 1907) p. 432. 
64 Ibid. 
65 For more details of the dispute between the judges and the assembly, which affected Lewis 
far more than his peer Peter Bryan Bruin, see the entry for the Territorial Judiciary in Rowland, 
Encyclopaedia of Mississippi History, Vol 1. P.978. Despite Lewis being the one who took the 
fall, Claiborne actually considered him to be the only genuinely qualified lawyer of the three 
judges. 




former Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, becoming Jefferson County.66 
This was, again, a very public showing of respect to the new Republican 
president, demonstrating the extent to which the legislature wished to 
demonstrate its allegiance to the party, even if their actions did not truly reflect 
this. Indeed, the seat of the new Jefferson County was the appropriately named 
Greenville, home of Cato West and Thomas Marston Green, among others. It 
also further reduced the footprint of the Sargent administration, as it had been 
he who had named the county in Pickering’s honour. The importance of 
geography to the networks of the Mississippi Territory is also visible in the 
actions of the assembly, in that the seat of government was shifted from 
Natchez to Washington in early 1802.67 This took the seat of government and 
the meeting place of the territorial legislature away from the hub of pro-
Sargent activity in Natchez, an important base for the merchants of the region, 
and into the more rural parts of Adams County, where the Green-Wests 
flourished. Although Washington was not far away from Natchez in 
geographic terms, this was an important geopolitical shift, putting power into 
the hands of the Green-West network. 
On the face of it, these partisan moves should have suited Governor Claiborne. 
They helped to diminish any influence that may have been held by the 
supporters of the previous administration and should have solidified his base of 
support amongst those who had sought his help in overthrowing Sargent back 
in 1799-1800. Yet much of the opposition to Claiborne’s administration 
actually came from within his own supposed base of support. Cato West and 
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his network may have turned to Claiborne for support against Sargent, but 
quickly turned on him once he took on the governorship himself. The fallout 
was not simply political, for any actual political arguments between 
Claibornites and the Green-West faction were somewhat petty, less about 
policy and strategy than patronage or the lack of it. Problems began with the 
perception that Claiborne was not appointing enough of Cato West’s 
supporters, retaining some loyalty to the Jeffersonian principle of 
bipartisanship reflected in his inaugural address.68 Even so, Claiborne had 
appointed number of West’s network to key positions, including West himself, 
who took up the key position of Territorial Secretary. Abner Green became the 
Territory’s treasurer, and West and Thomas Calvit became Justices of the 
Peace.69 But West clearly felt that Claiborne did not go far enough, infuriated 
that Claiborne did not support the suggestion that the Legislature be moved 
once more, to Greenville, and by the governor’s apparent rejection of the idea 
that the franchise should be extended.70 Claiborne’s apparent disapproval of 
the importation of slaves must also have been of some concern to the planters 
of rural Mississippi and contributed to the distrust of Claiborne among West’s 
allies, demonstrating the extent to which political decisions and stances were 
as much about economic gain as they were about allegiance to a political 
ideology.71 
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The divide between Claiborne and West and their respective supporters is a 
significant one. It demonstrates that the Cato West and the Committee of 
1799’s hatred of Sargent was not entirely borne out of political allegiance and 
views. Even after he had been replaced by an established Republican, who had 
served in the federal House of Representatives for Tennessee, the Green-West 
faction did not fall into line. Yet while the disputes between Claiborne and 
West are significant in themselves, it’s also important to discuss how these 
were reported and politicised by Mississippi’s fledgling media. By examining 
the way Mississippi’s newspapers, in particular the Missisippi Herald, reported 
the fallout in the years following the events themselves, it will be shown that 
the national party political terms were appropriated not only for political 
advantage but also as a way of building Mississippi’s society. 72 The way the 
Herald reported and retold the events of Claiborne’s governorship, twisting 
events to fit a narrative, helped to inform new migrants to the Territory of its 
recent political history. Republicanism and Federalism were the only political 
factions any American migrant would have recognised, and thus, being able to 
identify the local networks of the Mississippi Territory was an important way 
of integrating into the community.  
Mississippi’s newspapers, unsurprisingly, had a history of partisanship, yet 
evidently remained influential within the Territory’s society. The position of 
the Territory’s “public printer” very much depended on who was in favour 
with the Governor at the time, generally shifting between Andrew Marschalk, 
printer of the Natchez Gazette and the aforementioned Herald, generally 
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Natchez-centric and pro-Sargent, and Samuel Terrell, publisher of the 
Mississippi Messenger, though he was replaced by the more partisan John 
Shaw around the time of the Burr affair. Though Marschalk was generally 
viewed as being “Federalist” due to his support of Winthrop Sargent, it’s clear 
that this was a marriage of convenience, as he also supported Claiborne and 
later Robert Williams against the Green-West faction. He was less a supporter 
of any of the governors and more an opponent of the belligerent Wests.73 The 
newspapers regularly reprinted articles from around the states, including news 
from Congress, in order to keep inhabitants informed of wider current events, 
though the most interested articles were generally found on pages two and 
three of the standard four-page publication. It was there that local news and 
opinion pieces were published. Political commentary in the newspapers, 
particularly in the period before 1810, generally took the form of letters from 
readers under pseudonyms. It’s not thoroughly clear who the authors of these 
letters were, but it’s likely that they were the editors themselves, thanks in part 
to certain consistencies. Yet, despite the fact that there was a certain lack of 
authenticity behind any comment, they were clearly influential. In August 
1802, for example, an anonymous letter claimed that William Dunbar’s 
election to the General Assembly had been “procured by corruption.” The 
accusation must have caused some commotion around the region as Dunbar 
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took the opportunity to publish his own letter two weeks later in order to deny 
the accusation.74 In order to have elicited such a rapid response, the Herald 
must have had a sizeable readership among the enfranchised inhabitants of the 
Territory. This is important to keep in mind when discussing how the 
newspapers reported important political events – they clearly had a captured 
audience, and they were not simply preaching to the converted.  
That being said, whilst the Territory’s newspapers were certainly the main way 
of hearing of local events, reporting on political events was not necessarily a 
regular occurrence. Of course, there were regular advertisements and requests 
that could be found in any early American newspaper that give a flavour of the 
local society, but one could not rely on the papers for a steady source of news 
on the legislative council’s activities, for example. Indeed, the most interesting 
reporting of the fallout between William Claiborne and Cato West did not 
come until five years later, in 1807. The coverage of Claiborne’s 
administration in the summer of 1807 was not a coincidence however, being in 
the middle of a period of intense political debate between Governor Robert 
Williams and his secretary, Cowles Mead. Taking the form of several letters to 
the editor of the Misissippi Herald by two writers known as “Scurvy Grass” 
and “Dr Birdlime”, the coverage of the political situation of 1802 discusses the 
foundations of the political networks of the Mississippi Territory and the 
warnings they should provide for the politicians of the day. Unfortunately, the 
series of writings is incomplete, as Scurvy Grass and Dr Birdlime apparently 
both suffered from illnesses which prevented publishing further reports; 
Scurvy Grass, for example, became “extremely ill with the Mulligrubs” on the 
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17th June, and was unable to continue to paint his portrait of the “Federalists 
and anti-Federalists” of the Revolution. 75  By the 15th July, “Mr Birdlime is 
despaired of by all of his physicians except one,” and was equally unable to 
tell the tale of Claiborne’s administration.76 What has survived is highly 
satirical and requires some understanding of Mississippi’s early history and 
society, as most of the characters involved were given fake names. Whilst 
some are not particularly clear as very few clues are revealed in order to reveal 
their true identity, others are more obvious. George Poindexter became “The 
Prince of Peace”, Ferdinand Claiborne became “The Knight of Rueful 
Countenance” and Cowles Mead became “The Good Man Friday”. Whilst 
these were literary references, drawing on Robinson Crusoe and Don Quixote, 
other pseudonyms drew on recent history, with references to Tallerand and the 
Baron von Steuben being allies of the Prince of Peace.77 The stories are 
somewhat difficult to translate and must equally have been so for readers at the 
time. However, anyone with a good understanding of recent Mississippi 
history would have recognised the characters. Furthermore, by using these 
literary and historical nicknames, Marschalk (or his writers) provided 
importance reference points for new migrants into the Territory, turning the 
Herald’s stories into something far more informative. Marschalk provided a 
highly partisan version of events which introduced the reader to all the main 
actors of the period in a way that any could understand.  
The articles which appeared in the summer of 1807 in the Herald alongside 
accounts of Aaron Burr’s trial in Richmond, Virginia, took the form of several 
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letters from Mr Birdlime addressed to “Robert Williams, Esq. endeavouring to 
act the Governor of the Mississippi Territory.” Despite this somewhat 
lukewarm introduction, the author quickly noted: “I have no cause whatsoever 
to induce me to hurt your feelings, nor those of any one possessed of 
sensibility,” instantly aligning the articles against the Green-West faction, 
whom Williams had made great enemies of in the wake of the Burr 
Conspiracy. From then, Birdlime sets the scene of his visit to “Old Steadfast”, 
apparently an elder statesman of the Mississippi Territory, and his 
conversations there with “Neighbour Spriggins”, who had become a “violent 
enemy” of the Williams administration. In recounting the conversation, the 
author cleverly explains how unpopular Governor Williams had become in the 
Territory, highlighting the arguments against him (though stressing that he 
didn’t agree). If the letters were serving as introductions, or reminders of the 
history of the Territory, then this literary explanation of current events would 
have certainly helped new migrants to acclimatise to the political situation. 
Furthermore, they also help create a bridge between the events of 1802 and 
1807. By establishing the factional divides present between Governor Williams 
and his enemies, the author drew parallels between Winthrop Sargent and his 
enemies and, following that, W.C.C. Claiborne and his enemies. It’s significant 
that, in the discussion of Spriggins’ views, no party labels are used at all; 
networks are defined by support of, or opposition to, the governor at the time.78  
The letter then switches focus to discuss the events of 1802: 
“You cannot forget that last winter was a year, our legislative assembly was so 
split up into parties that they could not, after many trials, elect a member to 
 
78 Mississippi Herald, 17/06/1807 




congress. The republican party, as they called themselves, were divided into the 
tools of Claibourne and the tools of West. A third party, almost equally 
numerous, called themselves Federalists. The tools of Claiborne and West hated 
each other – they both hated the Federalists, and the federalists hated both. The 
republicans, when united, carried every thing before them, but when divided, the 
federalists turned the scales.”79 
The implication that the Republicans had self-identified themselves as such, 
and that the third party “called themselves Federalists” is an important one to 
note. The Herald has often been considered a ‘Federalist’ newspaper, in direct 
contrast to the Messenger which was fervently a Green-West supporting 
publication and has thus been seen as ‘Republican’. The suggestion here  is 
that, as per the argument of this thesis, the terms were appropriated by the 
networks of the Territory rather than actually being based on genuine political 
opinion. The fact that this is being implied by one of the most important 
political newspapers in the Territory only adds weight to this assessment. 
Furthermore, the importance of patronage and networks is underlined. The use 
of the term “tools” of Claiborne and West is significant. It demonstrates the 
extent to which these networks were dependent on a patron at their head. The 
networks were based on the politics of personality rather than ideology. This 
further highlights that there was no real ‘Republican’ party at all, but instead 
there were multiple self-serving factions, which only came together when it 
suited the ambitions of both.  
Despite discussing the falling out between Claiborne and West here, the author 
of these letters changed tactic in the subsequent two editions of the Herald. 
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‘Mr Birdlime’ returns to the beginning of Claiborne’s Governorship on 24th 
June, and rebrands West as ‘the old Roman Knight’ and Claiborne as the 
‘young Governor Homespun.’80 In this new version of events, West  courted 
the good graces of the Governor, finding that “a country girl of twelve or 
thirteen years as not more courtable;” indeed, “No one knew better than old 
Cato how to take advantage of those youthful ebullitions of patriotism and 
virtue.” 81 Although different to the original letter of the 17th June, the 
sentiment remains the same, as Birdlime compared the governorship of 
Claiborne to that of “old Trunnion” – alias Winthrop Sargent. It is suggested 
that, in courting Claiborne’s favour, West convinced him that “the friends of 
old Trunnion were his inveterate enemies, and would remain so in despight 
[sic] of every effort of conciliation.” Furthermore, that “a great majority of the 
good citizens were inimical to old Trunnion to that degree that they would 
side, without hesitation, with any one who opposed or made battle with him.”82 
The politics of personality and patronage are clear once again here. This is 
nothing to do with the ideals of Thomas Jefferson’s Republicanism, but instead 
about Cato West securing the support of the Governor in order to win partisan 
victories over his personal enemies.  
That message is made even more clear later in the letter. “You have but one 
course to pursue,” West supposedly informed Claiborne. “hoist the standard of 
Republicanism and declare open war. The Cato West-and-othersites will rally 
round you. They know the colours – They all dance to one turn – no matter for 
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the song .”83 Thus, according to the author of these letters, potentially Andrew 
Marschalk, Republicanism was not a political ethos in the Mississippi 
Territory, but instead simply a signifier of partisan networks. Apparently, Cato 
West and his allies had appropriated the term, and would support anyone who 
purported to represent the party, no matter what their real beliefs were. Such a 
message was taken forward by the other writer, ‘Scurvy Grass’, on the 22nd 
July, who penned a somewhat clumsy comparison of Cato West and his 
namesake, Marcus Porcius Cato, the Roman Tribune of the late Republic, an 
enemy of Julius Caesar, writing, for example: 
Cato the Censor loved no Country but Italy, he hated all governments except the 
Republican. 
Our Cato loved, advocated and deprecated alternately the American and Spanish 
governments – Therefore the more liberal of the two.84 
Although Scurvy Grass attempted a nuanced historical comparison, his letters 
are distinctly unsubtle. He, as well as Mr Birdlime, clearly intended to 
demonstrate to the readers of the Herald that ‘Republicanism’ in the 
Mississippi Territory was not real, but was instead fabricated and appropriated 
by the personal networks of Claiborne and West. The metaphors employed are 
thinly veiled, and do as much to discredit any supposed Federalists as well – 
although the faction is depicted as being more united than its enemies, they are 
defined by their opposition to Claiborne and West, and support of Sargent, 
than by any political notion.   
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The letters of Mr Birdlime and Scurvy Grass in the Mississippi Herald in 1807 
are an important insight into how Mississippians viewed their political 
factions. The timing of the publications was clearly significant – as will be 
demonstrated, it was a time of significant introspection when the loyalty and 
political identity of the Territory as a whole was being called into question, and 
those purporting to be ‘Republicans’ were at war with each other once again. 
By providing a history of the politics of the Territory, the articles provided 
signposts for readers. For those in the loop, they would seemingly be 
humorous and satirical, and for those new to the Territory or to politics, they 
would provide important signposts. They aimed to inform readers about the 
history of either faction in 1807 – though West was no longer active, the 
Green-Wests were still represented by Cowles Mead, and whilst Claiborne was 
no longer involved, Governor Williams was in a very similar position. Indeed, 
the articles would also have helped those with no knowledge of the factional 
networks of Mississippi at all. By explaining the links, however tenuous, to the 
national political parties, such articles would help migrants understand how the 
factions of Mississippi sought to align themselves. This then, explains in some 
way how political identity in Mississippi was formed and moulded. The 
appropriation of the terms ‘Federalist’ and ‘Republican’ meant more than 
simply currying favour at the national level. By using such naming 
conventions, the factions of the Territory were able to bring in new members 
and supporters, who would not have known any other political party than the 
two at the national level. Using these names gave a veneer of legitimacy to a 
system which was partisan and largely driven by patronage and personal, 
private networks. 





As has been discussed, the writings of the Mississippi Herald came from a 
particularly tumultuous time in the tenure of W.C.C. Claiborne’s successor as 
Governor, Robert Williams. A North Carolinian Republican who had served 
three terms in the House of Representatives, Williams arrived in Mississippi in 
January 1805, beginning yet another period of instability and factional dispute 
in the Territory, culminating in a period of national crisis in the winter of 
1806-1807.85 The appointment of Williams itself was somewhat controversial 
in itself, with Dunbar Rowland claiming that “Col. Cato West… was generally 
regarded as the choice of the majority of the people,” which caused an element 
of disaffection which would haunt Williams throughout his Governorship, and 
which will be explored in greater detail throughout this chapter.86 
The defining incident of William’s tenure was undoubtedly the Burr 
Conspiracy when, for a brief period of a few months, the eyes of the nation and 
the federal government were trained upon the Mississippi Territory. The arrival 
of former Vice-President Aaron Burr in January 1807 sparked suspicion and 
intrigue across the territory, to the extent that it resulted in all-out political war 
across the spring and summer of 1807, culminating in duels and cries for 
impeachment. It has already been shown that political affiliation in the 
Mississippi Territory was vague and oftentimes fraught, but the events 
surrounding the Burr Conspiracy elevated political divides in the Territory to 
another level, and provides a perfect case study for assessing political 
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relationships in the Mississippi Territory, affiliation to the national political 
parties within the Mississippi Territory and the spirit of American nationalism 
and in the Territory, which helps to inform wider questions of national and 
regional identity. It is therefore a hugely important subject which has been all 
too often overlooked as a side note by histories of the Burr Conspiracy and of 
the Mississippi Territory as a whole. 
The best study of the Burr affair in Mississippi to date is provided by Haynes, 
whose helpful narrative encapsulates the major events of the period. However, 
Haynes fails to connect the dots between trends that seem persistent across the 
period; he is too happy to view fractures in the Mississippi Republican party as 
blips rather than inherent problems, as will be demonstrated here. The Burr 
affair is also discussed in D. Clayton James’ Antebellum Natchez, but the 
account features worrying errors, including incorrectly stating that the Acting 
Governor at the time was Cato West, rather than Cowles Mead, rendering his 
assessment unreliable despite it being useful in other areas.87 Furthermore, 
both he and Haynes lean far too heavily upon works that came before it, most 
notably from Abernethy.88 Thomas Abernethy’s classic work on the Burr 
Conspiracy as a whole, first published in 1954, has clearly been an influence 
on a great deal of work on Burr. As is standard for broader studies of Burr, his 
escapades in Mississippi are only the focus of one chapter and is again accurate 
while providing no real analysis, nor assessment of the political consequences 
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for Mississippi.89 The assessment here inverts the process, aiming to establish 
not what the events in Mississippi tell us about Burr, but what the Conspiracy 
can tell us about the Mississippi Territory.90 The most recent study of the Burr 
affair, by James E. Lewis, has attempted to provide a new analysis, focusing 
on interpreting the impact of the events of the Conspiracy rather than re-
investigating what happened. While this is certainly useful, New Orleans and 
the Orleans Territory are given far more importance in the narrative, with 
Governor Claiborne as a figure of greater analysis than his counterpart in 
Mississippi. Lewis’ work is comprehensive and, in many ways, should be seen 
as a definitive study of the Burr Conspiracy as a whole, but there is 
undoubtedly a need for a more nuanced and focused study of Burr’s impact on 
the Mississippi Territory. 91 
The focus of this study of the Conspiracy is not therefore Aaron Burr, and 
more focus will be given to sources from the Natchez District, most notably 
from Judge Thomas Rodney and other leading figures, and discussion of the 
events in local newspapers. These sources help to inform a study of 
Mississippian responses to Burr and allow us to gauge whether or not a sense 
of loyalty to the United States was present at the time, or whether the 
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inhabitants were supportive of Burr. Subsequently, and perhaps of more 
importance to this thesis as a whole, the political fallout will be discussed, 
returning to consider the nature of party politics in the Mississippi Territory. 
The episode as a whole reinforces the notion that the terms Republican and 
Federalist are inappropriate and misleading, as there is little coherence 
between those political parties on a national level and those that claimed to 
represent the parties in the Mississippi Territory. 
By 1806 the vast expanse of land ceded to the United States was loosely 
organised into the Louisiana Territory, and the governorship given to General 
James Wilkinson, the commander of the US army in the region. This became 
problematic for a variety of reason. Another, more pressing problem for the 
inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory was that the Purchase resulted in 
increased aggression from the Spanish governments in Texas and West 
Florida; one right on the border of Mississippi, the other now only a few miles 
away, without a buffer from the French in Louisiana. The result was, 
unsurprisingly, increased belligerence from the Spanish, who felt increasing 
threatened by an expansive United States. This was coupled with growing 
distrust of the Spaniards, since Pinckney’s Treaty in 1795. As Alan Taylor 
notes, Spanish Louisiana had “offered alternative destinations and 
constitutional models meant to entice Americans to forsake their 
independence. North America was riven with competing allegiances and 
multiple possibilities.”92 For the politicians of Natchez, who were eagerly 
 
92 A. Taylor, American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750-1804 (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2016) p.351. 




anticipating Mississippi’s population growth, Spanish America was a threat 
even before the Purchase. 
Throughout 1805 and 1806, one of the major concerns of American planters in 
the Mississippi Territory related to the pre-existing claims to land authorised 
by previous Spanish and British governments. Several letters to and from the 
federal government to the Mississippi legislature highlight the concerns of 
settlers who feared losing their lands to these competing claims. It’s important 
to note that, as one letter from William Lattimore to John Quincy Adams 
discusses, the lands of the Mississippi Territory had not been officially opened 
to sale by the American government, so settlers in the Territory did not 
necessarily yet have true ownership of their land. With the Yazoo Controversy 
still fresh in the mind and not fully resolved, American settlers were keen to 
ensure that the American government would protect their interests in the wake 
of increased Spanish activity on the border.93 Increased Spanish authority in 
the Old Southwest also created a secondary threat for inhabitants of the 
Mississippi Territory. As has been demonstrated by Kathleen DuVal, Spanish 
governors were much more effective than their American counterparts when it 
came to engaging with the native Choctaw and Chickasaw nations in the 
region.94 Thus, the potential rekindling of Spanish authority around the Gulf 
Coast increased fears that Native Americans would also grow increasingly 
dangerous to Mississippi’s settlers. Indeed, from the 1780s up until the War of 
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1812, the Spanish continually provided the southern Indian nations with arms 
and equipment in order to disrupt American settlers. Despite the presence of 
Spanish officials, actual Spanish settlers were few and far between in the 
region, so a reliance upon sovereign Native nations made a lot of sense.95 
Furthermore, as Grenier has noted, one of the major motivations behind 
Mississippi’s involvement in the Creek War of the mid-1810s was to force 
Native Americans away from the region, thus reducing Spanish influence 
around the Gulf Coast.96 Spanish authority in the region was inextricably 
linked with concerns over a resurgence of Native American aggression, 
whether this was based on any truth or not.  
However, a dislike for the Spanish colonies bordering the Mississippi Territory 
should not be mistaken for true loyalty to the United States. Across this period, 
it is still clear that Mississippi’s inhabitants were also exasperated by the lack 
of action by the federal government. Isaac Briggs, the chief surveyor of the 
Territory, even went as far as to imply that inhabitants of the nearby Orleans 
Territory hoped that “they will shortly again pass under the mild, beneficent 
Government of Spain, and be relieved from the grievous oppressions of that of 
the United States.”97 Of course, this is not an especially reliable source, as 
Briggs was more disaffected by life in the region than most. He had grown 
frustrated over the lengthy process of surveying the Territory and had grown 
resentful of its people and their inactivity. Regardless, this should still serve as 
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a warning that identities and loyalties in the Southwest should not be assumed, 
even three years after the Louisiana Purchase. It also gives us some idea of 
how parts of the Southwest were viewed in the wider United States. Much of 
the historiography of the Mississippi Territory talks solely in terms of political 
parties and of American citizens, but such loyalties to the United States were 
not truly established by this point. Running alongside the conflicting party 
politics which will be explored in this chapter is also the question of whether 
Mississippi’s inhabitants truly felt part of the United States. Briggs clearly felt 
that they did not, and he evidently felt out of place there.98  
In the context of 1806, the Spanish threat was genuine.99 The Territory itself 
was going through a period of transition, once again. In April 1806, Governor 
Williams left Mississippi for North Carolina, with the intention of returning 
with his family. In his stead, he left his recently appointed secretary, Cowles 
Mead. Mead had no demonstrable political experience, having recently failed 
in a bid to enter Congress as a representative for Georgia.100 Barely twenty-
nine years of age, Mead was hardly well equipped for the crisis which was to 
come. Tensions on the Spanish-American frontier began to come to a head 
around in the summer of 1806, when Thomas Freeman was appointed by 
President Jefferson to conduct a scientific exploration of the Louisiana 
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Territory. In a letter to William Claiborne, now Governor of the Orleans 
Territory, Freeman reported that his exploratory party was met at the Red 
River by a Spanish force and ordered to return to the American garrison at 
Natchitoches, with force threatened if the Americans did not comply.101 The 
same Spanish force was also accused of ripping the American flag off a 
flagpole in the centre of a Native American village, stating their intention to 
“kill, take, or drive back” any Americans in the region.102 Not long after this, a 
Spanish force crossed into the Louisiana Territory from Texas, moving within 
a few miles of the town of Natchitoches.103 This finally prompted action from 
the federal government, who had generally been quite lax in response to the 
Spanish threat, which, as will be shown, caused a degree of frustration from 
the people of Mississippi who did not feel suitably supported by their 
government. However, even when the government did respond, they did so 
through the Governor of Louisiana and the head of the army in the region, 
General Wilkinson. Unfortunately, as was suspected at the time, Wilkinson 
was a paid Spanish agent and had been since the 1790s, and as such, he was 
not particularly keen on encouraging military action against the Spanish.104 
Eventually though, American military action was required.  
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Whilst the works mentioned throughout this chapter can provide adequate 
summaries of the particular events that took place, it’s important to investigate 
the ways in which Mississippians responded to being unable to act against the 
Spanish, or to the opportunity to strike back. Cowles Mead clearly believed 
that Mississippi’s citizens were ready to take up arms in the name of the 
United States, writing: “The alacrity with which the inhabitants flew to their 
ranks, joined to the general ardour pervading the whole territory, induces me to 
believe that every reliance may be placed in this people for personal aid if 
requisite to their honor and a free & spirited nation.”105 Furthermore when 
Ferdinand Claiborne, as commander of the Mississippi militia, took a 
detachment of Mississippi militiamen with him with the intention of dislodging 
the Spanish from Natchitoches, he wrote that, “on future occasion the 
Government will view in us a people attached to the principles of the Federal 
constitution, and ready at all times to pledge their lives and fortunes, in 
defending the honor and independence of the United States.”  He went on to 
write that he believed, they “seemed anxious to… exhibit the character of the 
Mississippi Territory in its true colors.” Whilst this declaration of loyalty to the 
United States is interesting, what is of further note is a repetition that they 
wished to demonstrate themselves to be “so honorable to themselves, and 
auspicious to the particular section of the union to which they belong.”106 Of 
course, whilst this is a very top-down way of assessing the opinions of 
Mississippi’s inhabitants, these letters do reference more than a simple loyalty 
to the United States, and demonstrates the ways in which national loyalty and 
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loyalty to Mississippi began to play off against each other as the era 
progressed. In Chapter One, there was a desire to enter the Union as fully 
recognisable American citizens, but as time went on, a more distinctly 
Mississippian form of identity began to emerge. 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that that independent spirit, of pride in 
Mississippi, was appropriated by its commanders in order to demonstrate a 
degree of loyalty to the United States. This is highlighted by the fact that 
Claiborne actively congratulated himself and Mead for creating that loyal 
spirit, rather than it being organic. Indeed, when the militia were ordered to 
return to Mississippi by Wilkinson, who cited the fact that the Spanish had 
already left, Claiborne reported a great deal of “chagrin and mortification” 
across the ranks.107 Despite a lack of further sources from this event, this 
mortification should be seen less as a disappointment that the troops were not 
able to demonstrate their American spirit, but more that they were not able to 
inflict casualties upon the Spanish The American identity portrayed here is 
contrived and created by Claiborne, rather than being organic. 
The same belligerence towards the Spanish can be seen in 1806 in response to 
the threat from West Florida. Documents to and from Cowles Mead, shortly 
after his arrival in the region, suggest that the militia of Washington County, 
fronted by Colonel John Caller, were the instigators of violence on the frontier. 
Concerned by the threat the Spanish in West Florida posed, and in large part 
due to the fact that they had closed the port of Mobile to American business, 
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Caller began planning to attack the well-fortified town, before being dissuaded 
by Judge Harry Toulmin.108 It is worth remembering that Washington County 
was not too far detached from Adams and Jefferson Counties, and Natchez as a 
result. It would be easy to see the County as a backwater, detached from the 
centre of Mississippi society, but this is far from the case, at least in 
geographical terms. Thus, the fact that the militia of Washington County were 
planning on assaulting West Florida over the closing of Mobile to American 
trade can reveal a great deal about attitudes towards the Spanish across the 
Natchez District as well as the wider territory. It demonstrates that 
Mississippians were actually more interested in protecting their economic 
interests than defending from Spanish attack. Indeed, the Spanish military 
threat from West Florida was relatively minor and the actions of John Caller 
should be seen as pragmatic and self-serving, rather than defensive. This 
strengthens the previous suggestion that ideas of American pride and loyalty 
among the Mississippi militia were creatively mobilised by Claiborne and 
Mead.  
This then, was the situation in Mississippi on the eve of the Burr Conspiracy. 
There was significant anti-Spanish sentiment across the Territory, and the lack 
of action in support of such sentiments from the federal government must have 
been concerning. At the very least, Aaron Burr believed this was the case. He 
had visited the region to visit General Wilkinson in 1805, who at the time 
declared “The western people disaffected to the government! They are bigoted 
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to Jefferson and Democracy.”109 Wilkinson, it should be noted, was in league 
with Burr throughout the affair and was, quite possibly, the real antagonist 
behind the plot. To some extent, this was known by the inhabitants of 
Mississippi, who were naturally suspicious of the General. In September, 
Cowles Mead wrote to Henry Dearborn, declaring that the people of 
Mississippi were of the opinion that “General Wilkinson is a Spanish 
officer.”110 Indeed, James Lewis’ study of the Burr Conspiracy highlights the 
extent to which Wilkinson was not trusted across the United States, and 
especially in the west.111 The suspicion was matched by Mead himself, who 
refused to comply with a request from Wilkinson to send 500 militia to New 
Orleans for defence in November. Mead’s rejection was so swift that 
Wilkinson was able to respond barely 2 days after his initial request.112 The 
general suspicion of Wilkinson in the Mississippi Territory was clearly 
significant if it was enough to refuse orders that were made on the grounds of 
regional defence. This highlights the extent to which the suspicion and unrest 
in the Mississippi Territory throughout 1806 and into 1807 was not borne out 
of a desire to defend America, but of suspicion of the Spanish. As will be 
shown, the receptions of Burr and Wilkinson, though undoubtedly in league 
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and without good intentions towards the United States, were remarkably 
different. 
From November 1806 onwards, the Burr affair escalated.113 In late November, 
Wilkinson arrived in New Orleans and, it appears, handed over a letter to 
Governor Claiborne, dated July 29, 1806. It was written in a cipher, from 
Aaron Burr, detailing Burr’s plan to travel to Natchez with a force 2000 strong, 
and capture Baton Rouge on the way to revolutionise Louisiana and Mexico. It 
has now been proven that the cipher letter was a forgery, and has been used by 
historians focusing upon Burr’s trial in Richmond to demonstrate that it was in 
fact Wilkinson who was the chief conspirator, and was attempting to frame 
Burr, who may not have known a great detail about the plot in reality.114 Mead 
and Claiborne were both on high alert from then on, yet Burr would not arrive 
in Mississippi himself until 10th January 1807, by which time Mead had 
provided Ferdinand Claiborne with a large militia force to take Burr into 
custody, “as the common enemy of our Country.”115 From this moment on, the 
correspondence between Burr and those working on behalf of Mead were 
distinctly different in tone to any correspondence with Wilkinson. Thomas 
Fitzpatrick, a militia officer, wrote to Burr reassuring him that Mead felt he 
had been “vilified by rumor” and, that he would “receive all the benefits of 
individual civility, and the full and complete protection of the laws of the 
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Territory.”116 This was, perhaps, a consequence of Burr’s company. Although 
Mead had been expecting a force of around 2000 men, Fitzpatrick reported 
something else: “There is nothing serious to be apprehended from Col. Burr at 
this time, his whole force does not exceed 100 men and they are not all armed, 
he has no cannon of any description, at least none ready for service.”117 Yet the 
tone of the correspondence is still interesting. Burr was a fugitive from the 
federal government and a political exile. Thomas Jefferson was vocal in his 
hatred of Burr, and he was hated by the Federalist Party after having killed 
Alexander Hamilton. Indeed, as Lewis has identified, even if some national 
Federalists were seen to be questioning Burr’s trial, it was less out of 
admiration for Burr and more out of hatred for Jefferson.118 He also highlights 
the extent to which Federalists in early 1807 demanded an even stronger 
response to Burr than Jefferson was willing to provide.119 This relatively warm 
welcome for Burr is further evidence to highlight the disparity between the 
national political scene and attitudes in the Mississippi Territory. 
Despite the fact that, on 23rd December 1806, Cowles Mead called for “the 
officers both civil and military and the citizens of this Territory” to help to 
defeat the “agents employed in this Country,” Aaron Burr enjoyed something 
of a celebrity status in the Natchez District.120 Although he was arrested, he 
complied willingly and was granted bail, paid for by two wealthy inhabitants 
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of the Natchez District, Colonel Benijah Osmun and Lyman Harding.121 These 
individuals have been defined as Federalists, yet there is no real evidence to 
define any of these men by these categorisations. It should be argued that the 
actions of Osmun and Harding do not reflect the standard attitudes of 
Federalists towards Aaron Burr, and that claims of these men’s Federalist party 
affiliation is lifted from the work of J.F.H. Claiborne, which does not provide 
any evidence to support such claims other than a broad claim of support of 
John Adams and a lack of confidence in Jefferson.122 Nothing of Osmun’s 
reflects any great political interest; he was much admired by both Claibornes 
for his military service and generally refrained from political activism.123 
Harding, as a Massachusetts lawyer, exhibited more of the hallmarks of 
Federalism, again in part due to his heritage, and served as a local attorney-
general under Sargent, but his political activity is described by Rowland as 
“genial” at best. Harding is another example of a pro-Sargent lawyer (he 
named his son Winthrop Sargent Harding) and merchant – in 1805, he invested 
heavily in the cotton industry and made a significant fortune in that manner.124 
Indeed, even if Federalists on the national level erred on the side of caution 
when accusing Burr, this was borne out of distrust of Jefferson, not personal 
respect for Burr, so such a personal show of support for Aaron Burr still 
remains a questionable act for any dedicated Federalist. Instead, we should see 
this as a military officer and a wealthy merchant seeing in Burr an opportunity. 
Burr brought with him charisma, celebrity and, importantly, an opportunity.  
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Not long after Burr’s bail was paid, the Mississippi Messenger commented, in 
support of Burr, that, “We see him always submissive to law, and friendly to 
our Territories, and their inhabitants… Burr threatens to invade the Spanish 
colonies, and our citizens arm against him. Our laws, our constitution, and 
dearest principles are invaded, and we are silent and calm spectators.”125 To 
the Messenger, Burr was not the enemy, Wilkinson was. It was a profoundly 
anti-Spanish gesture, and highlights the extent to which Aaron Burr was 
deemed to provide a unique opportunity to Mississippi’s inhabitants. Even 
more interestingly, the Mississippi Messenger was a pro-Green-West faction 
newspaper. As will be shown later in this chapter, it became fervently anti-
Williams when he began to side with Natchez merchants such as Seth Lewis 
and William Dunbar. This highlights the extent to which the Burr Conspiracy 
was a landmark moment in the history of the Mississippi Territory, and a point 
where it was utterly at odds with the national political landscape to the extent 
that national political parties became irrelevant. When political rifts did appear 
in early 1807, they were not along party lines. The Burr Conspiracy presented 
a test of the Territory’s national profile of identity and loyalty, one which it 
seemingly failed. Instead of presenting itself as a united body and displaying 
its status as a part of the United States, it fractured and distanced itself from the 
nation. 
Beyond this, the events of Burr’s time in Natchez suggest something profound 
about Mississippi inhabitants’ attitudes towards the United States. Clearly, 
Mississippi’s inhabitants knew Burr was involved in a plot. Based on the 
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aforementioned piece in the Mississippi Messenger, it was assumed that he was 
planning on attacking the Spanish. Indeed, Burr implied it himself: 
I have no such design, nor any other which can tend to interrupt the peace or 
welfare of my fellow Citizens, and that I harbour [neither] the wish nor the 
intention to intermedle with their Government or concerns – On the Contrary my 
pursuits are not only justifiable, but laudable, tending to the happiness and benefit 
of my Country Men and Such as every good Citizen and virtuous man ought to 
promote.126 
This was, it appears, embraced by Mississippians. Newspapers declared that 
Burr should be embraced, militia officers such as Osmun took him in, and even 
territorial judges seemed to show their support for his venture. Thomas 
Rodney, one of Mississippi’s most influential residents, declared his 
willingness to “put on the old ’76 and march out in Support of Col. Burr and 
the Constitution”.127 The overwhelming tone of comments regarding Aaron 
Burr are in support of him and in opposition to General James Wilkinson. They 
are also, importantly, in support of any venture against the Spanish. It’s 
important to consider, however, that such hatred of the Spanish does not equal 
support of the United States, even with the regular mentioning of the 
Constitution. Burr remained a criminal, a fugitive from the Federal government 
and someone that the Governor of Mississippi had arrested and intended to put 
on trial, even if he was convivial about it in the process. Scoring political 
points over the Spanish in the region, it seems, was more important than 
remaining on the side of the Federal Government, who had issued warrants for 
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Burr’s arrest. The implication here is that the inhabitants of Mississippi, 
whatever faction they supported and whether a private citizen or a politician, 
felt that if President Jefferson or the US Army (represented by James 
Wilkinson) was not willing to act on the Spanish frontier, they would get 
behind someone who would. Thus, contrary to the views of historians such as 
Kastor and McMichael discussed at the start of this chapter, American loyalty 
and identity in the Mississippi Territory was not yet fully defined or certain. 
Again, Burr’s presence and the promises he offered formed a test of the 
Mississippi Territory’s identity 
Burr’s words themselves also present interesting views on the Mississippi 
Territory from an outsider’s perspective. Appealing to them as Citizens (with 
emphasis on the capital ‘C’), and as ‘good Citizens’ at that, speaks to the idea 
that Mississippi’s inhabitants were as much a part of Burr’s America as any 
other. Yet in contrast he refers to ‘their Government’, suggesting that the 
Mississippi Territory’s government was unique in form and politics to that of 
the rest of the United States. Of course all the states and territories of the 
Union had a unique form of government, but the implication from Burr is that 
Mississippi’s was known to be distinct. It suggests that federal-level politicians 
with knowledge of the Mississippi Territory knew its political identity differed 
from that of the rest of the Union. This is in keeping with what can be gleaned 
from correspondence between the Federal Government and Mississippi around 
this time – the Territory was very much left to its own devices, speaking to a 
wide division between the local government and that on the national level.  
Perhaps the clearest indication of this unique political situation can be found in 
the trial of Aaron Burr itself.  It was the catalyst to one of the more turbulent 




moments in Mississippi’s political history, where factions crumbled and 
reformed under new banners, and any semblance of loyalty was lacking. 
Significantly, it coincided with the return of Governor Robert Williams, who 
instantly took control of matters, demoting Cowles Mead back to the position 
of Territorial Secretary. He addressed the Legislative Council on the 28th 
January thanking Mead for his work in apprehending Burr and stating that he 
was proud of the “the zeal and patriotism exhibited by the people of this 
Territory” throughout the affair.128 This was, however, simply lip service. As 
will be shown, he showed nothing but disdain for Mead upon his return, 
accusing him of being too kind to Burr whilst simultaneously being supportive 
of Burr himself. We have seen that public opinion in Mississippi, both from 
Natchez elites and from at least one significant newspaper, was learning 
towards support of Burr. Furthermore, there seemed to be a degree of 
consensus amongst politicians and legal minds in the Territory that they had no 
jurisdiction to put Burr on trial. Indeed, both Judge Thomas Rodney and 
Attorney-General George Poindexter argued as much, that the local supreme 
court had no right, and the trial should be suspended or aborted so that Burr 
could be sent to Washington, D.C. for trial by the federal government.129 This 
does add an interesting dynamic to the proceedings - for all the feelings of 
support for Burr and his assumed plans, there was still a desire to uphold the 
laws of the Territory and of the U.S. constitution. This could, however, be 
attributed to a desire to keep Burr away from the hands of James Wilkinson, 
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who continually attempted to convince Mead to send Burr to New Orleans, and 
sent men with orders to seize Burr just before his trial.130  
Burr was eventually brought to trial in the Mississippi Territory, and stood 
before the Mississippi Supreme Court on the 2nd February.131 It was a messy 
affair, and no character came out of it particularly well. Although it began on 
the 2nd of the month, it was instantly halted as George Poindexter, the 
prosecuting attorney, failed to appear.132 The trial began properly the next day, 
with Judge Rodney presenting the case and Burr giving some words in his 
defence, though it remained relatively uneventful. On the third day of the trial, 
Poindexter arose and declared that the grand jury should be dismissed on the 
grounds that “he had nothing to law before them, and the Court had no 
Jurisdiction.”133 What happened next appears to have been confused by 
scholars of the trial. Haynes asserts, without references, that Judge Bruin was 
in favour of Poindexter’s motion but Judge Rodney was against.134 This is 
curious – as has already been mentioned, Rodney had previously declared that 
he did not believe he had the jurisdiction to try Burr either. It is more likely 
that Kline’s account is correct, whereby it was not this motion that Rodney was 
against, but a later one from Lyman Harding that the trial be dismissed, which 
Rodney rejected on the grounds that Poindexter, as prosecutor, was not 
present.135 Regardless, Poindexter’s motion did fail, leading to the jury being 
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sent out to deliberate and return a verdict. That verdict acquitted Burr, stating 
that they were “of opinion that Aaron Burr has not been guilty of any crime or 
misdemeanour.” However, the jury also presented that they found, “as highly 
derogatory to the dignity of this Government, the armistice (so-called) 
concluded between the Secretary, acting as Governor, and the said Aaron 
Burr.”136 Thus, the jury actively condemned the work of Cowles Mead, 
reopening the factional divisions that had existed throughout the early years of 
the Territory. The way the jury spoke of “the dignity of this Government” is 
also interesting, and gives us a sense of the way the grand jury viewed the 
Territory. Its members seemingly recognised that that the Territory and its 
inhabitants were under scrutiny during the Burr affair, and realised that they 
were failing the test.  
Unfortunately, official documentary evidence of the trial has not survived, and 
there is no record of who actually made up the jury on the trial. It was 
comprised of 23 men, drawn from 72 freeholders, but we have no knowledge 
of their background or views beyond that.137 Interestingly, the Mississippi 
Messenger, in its report of the trial, wrote: “We deem it unnecessary to remark 
that these presentments were not founded on any bill exhibited to the Grand 
Jury, and that being negative, they met no further attention than mere 
perusal.”138 Evidently, the editors of the Messenger did not wish to publicise 
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the critical nature of the jury’s comments, leaning as it did in favour of Mead 
as an extension of the West-Green cohort. Indeed, two weeks later, the 
Messenger printed a letter from William B. Shields, commenting upon the 
presentments and defending Mead. Shields was one of the attorneys defending 
Burr, and believed that Mead had “acted with an [sic] single eye to the honor 
and safety of the Territory.”139 J.F.H. Claiborne claimed that the action of the 
jury was “purely partisan”, and Thomas Rodney was also supportive of Mead, 
stressing that he had acted in good faith.140  
However unjustified (both in fact and in legality) the presentment of the Grand 
Jury on Mead was, it was certainly controversial and significant. Evidently, the 
Jury felt that Burr was innocent, and that the actions taken by the territorial 
government and its agents in arresting Burr were unnecessary. Yet, in 
criticising Mead, they were also criticising William Shields, one of the 
individuals Mead sent to negotiate with Burr, who went on to defend him at 
trial. Indeed, even Mead was of the opinion that Burr was innocent.141 On the 
face of it then, everyone involved shared similar views over Aaron Burr and 
the trial itself, which implies that the Grand Jury’s presentment was unrelated 
to the Burr affair and was a veiled political attack on Mead. It is therefore 
necessary to explore who Mead’s political enemies may have been. It has 
already been shown that Mead was part of the West-Green faction via 
marriage, and since 1805 one of their major political enemies had been the 
recently returned Governor Robert Williams. Cato West and his Greenville 
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based allies had assumed that West would rise to the permanent governorship 
upon W.C.C. Claiborne’s appointment as governor of the Orleans Territory.142 
The relationship between Williams and the West-Green faction had not healed 
since then, and Williams promptly jumped on the opportunity to target Cowles 
Mead in the aftermath of the Burr trial. Thus, it can be assumed that the 
freeholders who made up the grand jury in the Burr trial were, at least to some 
extent, allies of Robert Williams. Although impossible to confirm, it is quite 
possible that the majority of the freeholders of the Mississippi Territory came 
from Natchez, or by extension Adam County, as its population was far greater 
than any of the surrounding counties.143 This would go some way to explaining 
the attitude of the jury towards Mead, whose supporting base was largely made 
up of the inhabitants of Greenville, in Jefferson County. Either way it cannot 
be ignored that, even if a trial of national importance such as the Burr trial, 
partisan and factional attitudes still rose to the forefront.  
Ultimately, the conclusion of Burr’s trial was botched. Judge Rodney, 
dissatisfied with the jury’s verdicts, refused to release Burr and demanded he 
be held in custody. In response, Burr fled and forfeited his bonds, writing to 
Governor Williams as he did so to declare his innocence and complain of 
mistreatment. He was eventually recaptured by the army and escorted back to 
Virginia, even as Governor Williams tried to return him to Natchez for a 
retrial.144 However, even if the incident itself ended abruptly, it left a lasting 
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legacy upon politics in the Mississippi Territory. We have already seen that, 
upon his arrival from North Carolina, Governor Williams congratulated Mead 
on his service. However, he quickly pounced upon the opportunity to attack 
him once the trial had concluded. In response, Mead following the example of 
his predecessor as secretary, Cato West, and refused to fulfil the duties of his 
office, in at least one instance hiding official documents away in his house to 
prevent Williams accessing them.145 Indeed, the events following the Burr 
affair are the perfect example of how the supposed Republican party of the 
Mississippi Territory did not exist. Mead and Williams became the figureheads 
of two rival factions which vocally attacked each other and shaped Mississippi 
politics for years to come. As will be demonstrated, while both sides claimed 
to represent true Republicanism, the factional divide came to emulate the 
events of Winthrop Sargent’s tenure, without even the façade of party politics. 
Firstly, it is worth addressing the role of the national Republican party in these 
events, in order to highlight how detached it was from the factions of Mead 
and Williams. Once Aaron Burr was finally returned to the federal 
government, he was put on trial in Richmond, Virginia. The key witness for 
Jefferson’s prosecution was, of course, General James Wilkinson with his 
cipher letter, with Jefferson arguing that “there was no room to doubt of the 
integrity, firmness & attachment of Wilkinson.”146 This was reflected by 
Republicans across the eastern seaboard, with various newspapers declaring 
their support for Wilkinson, who they argued had helped defend the Union. In 
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contrast, Federalists and other supporters of Burr railed against Wilkinson, 
accusing him of putting the west on the verge of Civil War.147 As has already 
been shown, Mississippians were highly suspicious of Wilkinson, including 
those who were meant to represent the Republican party. Seeing Wilkinson 
paraded by Jefferson as his star witness apparently caused a great deal of 
distress to individuals such as Cowles Mead, who wrote to Secretary of State 
James Madison declaring:  
when I see Genl Wilkinson and his mercenry [sic] bands wearing the laurels which 
should deck the brows of the brave yeomanry of this Territory, I cant [sic] keep 
down the glow of discontent. Who arrested Burr and his associates, and brought 
them to the pedestal of an offended Country – Who marched twenty four hours 
without food and lay the same length of time, without blanket or tent, under the 
deepest snow ever seen in this Territory, I answer my brave fellow Citizens of the 
Mississippi. While Wilkinson was spending hundreds of thousands of dollars to 
magnify a bubble, This Territory without noise of expense arrested this mighty 
plot and shewed themselves the real friends of the Genl Government.148 
Clearly, Mead was not impressed by the Republican government’s support of 
Wilkinson, and perceived lack of support for the people of Mississippi. Mead’s 
fury not only highlights the alienation of Mississippi as a whole from the 
United States, but also the disjuncture between the Republican party of the 
United States, and the factions that claimed to represent it in the Territory. 
Even if Mead’s faction would claim to represent true Republicanism, there 
were clearly huge divisions between that idea and the reality. What’s more, 
Mead’s letter displays the hallmarks of Republican rhetoric. By referring to 
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Mississippi’s inhabitants as “brave yeomanry” and “Citizens”, he invoked the 
Republican ideology of farmers rising up in defence of their lands. Yet, 
although Mead was playing up to that role, the remainder of the letter speaks to 
the idea that they were acting in defence of their own land, not that of the 
nation. Although the rhetoric is the same, the meaning is somewhat different 
when it is applied to the Mississippi Territory.   
In contrast, if Governor Williams was outraged by the support of James 
Wilkinson, he did not show it. As Mead was venting his frustration to James 
Madison, Williams was working hard to discredit him entirely. Writing to 
Jefferson in May 1807, he wrote that Mead and George Poindexter were at the 
head of a party, “fomenting all the discontents they can among the people,” 
and defending Wilkinson and his conduct.149 In doing so, Williams was 
highlighting claims he had made as early as March 1807, whereby he accused 
Mead of causing just as much uproar in the Territory as the entire Burr 
Conspiracy.150 The spectre of James Wilkinson became a key aspect in the 
factional disputes that ensconced the Mississippi Territory throughout 1807, 
with Williams accusing Mead and his faction of being overly critical of 
Wilkinson and too sympathetic to Burr, jumping on the bandwagon established 
by the Grand Jury. In contrast, Mead would accuse Williams of being too 
friendly to Wilkinson, taking personal insult at his depiction at the hands of 
Williams. Yet Mead would also accuse Williams of being overly sympathetic 
to Burr, and this was taken forward by the Mississippi Messenger, which 
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charged Williams with “Burrism” and disloyalty to Jefferson.151 It’s worth 
remembering that the Messenger was thoroughly in support of Burr in January, 
but this quickly shifted once he became an opponent of the newspaper’s 
patrons. Indeed, in a uniquely transparent article, the Messenger declared that 
“Governor Williams has never patronized the Messenger, the Republican 
paper… but on the contrary has given his subscription and support to the 
Herald, the warmly Federal press.”152 It should still be noted that these 
references to Republican and Federal newspapers do not mean a great deal and 
should be read as pro-Williams and anti-Williams, and this goes some way to 
highlight the importance of patronage to the debate at this time. These 
references are once again a case of appropriation, whereby the factions were 
taking on the guise of the national parties whilst engaging in their own 
disputes. This debate is less to do with political beliefs and much more to do 
with personal networks and financial gain.  
Whilst the aforementioned letters to and from the federal government might 
imply that Williams was a loyal Republican and Mead was not, Williams’ 
actions depict a different message entirely and highlight the extent to which 
there was no real Republican party in Mississippi at all. After Attorney-
General George Poindexter was made Mississippi’s delegate to Congress, he 
appointed in his stead Seth Lewis, the same key supporter of Winthrop 
Sargent. Indeed, in the aforementioned letter of March 1807, Williams wrote to 
Jefferson that Mead claimed he had been informed that “Robert Williams the 
Governor” was a “republican and an honest man, but to my astonishment I 
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have found him to be the reverse in his conduct – his appointments have been 
Federal.”  Williams claimed this was a direct consequence of Mead marrying 
into the Green-West faction.153 Yet Mead’s supporters were not limited to that 
well-established Green-West network that had existed as long as the Territory 
had. Joining Mead and George Poindexter in an “unprincipled Combination” 
was Colonel Ferdinand L. Claiborne, leader of the militia and brother of 
W.C.C. Claiborne.154 Under his brother’s governorship, Claiborne had formed 
a key part of the opposition to Cato West and his faction, yet now would turn 
and join it in opposition of Governor Williams. Thus, the factions of the 
Mississippi Territory were clearly extremely fluid in 1807, and open to change 
on a whim. Political support was defined much more by personality than 
political belief. Furthermore, by informing Jefferson of the accusation that 
Williams was acting as a Federalist, Williams may have been implying that he 
was actually acting as a true Republican; in his First Inaugural Address, 
Jefferson had famously declared “We are all Republicans, we are all 
Federalists.”155 By playing up to this sentiment, Williams drew a distinction 
between Jefferson’s Republicanism and that of the Green-West-Mead network, 
tying himself to the former, further serving to highlight the chasm between the 
two political organisations. 
Returning to the appointment of Seth Lewis, this was seen as a wildly partisan 
appointment, and came as quite the surprise to Mead’s supporters. Poindexter 
defined him as a participator “of the Arbitrary measures, and frauds of 
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Winthrop Seargeant [sic],”156 tying his political affiliation to Winthrop Sargent 
over the Federalist party as a whole. The appointment allowed the Messenger 
to attack Williams further, speaking of “federalists, alias Tories, alias 
Williamites.”157 Clearly, not only was the editor of the Messenger accusing 
Williams of Federalism, but he was also accusing him of being a traitor, tying 
his actions to the loyalist Tories of the American Revolution. It is important to 
note that the appointment of Lewis appears to have been a vindictive one. The 
Green-West faction had been intrinsic to the dismissal of Lewis as a Territorial 
Judge during the last period of unrest. His reappointment as Attorney-General 
must have been influenced by personal grudges and designed to anger the 
Mead-Poindexter-Claiborne triumvirate – there cannot have been any great 
political factors motivating it. Indeed, the Messenger made several claims after 
a Dr Carmichael was appointed as justice of the quorum in Wilkinson County, 
stressing that “Dr. Carmichael hates Thomas Jefferson… Dr. Carmichael hates 
Cowles Mead. Tell me who your friends are, and I will tell you who you are, 
says the Spanish proverb. You may know a man by his enemies – and by those 
he hates also, say we.”158 Poindexter would further back up this attack on 
Carmichael, stressing that he “generally known as the enemy of the 
administration.”159 Poindexter also highlighted Williams’ other appointments, 
including Isaac Guion and William Dunbar – dedicated members of the 
Natchez elite.160 As is quite clear, the tone of political attacks in the Territory 
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quickly descended. Furthermore, despite the fact that the terms Republican and 
Federalist are repeatedly uttered, the evidence behind each claim is always 
related to personality. The rhetoric always relates to individuals and their 
relationships and thus, personal networks were the defining characteristics of 
this political debate, not party loyalties. 
Williams’ response to claims that he had been appointing Federalists is also 
interesting in this regard. In a letter to Jefferson, he claimed he was acting in a 
bipartisan manner, writing that it was: 
in strict Conformity with your own Ideas of propriety… so as to secure “a sound 
preponderance of those who are friendly to the order of things so generally 
approved by the Nation” not thereby meaning to proscribe honest well meaning 
men heretofore federalist and now sincerely disposed to concur with the National 
sentiment and measures. This had the desired effect, but did not please a few 
restless characters who call themselves republicans.161 
The “desired effect” mentioned here was a further reference to Jefferson’s 
inaugural address and was intended to highlight the extent to which Williams 
was governing in a fashion in keeping with Jefferson’s ideology. Williams 
went on to claim that Mead’s faction, who could not abide his appointments, 
felt this way because of their dependence on “party” – which should be read as 
a dependence on factionalism, rather than national party lines. That is to say, 
the anti-Williams faction refused to let slip the veneer of Republicanism when 
it had become an easy stick with which to attack Williams. Both pro- and anti-
Williams individuals resorted to the same tactics, in that they both claimed to 
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either represent true Republicanism, or to represent the politics of Thomas 
Jefferson.  
Political debate in the Territory across 1807 and 1808 descended into a war of 
words and insults. In a letter to the Legislative Assembly in December, 1807, 
Williams highlighted his Republicanism once again, proclaiming: “Men 
capable of such attempts to violate the laws of their country, and to disregard 
the obligations of citizenship, will now know that the attachments of this 
people to law, order and their government, are paramount to the insidious 
attempts of any.”162 Yet, even in a speech in which he proclaimed the loyalty 
of the Mississippi Territory, he could not refrain from personally attacking his 
enemies, simultaneously defending the rights of the inhabitants to challenge 
the government whilst also attacking his enemies with thinly veiled insults 
regarding their “false representations and licentious publications.”163 By the 
end of 1807, any concept of true and genuine Republicanism was in tatters. 
The pro-Williams Misissippi Herald and pro-Mead Mississippi Messenger had 
become littered with attack articles, reducing the political debate to a war on 
words. The Messenger, for example, would quote Cicero, before claiming, 
“We  had intended to have published this quotation from Cicero, without any 
comment, for the particular consideration of Governor Williams… but as his 
excellency is not blessed with a very inventive genius, we conclude on second 
thought to assist his intellect, with a few observations.”164 At another point, the 
Misissippi Herald accused John Shaw, the editor of the Messenger, of printing 
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falsehoods in “gross contempt of the legislator”, further noting Shaw’s 
background as being from “the frog ponds of North Carolina”, adding that “the 
English Vocabulary does not furnish terms sufficiently harsh by which to 
describe him… But why attempt to depicture a creature on whom the Divinity 
has indelibly fixed his mark! His countenance is a true index to his mind. To 
see him is to know him.”165 The war between the two newspapers became 
reflective of the war between the two quasi-Republican political factions, 
guided by the patronage the editors received. 
Perhaps the biggest problem for those who have attempted to assign party 
labels to politicians in this era is the action taken by Thomas Jefferson in 
response to the factional splits in the Mississippi Territory. It could 
conceivably be argued that, for much of the post-Burr era, Robert Williams 
was actively becoming a Federalist. That is to say, if one was applying 
Federalist party labels where this thesis has sought not to, one could see 
Williams displaying little faith in the inhabitants of the frontier, deeming 
himself superior to those that were elected by the people, and employing in his 
administration those who had served under Winthrop Sargent as members of 
the Federalist party. Yet, despite significant protests from Cowles Mead, 
President Jefferson authorized all of Williams’ appointments and actually 
reappointed Williams himself for a second term as Governor.166 It’s difficult to 
see how Jefferson would have done so if he believed Williams to be failing his 
duties or leaning towards becoming a Federalist. Indeed, he did so despite 
great pressure from the anti-Williams faction. In early 1808, Mead composed a 
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petition to Congress calling for the removal of Williams as governor, in many 
ways reflecting the petition Cato West wrote regarding Sargent several years 
earlier. Williams was clearly affected by the letter, as he wrote to the President 
claiming the letter was a forgery, and that Mead could never have got enough 
support behind him to secure enough signatures.167 To some extent, this was 
true, as Williams had dissolved the General Assembly and Legislature in order 
to prevent Mead’s memorandum gaining traction.168  
How best then, to understand Williams’ actions? It has already been observed 
that governors of the Territory generally brought their politics with them from 
their homeland upon becoming governor, which would imply that Williams 
should have held the typically strong Republican beliefs of a North Carolinian. 
Yet his actions, in dissolving the legislature and calling into question the 
validity of territorial elections, were reminiscent of Winthrop Sargent, and 
were clearly defined as overtly Federalist by his opponents, particularly 
George Poindexter and John Shaw, the belligerent editor of the Mississippi 
Messenger. On the topic of the Northwest Ordinance being questioned, 
Williams argued: 
You censure the Ordinance; say it verges on despotism, and is derogatory to a free 
and enlightened people, and invoke my aid and that of the good people of the 
Territory to have it altered…I will observe that I have never been an admirer of 
Territorial governments nor have my opinions been secreted. Nevertheless, it is 
my duty, as well as every other officer, to administer the government as it is, and 
not as we may wish it, and every good citizen should give his aid in the same way, 
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thereby showing that we are ripe for self government and one that is better and 
more free… The sages of Seventy-six, whose wisdom, valor and patriotism broke 
the iron band of tyrrany, emancipated a world, and secured both civil and religious 
liberty for millions unborn, formed that very instrument, the Ordinance, which 
you now reproach with the epithet of despotism.169 
The tone of Williams’ defence here is decidedly Republican, but also 
highlights a great loyalty to the federal government, which certainly was not 
reflected by the people of the Mississippi Territory. If Williams’ actions were 
somewhat Federalist and bordering on despotic, yet his words and the faith 
bestowed on him by Jefferson and James Madison display overt 
Republicanism, then one must come to the conclusion that neither label is 
particularly appropriate. Williams’ actions, and his words, were guided by 
personal allegiance. His ‘Federalist’ appointments were actually appointments 
designed to attack his political enemies, and by highlighting his own 
Republicanism to the government he sought to discredit the supposed 
Republicanism of his enemies. If nothing else, Williams was highly pragmatic, 
and able to latch on to the support of the Natchez elite where he saw fit, 
because they were naturally opposed to his enemies in the Green-West faction.  
As for Williams’ enemies, it must be argued that their motivation for attacking 
Robert Williams was personal gain. After Cato West had been overlooked in 
favour of Williams for the governorship, the Green-West faction must surely 
have seen his absence during the Burr Conspiracy as an opportunity for 
themselves, through Cowles Mead, to finally secure the position of Governor. 
Although, particularly through the Mississippi Messenger, Poindexter, Mead 
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and Ferdinand Claiborne repeatedly highlighted the virtues of their 
Republicanism, this must be treated with scepticism. As has already been 
noted, Williams consistently had the support of Jefferson’s Republicans on the 
national level, but more importantly, the anti-Williams faction clearly never 
truly saw eye-to-eye with said Republicans. This was most apparent during the 
Burr Conspiracy, where Mead felt betrayed by Jefferson’s support of General 
Wilkinson and never felt that his actions in apprehending Burr had been 
appreciated. Furthermore, Mead and Claiborne were dismissed from their 
positions in the local government and the militia by Williams, and this was 
supported by Jefferson and Madison. The intense partisanship of this era, 
propagated by this faction, was based around using personal networks and 
influence based on geographic areas to achieve personal power. It was not 
about securing the authority of a political party as party loyalty was only 
rhetorical and did not exist within the Mississippi Territory in reality. 
Ultimately, the purpose of this chapter has been to highlight the extent to 
which the party labels of Republican and Federalist had divergent meanings in 
this era of Mississippi politics. Despite having been labelled as a united 
Republican party, there were a multitude of factions who operated across the 
region which claimed to represent the true Republican party but actually only 
represented the interests of the members of their network. In contrast, while the 
group traditionally defined as Federalists were a much more united group, they 
should really be characterised as a Natchez centric mercantile faction, as they 
were actively willing to engage with Republican governments if it suited their 
interests and displayed political opinions which did not reflect those of the 
national Federalist party. As was shown at the beginning of the chapter, this 




does not necessarily make Mississippi unique among other states and localities 
in the early Republic, but it does highlight how complex Mississippi’s politics 
had become. This was not a political backwater, but an increasingly politically 
active region. Factions and their tactics developed rapidly, even more so than 
in locales closer to the urban political hubs of the North East United States. 
 The events surrounding the Burr Conspiracy highlight this, and also serve to 
demonstrate the extent to which local politicians in the Territory were keen to 
jump on opportunities for personal gain, both economic and political. The 
Conspiracy is further evidence to suggest that the factions of the Mississippi 
Territory were different entities from those of the wider United States, and 
further expose that, contrary to the assumptions made by numerous historians 
of the old Southwest and the Louisiana Purchase, that the inhabitants of the 
Mississippi Territory were not yet fully established as citizens of the United 
States, or of its political institutions. Citizenship and party affiliation were 
highlight contingent upon the wider political climate of the Territory and were 
very much works in progress, especially in the build up to the War of 1812.  
 
 





Civic Institutions in the Mississippi Territory 
 
The moving of the Territory’s capital from Natchez to Washington in 1802 
ought to have been a significant moment in the Territory’s history. It 
demonstrated a Territory that was moving away from its eighteenth century 
past and looking ahead to a new, American future – the name of the new 
capital implying as much. Yet although the political centre of the Territory 
moved away, Natchez remained at the heart of life in the Territory, and that 
presented a political problem. Natchez remained, even after their national 
decline, the home of the self-proclaimed Federalists of the Mississippi 
Territory, the merchants of the Mississippi Society for the Acquisition and 
Dissemination of Useful Knowledge and the former supporters of Winthrop 
Sargent. Indeed, it remained home to the most significant buildings in Natchez, 
and was the natural destination for all visitors. This chapter explores two 
attempts to establish institutions outside of the Natchez city limits, both of 
which were, on appearance, for the good of the people of the Territory, but 
which also offered local politicians and planters the opportunity to win 
political and economic victories.  
Broadly speaking, this chapter will assess the ways in which the political class 
of the Mississippi Territory sought to use their private economic and social 
powers to influence the politics of the Territory. It will analyse the ways in 
which private and public interests clashed across the Territory’s history in 
order to understand whether or not the planters were more interested in 
protecting their private interests and assets rather than in performing their civic 
duties to their best abilities, and how planters approached the combination of 




ideas of virtue and collectivity. In doing so, it will focus upon moments in the 
Mississippi Territory’s history in which the private and public interests of 
politicians clashed, assessing their motivations and the implications for the 
Territory. Jefferson College and the Bank of the Mississippi provide another 
way of looking at the networks that have been examined across this thesis. As 
has been shown throughout this thesis so far, personal motivations had a major 
effect upon the development of loyalty and political identity in the Territory, 
with personal networks and ambitions outweighing loyalty to the nation and, at 
times, even to the Territory itself. 
Thus, this chapter consists of two case studies. The first focuses upon attempts 
to found Jefferson College, what would have been the first higher education 
institution in the Territory, around 1803. The second focuses on the 
establishment of the Bank of the Mississippi in 1809, which would become 
one the most stable banks in the antebellum Deep South. While both had the 
backing of the local government, and both attempts came from individuals who 
were members of the Territorial Assembly, these were private enterprises. The 
would-be founders of both institutions were eager to highlight the benefit to 
the public and to the Territory’s prestige, for they were both corporate civic 
institutions. They were also both areligious, and entirely dependent on public 
patronage and goodwill due to lack of government funding. Therefore, the two 
institutional case studies have a lot in common, though occurring at two 
different moments embedded within the political chronologies already 
established. The College study is set during the administration of Governor 
Claiborne, while the Bank of the Mississippi was founded during Governor 
David Holmes’ premiership. Focusing upon these two events at different 




points in Territorial history allows for an examination of the development of 
the nature of power within the Territory. The studies allow an insight into the 
relationship between public and private power and authority, and the true 
nature of the political factions of the Territory. The successes and failures of 
these institutions highlight the motivations of all the individuals involved, 
demonstrate what was and was not deemed acceptable in the political dispute, 
and ultimately provide a test the assertions made across this thesis about the 
nature of the political relationships of the Mississippi Territory and their 
relationship to the power and authority of planters within the Territory. 
To assess the impact of Mississippi’s institutions, it is necessary to explore 
how similar institutions impacted political systems beyond the territories. As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, Johann Neem and Albrecht Koschnik have 
undertaken studies to explore how political parties utilised private institutions 
for their own purposes. In Chapter Two, this focused upon the MSADUK and 
Mississippi Republican Society, but it is useful here to compare the 
development of Mississippi’s college and bank. In Philadelphia, Koschnik 
identifies Federalists turning to cultural institutions as a method of continuing 
to maintain influence and authority once their electoral chances diminished.1 
Likewise, Neem identifies a similar process in Massachusetts, demonstrating 
how grassroots organisations came proxies for party competition in the period 
following the Revolution.2 However, Neem argues that these organisations 
were not organic, nor spontaneous; they were dependent upon the state. In 
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keeping with Koschnik’s analysis, Neem demonstrates that Federalists were 
leaders in this regard, incorporating libraries, banks, colleges and other 
businesses, supported by the local government. Neem also highlights how 
colleges, particularly Harvard, became weapons in the political war between 
Federalists and Republicans, using its governing board to ensure dominance 
for either party.3 
It is easy to draw comparisons between Neem and Koschnik’s works and the 
Mississippi Territory. As this chapter demonstrates, the College and the Bank 
clearly became political bargaining tools, and methods for the elite, who were 
already engaged in politics, to expand their influence. They were also, 
however, genuine efforts to improve the wellbeing of the Mississippi Territory. 
As this chapter demonstrates, the divergence can really be identified in the role 
of those pertaining to be Federalists in the Mississippi Territory. Whereas 
Neem and Koschnik see their institutions as Federalist endeavours, the 
Mississippi “Federalist” faction were much more passive in their role in setting 
up Jefferson College. The membership of the Board of Governors, who battled 
to establish the organisation, were largely made up of the Green-West faction 
and supporters of Governor Claiborne. Granted, the faction was already in 
decline by this stage, with its fortunes dwindling alongside Winthrop Sargent, 
but this still runs contrary to the idea that Federalists turned to civic institutions 
once their political fortunes waned. That comparison is more apt in the case of 
the Bank of the Mississippi, in which the Federalists were more heavily 
engaged, with figures such as Winthrop Sargent being part of its foundation. 
However, as this chapter demonstrates, the Bank of the Mississippi was so 
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successful because it was founded with the intention of protecting the profits of 
the elite, not as part of a campaign to help improve the fortunes of the 
Territory.  
Whether the differences between Philadelphia and Massachusetts’ institutions 
and Mississippi’s highlights more about the nature of its factions or the nature 
of its institutions, this comparison highlights the worth in exploring 
Mississippi’s civic bodies in more depth. However, when considering 
Jefferson College, the drive to establish better education was a proxy for party 
competition. This chapter highlights how important the factions deemed the 
location of the College to be, as it would help improve the fortunes of their 
own locales. However, this chapter contends that this was, again, less to win 
the support of the populace politically, and more to do with bolstering their 
own bases. Additionally, comparisons can also be drawn between the Bank of 
the Mississippi and that of Territorial Florida, as explored by Edward Baptist. 
Baptist highlights how Florida’s Union Bank was dependent upon land 
speculation, and planter’s slave based business enterprises.4 The Bank of the 
Mississippi and Florida’s Union Bank both operated in similar fashion, 
supporting land and slave acquisition and speculation through loans and 
subsidies. Yet, as Baptist demonstrates, the Union Bank lacked the stability of 
its Mississippi counterpart, which endured across the War of 1812 and was 
considered the most stable and secure bank in the region. Whereas, albeit not 
intentionally, the Union Bank help yeoman farmers gain influence and voting 
power, the Bank of the Mississippi did the opposite, strengthening the hold of 
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planters in the region and encouraging the reconciliation of the political 
factions of the Territory through mutual interest.  
Comparing Mississippi’s institutions to their counterparts in other states and 
territories is helpful, but ultimately it is difficult to draw too many conclusions, 
purely due to how different the two case studies within these chapters are. 
Following Koschnik’s model, one would expect to see the Federalist-leaning 
faction of the Territory uniting in support of Jefferson College, but they did not 
to usher in its development. While they played a far more important role in the 
development of the Bank, this was just as much a tale of enterprise and 
networking (considering the rehabilitation of Winthrop Sargent) than it was 
about political authority. It is difficult to align the politicking behind Jefferson 
College with the examples put forward by Neem and Koschnik because it was 
so inward looking – there was no effort made to see past local differences for 
the benefit of the Territory, and neither was it used to develop power on the 
territorial level. 
The history of Mississippi’s institutions was largely written in the 1960s and 
earlier, appearing across the various issues of the Journal of Mississippi 
History. These articles, though somewhat outdated, are still the key reference 
points for modern histories of the Territory, having been used by Haynes and 
James, amongst others.5 W.B. Hamilton, for example, published an influential 
piece on Jefferson College in 1941, and Robert C. Weems Jr.’s study of The 
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Bank of the Mississippi was equally important when published in 1953.6 A 
second article by Weems on the subject of the bank was published in 1967.7 In 
the same issue of the journal, Margaret Moore explored the development of 
Protestantism in the Territory, touching on the importance of religion and the 
church in the establishment of Mississippi’s society.8 Moore’s study of the 
religion of the Territory is important to this project as it touches upon the ways 
in which religion helped to cultivate social networks across the Territory, 
demonstrating that networks were not solely created for political purposes. The 
private economic interests of planters has also been explored by historians 
such as John H. Moore, Robert Haynes and Charles Lowery.9 However, these 
different elements of territorial history are generally treated independently of 
each other. The following two chapters intend to bring these facets together in 
order to explore how they impacted upon the Territory’s networks and politics, 
demonstrating a more nuanced approach to both the political and economic 
history of the region. But it is first necessary to relate how the schemes to form 
educational and financial enterprises in Mississippi developed in the shadow of 
the foremost established “institution,” that of plantation slavery.  
 
6 W.B. Hamilton, “Jefferson College and Education in Mississippi, 1798-1817”, Journal of 
Mississippi History, Volume 3, No. 4 (October, 1941) pp. 259-276; R.C. Weems Jr. “The 
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1953), 137-154 
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(Columbia University, 1951) 
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Vol. 29, No. 4 (November, 1967), pp.359-369. 
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The study of slavery’s political and economic institutionalisation have 
burgeoned in recent scholarship, though the majority of studies of the 
expansion of slavery and the private interests of planters engages with the 
Antebellum period rather than the Territorial. Adam Rothman’s Slave Country 
explored the development and expansion of plantation slavery in the Old 
Southwest, effectively discussing the global nature of the institution of slavery 
and the economic motivations of the planters involved.10 John Craig Hammond 
offered a similar study in 2007, arguing that the expansion of slavery in the 
West during the period between 1790 and 1820 was down to local, popular 
politics led by planters and private citizens rather than the federal leadership or 
Founding Fathers.11 This idea was expanded upon by Walter Johnson, who 
argued that the growth of the cotton industry was so major that it became an 
imperial expansion in the Antebellum era. By doing so, Johnson focused upon 
the motivations of planters, not politicians, as the driving force behind 
American expansion. The previous chapter demonstrated the ways in which 
responses to Spanish belligerence on the frontier and The Burr Conspiracy 
were dictated by private, economic ambitions and concerns, and Johnson’s 
work provides evidence to show how this private ambition only became more 
and more influential in the policies of the Southwest.12  
However, such studies are not limited to the Southwest. Watson Jennison 
effectively discussed the expansion of slavery in Georgia and highlighted the 
driving influence of private, economically motivated planters, whom he argued 
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were actively attempting to remove power from coastal elites in order to 
protect their economic interests.13 Alan Taylor’s work on Virginia also 
highlights a similar situation, demonstrating how plantation politics had a 
profound impact upon national politics and foreign policy in the Revolutionary 
era.14 Furthermore, Manisha Sinha’s study of South Carolina, though focused 
on the Antebellum era, highlighted the dual role of planters as slaveowners and 
politicians, asserting that the two were inherently linked and that politics in the 
slave states were dictated by planters and their economic ambitions.1516 
Timothy Lockley’s work on Georgia illuminates the role that poor farmers and 
yeomen played in shaping the policies of a state founded upon the institution 
of slavery. By focusing upon the relationships between poor whites and 
enslaved African Americans in the face of the dominating planter class, his 
work highlights the complexity of these burgeoning societal networks and the 
impact they had upon the direction in which the region was heading.17  
Put together, the significant historiography of the politics of slavery in the 
early 19th century offers a great deal of context. Though these studies differ in 
time period and geography, focusing more generally on the road towards the 
Civil War, they demonstrate the ways in which the Mississippi Territory’s 
inhabitants’ private interests and ambitions were inherently linked to the 
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Territory’s political history. Furthermore, the example of the Mississippi 
Territory shows that political ambitions of planters and slaveholders were not 
new, or unique, in the Antebellum period, but had actually existed in the 
Southwest since the 1790s. As this chapter seeks to demonstrate, it is 
impossible to separate the political culture of Territorial Mississippi from the 
private ambitions of its politicians, or from the economic climate in which 
these politicians worked as planters and slaveholders. Rather than seeing 
political developments over the course of the history of the Mississippi 
Territory as a sign that the region was becoming more American, and moving 
closer to the Union, we should instead view them as a burgeoning autonomy in 
the Mississippi Territory. Indeed, there existed an as-yet untested contrast 
between the original thirteen states who had a shared experience of struggle 
and bloodshed in the maelstrom of revolution, and the new territories and 
states forming further west, which did not have that same history. Just as Cato 
West and the Committee of 1799 utilised the framework of the Constitution in 
order to achieve their own ambitions rather than in order to demonstrate their 
engagement with the Federal Government, the planters and merchants of the 
Mississippi Territory embedded themselves in the local government of their 
territory for their own pragmatic goals, not out of any great sense of civic duty. 
***** 
While it may not have served as the capital of Mississippi for long, Natchez 
remained its most the important urban hub throughout the Territorial period. 
Already nearing its centenary by the beginning of the 19th century, by 1812 it 
was an “uneven” and irregular town, poorly laid out with few public buildings. 
That was, at least, the opinion of architect Levi Weeks, writing to his associate 




Epaphras Hoyt in September 1812. The town was situated on a bluff, “about 
300 miles by the course of the river from New Orleans, 150 in a direct line,” at 
a point where the Mississippi River was around three quarters of a mile in 
width. According to Weeks, the town was divided into two distinct districts. 
Natchez-under-the-Hill was situated on the plains below the main city, on the 
shores of the river. It was liable to flooding, and Weeks reported that several 
acres of land there had been lost over the past four years due to the shifting 
tides of the Mississippi. Under-the-Hill could be found, “great number of small 
houses which accommodate boatmen and the like, and where the filth of 
creation reside.” Much like in any port town, it was there that the commercial 
activity of Natchez largely took place, with boats stopping off there on the way 
down the Mississippi River to New Orleans. As a whole, the city had a rough 
radius of one mile, though it was reported that “it is not regularly laid off, only 
30 squares of about 300 feet each, each square containing 4 lots – some of 
those lots are again subdivided to suit convenience.” In addition, being by the 
river and on a hill meant that the land upon which the city was built was 
uneven: “you are constantly ascending and descending as you pass through in 
any direction – the Streets run northeast and southwest and all right angles.” 
There was only in the city wide enough for a carriage to transport goods down 
to the river, which wound down the hill throughout the city. 18 In all, it was a 
far cry from the logically laid out cities of the North East, perhaps somewhat 
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ironic considering the role that Andrew Ellicott had played in the planning of 
the nation’s capital. 
Despite being the central hub of the Mississippi Territory, Natchez did not 
have a great deal of public space. It had been replaced by Washington as the 
Territorial Capital around 10 years before Levi Weeks penned his description 
of the town. As an architect, he clearly took significant notice of the buildings 
and infrastructure of the city. He noted that, “the Public Buildings are a city 
hall, a market house, a catholic church, a small Methodist meeting house, and 
engine house and a new church.” Of the homes, he reported that, “the houses 
are extremely irregular and for the most part temporary things, but of late a 
number of good houses have been built.” Weeks claimed to have been in the 
process of building a townhouse at the time, believed to have been that of 
Lyman Harding. Said house was outside of the marked lines of the city, but he 
claimed that it would be “the most magnificent building in the Territory.”19 
The impression we get of Natchez from Weeks is far less romantic and 
picturesque than the more idealised accounts that can be found in many early 
nineteenth century travel writings and emigrant guides. In the 1830s, Robert 
Baird, for example, described Natchez as “one of the most beautiful places in 
the Valley of the Mississippi,” though, more appropriately, Samuel Brown 
wrote in 1817, “the inhabitants are distinguished for their wealth, luxury and 
hospitality; this remark is only applicable to the merchants and rich planters; 
for there are great numbers of poor dissipated wretches; of all nations, and of 
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all colors.”20 Levi Weeks’ account, however, is one of the few that have 
survived from an inhabitant of Territorial Natchez. It provides an important 
insight into how Natchez was built, but also how its people lived and their 
livelihoods, which will be explored later in this thesis.  
However, Levi Weeks’ account of Natchez is not only useful in enabling us to 
understand how Natchez looked and sounded in the Territorial era; it also helps 
to explain another of the Territorial Government’s most problematic issues. 
Incorporating land disputes, the limitations of the Northwest Ordinance, and 
the perennial problem of residents putting their private interests over the 
benefit of the Territory, the dispute over Jefferson College, Mississippi’s first 
higher education institution, became a focal point in Mississippi’s early 
history. At the heart of the issues which arose from the debate was the 
irregularity of Natchez. Having been built over a century earlier, it did not 
conform to the structured grid layout upon which the Mississippi Territory had 
been surveyed. Once again, the design of the Mississippi Territory did not bear 
any resemblance to the reality on the ground. This became a significant 
problem when the Territorial Government began plans to introduce Jefferson 
College. As per the ordinances establishing the land policy of the Territory, 
one lot of every township surveyed ought to have been left clear for the 
purposes of education and said Act of Congress granted Jefferson College an 
appropriate amount of this land upon its inception. Unfortunately, as will be 
explored in this chapter, the available lots in the city were either already 
occupied or of considerable land value, causing a clash between wealthy 
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inhabitants’ private economic values and their civic duties.21 The opportunity 
to found a College was one that was enthusiastically taken up within the 
Territory. It was perceived that it would provide a new level of prestige to the 
Territory, demonstrating its capability to become a fully-fledged member of 
the United States, capable of producing learned gentlemen without the need to 
send them away from the Territory for education. Indeed, educational 
institutions carried enormous weight in the Republican-dominated nation post-
1800; it was perceived that education could help the Territory transform from a 
rural backwater to a centre of culture and learning on the frontier, and would 
allow common people, not just the elite, to take an active part in civic life.22 
Thus, a college’s endowment was a prestigious and socially-profitable boon 
for the politicians who could establish it. Fundamentally, the debate over the 
founding of Jefferson College came down to one question – where would it be 
built? The choices and their complexities were obvious – selecting either 
Natchez, Washington or Greenville would actively favour one of the three 
major factions of the Territory. For a bipartisan venture which required support 
across all factions, this was problematic. 
In order to understand the significance of the debate surrounding Jefferson 
College, it’s necessary to return to the temporary Governorship of Cato West. 
In the previous chapter, attention was drawn to the three main networks in 
operation amongst the political classes in the wake of Governor Sargent’s 
dismissal, solidifying during the Claiborne administration. Not only were these 
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networks indelibly linked to family and patronage, but they were also 
inextricably tied to the geography of the wider Natchez region. As we’ve 
already seen, the pro-Sargent, quasi-Federalist, merchant network was based in 
Natchez, with the majority of its influential members residing there. For 
example, William Dunbar owned many plots in the city and the surrounding 
area, including his plantation, known as The Forest, and a town house called 
The Grange in the city itself.23 As was explained by Levi Weeks, Lyman 
Harding resided there, and it’s known that Aaron Burr resided alongside 
Harding and Benijah Osmun while in Natchez, placing Osmun as a Natchez 
resident as well. Furthermore, Winthrop Sargent became a resident of Natchez 
after his dismissal from the governorship, residing in his mansion, Gloucester 
from 1800 onwards, which it’s believed that Weeks also had a hand in 
renovating in 1808.24 
Natchez, however, was no longer the political centre of the Territory. Almost 
immediately upon the removal of Sargent, the legislature was relocated to 
Washington. Compared to Natchez and the merchant faction, the faction which 
identified and supported the development of Washington was not so much 
based in the town itself, but one which saw logic in developing it as a genuine 
capital for the Territory, in terms of politics, finance and education. Thus, it 
was less that the networks that were based in Washington had a vested interest 
in the town for any great personal or romantic reason, but simply that it made 
sense. It is not easy to define this network as it was highly fluid and subject to 
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change based on the political climate, though it was generally in opposite to 
the Green-West faction, despite nominally being “Republican”. That is to say, 
during the Claiborne administration, this faction was made up of Claiborne’s 
own family and its supporters, in opposition to both the Natchez network and 
the Green-Wests. However, after W.C.C. Claiborne left for New Orleans and 
Ferdinand Claiborne fell in with Cowles Mead, George Poindexter and the 
West-Greens, the Washington establishment became Robert Williams’ 
network.  
The third and smallest of the three urban hubs in the region was Greenville. 
Though Greenville is currently the county seat of Washington County, the 
town was a different entity entirely during the Territorial period. Its name 
reflected its political foundation: it was the family home of the Thomas 
Marston Green and Abner Green, part of the family that Cato West and Cowles 
Mead married into, establishing the Green-West faction. The family networks 
of Cato West and Cowles Mead were never more powerful than when the two 
served as temporary governors in the wake of Claiborne and Williams’ 
respective departures from the territory, but it was under the authority of Cato 
West that we can see the greatest attempts to consolidate their power in 
Greenville. At no point was that more prominent than in the Jefferson College 
debate between 1801 and 1806, when each faction – the Natchez merchants, 
the Green-Wests of Greenville and the Washington-based Claibornites – staked 
their claim to be the site of the College. As a whole, this geopolitical debate is 
representative of the fact that politics in the Mississippi Territory was more 
based upon patronage than political affiliation, and that its politicians’ loyalties 
were not to political parties or to the Territory itself, but to their own ambitions 




and those of their families. The concept of the College being motivated by 
Territorial development also offered a façade under which self-interested 
planters could conceal their true motives.  
Jefferson College caused two disputes. Firstly, over the town in which the 
College would be placed and secondly, over the specific plots of land in 
Natchez to be given to the College for fundraising. One aspect that was never 
challenged however, was the name. In the spring of 1802, Governor Claiborne 
declared that: “Every Government which aims at the general welfare and 
happiness, ought to direct its views to the advancement of Literature, as the 
most efficient means. But the very preservation of a Republican Government 
in its genuine purity and energy, depends upon a diffusion of knowledge, 
among the body of Society”.25 With such a Republican message at the heart of 
Claiborne’s declaration that the Territory needed an educational institution, it’s 
hardly surprising that it would be named in Thomas Jefferson’s honour, 
especially considering the renaming of Pickering County in the same way. Of 
course, both ventures could be seen cynically, designed to win favour from the 
President. It may have worked: Claiborne would soon receive the 
Governorship of New Orleans in thanks for his work in Mississippi. All the 
same, the underlying message of Claiborne’s declaration was that he intended 
for Jefferson College to be sponsored and cultivated by the territorial 
government, inherently linking the fate of education in the Territory to its 
politicians. Indeed, Claiborne stated that: “A Seminary of Learning, 
established at some situation central to the Population of the Territory, fostered 
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by the Government, and placed under the direction of a well selected Board of 
Trustees… [would] become a fruitful Nursery of Science & Virtue.” 26 Thus, 
the location of the College became a distinctly political decision, as the 
government would be perpetually linked to its progress. However, the addition 
of a Board of Trustees suggested that private citizens would be responsible for 
its wellbeing. As such, one of the consequences of the College was a blurring 
of the lines between the public and the private. 
Such a melding of private and political views was evident in the way in which 
the Board of Trustees was assembled. According to the minutes of the first 
meeting, its members included Claiborne himself, William Dunbar, Anthony 
Hutchins, Daniel Burnet, Abner Green, Cato West, Thomas Calvit, and Felix 
Hughes.27 Evidently, there was a concerted effort to bring together all the 
networks of the Mississippi Territory in something of a bipartisan manner, 
suggesting that the intention was to place the College above the bickering and 
arguing that had dominated recent territorial politics. The trustees also included 
influential inhabitants of the Tombigbee District as well, demonstrating the 
intention that the College would serve the entirety of the Territory and be a 
unifying organisation.28 Indeed, the individual records of those invited to join 
the board reflected that. John Girault, part of the Natchez merchant network, 
informed Claiborne that: “Although my accepting the appointment of Trustee 
to Jefferson College will much interfere with my domestic business, I cannot 
withhold my mite of service towards the promoting so desireable [sic] an 
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institution; I therefore do cheerfully accept the same.”29 Girault, a member of 
the Natchez elite affiliated with Winthrop Sargent and William Dunbar, 
displayed an attitude reflective of that faction here.30 His words strike a similar 
tone to the mission of the Mississippi Society for the Acquisition and 
Dissemination of Useful Knowledge, which declared its intention to improve 
the reputation of the Mississippi Territory and its inhabitants, particularly 
through the promotion of education. While some studies of the attempts to set 
up the College have suggested that Claiborne had to force the plans upon the 
citizens of the Territory, it is apparent that many inhabitants of the Territory 
leapt at the opportunity.31 
Admittedly, the enthusiasm for the College and its board was not universal. A 
week before Girault was appointed, Robert Dunbar refused to join, claiming 
that he would be “capable of so little aid to that Institution.”32 It is possible that 
Dunbar was their first choice, and his refusal meant that Girault took up the 
role – by March 1803, the committee had already been established and this late 
appointment may have been to fill a remaining role. Though it’s not entirely 
evident from the documents available who Robert Dunbar was, it is known that 
William Dunbar had a son named Robert, and as William was in his mid-50s at 
this point, it’s quite possible that this was an attempt by William Dunbar to 
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ensure his family remained involved in the management of Jefferson College. 
If that was the case, then Girault would have been a suitable replacement for 
Robert, being as he was one of the leading merchants in Natchez society and a 
friend of Dunbar himself. As will become clear, the fact that every major 
faction was engaged in promoting the welfare of the College would actually 
hinder its progress significantly and potentially extended the time it took to 
complete the process of opening the institution. 
The Board of Trustees was not the only example of the importance of private 
citizens to the wellbeing of the College; they were also instrumental in the 
funding of the college as a whole. One of the first public declarations of the 
Board of Trustees was a plea for donations, and one of their first acts was to 
form a committee in order to start a fundraising lottery.33 According to 
Hamilton, no public funding was appropriated for the foundation of the 
College, forcing the Board of Trustees into attempting more novel fundraising 
techniques. The lack of public funding is significant, particularly as it is 
apparent that the College did have the support of the local government. By 
directing the responsibility of funding the institution onto the general public, 
Jefferson College became more than simply a means of promoting education; 
it became a further test of the inhabitants’ civic values. Jefferson College was 
not to be Claiborne or West’s project, but it was meant to be owned by the 
people of the Mississippi Territory, helping to cultivate Republican virtue and 
civic pride. Unfortunately, the records of the lottery are no longer available, 
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but it appears that it was unsuccessful.34 Everyone who entered the lottery 
eventually had their fee refunded, as apparently it could not drum up enough 
interest to make it worthwhile.35 We do, however, have some record of how 
the lottery was orchestrated, and its failure does not appear to have been 
through lack of effort. Interested parties could purchase tickets for five dollars 
from a number of sites, including Bayou Pierre, Coles Creek, Ellicottville, 
Washington, Natchez and St Catherine, all across the territory. Indeed, an 
advertisement in the Mississippi Herald reveals who was selling these tickets – 
Ferdinand Claiborne, Andrew Marshalk, Thomas Marston Green, Daniel 
Burnet, Isaac Gaillard, William Dunbar and David Lattimore were all listed. 
These figures were some of the most prominent in all of the Territory, so its 
failure had nothing to do with a lack of top-down support. The failure of the 
lottery suggests a failure to engage the wider public of the Mississippi 
Territory. All of its major politicians and network leaders were involved in its 
management, but this was not enough.36 Perhaps this suggests simply that the 
College did not inspire any great widespread support and that, once again, 
private citizens were choosing their own fortunes over those of the Territory. 
Alternatively, this could also point to a complete disjuncture between the 
leaders of the Territory and its people. For all that the leading lights of the 
Territory were driving the idea of the College in order to promote the 
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education of the Territory, it appears that the common folk were simply not 
interested. In light of the attitudes displayed by private citizens across this 
thesis, the former seems the more likely reality. Private citizens of the 
Mississippi Territory, including politicians in their private affairs, repeatedly 
chose their own private enterprises over the needs of the Territory – self-
determinism was quickly becoming a defining characteristic of the region, and 
public institutions tended to suffer as a consequence. 
Although the issue of funding the College was far from resolved, the Board of 
Trustees swiftly moved on to the contentious issue of the College’s location, 
highlighting that the two issues were intertwined – the location of the College 
could determine its value, both in terms of the profitability of the land it was 
granted and the value of donations it could receive from patrons. . For the 
college to have any chance of succeeding, it needed to retain the support of all 
three factions, requiring a great deal of compromise. The College was instantly 
dependent on the goodwill of both private citizens and the federal government 
in this regard. Claiborne, in his role as President of the Board of Trustees, 
wrote to Congress in January 1803, declaring: “Our local government has no 
lands to bestow upon us. But we trust that the Legislature of the United States 
in whom the right of our soil is vested will give aid to an institution which will 
tend to establish Republicanism in the minds of the youth of the territory and 
be the firmest band of our attachment to the Union.”37 In making this 
declaration, the Board also revealed a political motivation behind the College – 
securing statehood. Whilst the lands granted to the College by the Federal 
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Government were seemingly undesirable to the Board, as they were never truly 
considered a first choice, the acquisition of land by the College would still 
have been important, allowing a useful source of income to supplement any 
offers from private citizens. As it transpired, these government grants of land 
would become significant, as they offered a neutral compromise should no 
other plot be deemed accessible.  
However, the goodwill of the inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory did not 
come easy to the Board of Trustees. Any offer of land from private citizens 
often came with a catch, evident in the two best documented offers of land, 
from Mordecai Throckmorton on one hand, and John and James Foster on the 
other. Throckmorton, a member of the Green-West network, offered around 
twenty acres of land near Greenville, and the Fosters offered a smaller plot of 
around twelve to fourteen acres in Ellicott’s Spring, near Washington. 38 While 
none of the names here were those of the most influential members of either 
faction, it is evident that they were acting as representatives of their networks. 
For example, once the Fosters offered their plots of land, conditional offers of 
funding came in from figures such as Ferdinand L. Claiborne and Seth Lewis, 
who at the time had fallen into favour with the Claibornes. If the Ellicott’s 
Spring site was chosen, a whole wave of funding would have been opened up 
to the College by the Claibornite faction, highlighting the extremely 
transparent ways in which the networks were seeking to assume control of the 
College. Similarly, Hamilton asserts that various citizens offered “divers 
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sums” of money should the College be situated at Greenville.39  It’s clear that 
the factions were aggressively pursuing control of the College, and the Board 
of Trustees was evidently in a difficult position, being as they were in dire 
need of funding. However, it would appear that the Board of Trustees itself 
retained a degree of impartiality, thanks to its bipartisan make-up, though this 
could have derived from competitive rather than collaborative interests. All the 
same, William Claiborne was the one who appointed the Board, and remained 
its President. One must assume that it would have been relatively 
straightforward for him to accept the patronage of Washington and locate the 
College there. As such, it should be noted that the Board of Trustees seems to 
have been made up of inhabitants who were interested in promoting the 
wellbeing of the Territory. Whether or not this was reflected by the general 
public, however, is in much more doubt. 
In March 1803, Territorial Judge David Ker proposed a site in Greenville to 
the Board of Trustees, arguing that it was “nearer to the centre of the Territory 
& its future population, & close to the seat of the supreme court and probable 
seat of the legislature.”40 This proposal apparently caused a great deal of 
acrimony. Hamilton records that the March board meeting was poorly attended 
and that those remaining members voted through the proposal, but it’s clear 
that, by May, there had been something of a reversal.41 The decision to award 
the College to Greenville was swiftly revoked, but it was the manner in which 
it did so that makes this a particularly striking moment in the College’s history. 
Writing to Governor Claiborne on the 31st May, Ker declared that he had been 
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charged with “having corruptly and for personal views wished to fix the 
College near Green-ville [sic] and with having before the last meeting… 
combined with the members from Jefferson District in an underhand scheme 
for establishing that objective.” Ker went on to bemoan the fact that he had 
been accused, “as one of the committee who reported the proposals of land for 
the site of the College with having in that report stated the quantity of land 
proposed by Messrs Foster [Ellicott’s Spring, near Washington], as less than 
the real quantity offered.”42 The implication here is evident, that Ker and the 
rest of the Committee were partisans, attempting to mislead the Board of 
Trustees into giving Jefferson College to Greenville by lying about the amount 
of land offered by the Foster family. These charges were, to Ker, “highly 
dishonourable… and even calculated to ruin my respectability as a public 
character. What is a judge without integrity and truth?”43 Evidently, for all that 
Jefferson College seemed to be a bipartisan effort, one could not remove the 
influence of the Territory’s factions from the equation. Although the Board of 
Trustees was made up of members of each network, there was a great deal of 
suspicion amongst them, with each faction determined that the other should not 
gain a victory. There remained friction between the desire to further the 
fortunes of the Territory and the desire to secure victory for each member’s 
own faction, and it appears that the two were not reconcilable.  
Without actually having the voting statistics for the Board of Trustees one can 
only speculate, but it is quite possible that Ker’s decision to back Greenville 
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would have driven an even deeper wedge between the two supposedly 
Republican factions. The fact that a decision made in March 1803 by a 
depleted Board could have been overturned in May suggests that a significant 
number of its members had been absent and that well over half would have 
been against the decision, and aggressively so. As such, those attacking Ker at 
the May meeting of the board must have been both members of the Natchez 
faction and the Washington Claibornites. Indeed, Ker accused Governor 
Claiborne of malpractice as chairman, writing that “you [Claiborne] sat 
patiently in the chair and heard me accused of immorality without calling the 
room to order.”44 There is a significant disjuncture between how the Board of 
Trustees looks on paper to how it appears to have acted. On paper, we see a 
group drawn from all influential networks of the Mississippi Territory coming 
together for the good of the Territory. The reality appears to be the opposite. 
Although the intent may have been there, the bipartisan Board simply appears 
to have resulted in constant dead ends. The Board was clearly brought together 
with the best intentions of the Territory in mind, but they were unable to put 
their own self-interest aside when it came to actually establishing the College, 
a stark reminder that there was no tradition of trust within Mississippi politics 
– the rules for interpersonal relationships and dynamics of conduct of politics 
had not yet been fully established within the fledgling government.  
If the Board of Trustees was not going to divide the population by settling for 
Greenville or Washington, then this new committee was in need of 
compromise. In July 1803, the “The committee appointed by the Board of 
Trustees of Jefferson College to view the different sites offered as donations 
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for Jefferson College” put forward the town of Selsertown as a potential site.45 
The chairman of the Committee, John Girault, resolved: 
… that the vicinity of Selsers Town is, in the opinion of this committee, the most proper place 
for the site of the College aforesaid, and that we do recommend to the board of trustees to 
accept the offers of donation of lands made, and subscription for money… and also that they 
purchase the land, of Mr Richard Curtis, for the use of the College, providing the price does 
not exceed 2000 dollars for all his land, in that neighbourhood. 46 
Selsertown was founded by George Selser, a migrant from Pennsylvania who 
founded an inn in the area before developing it into a hamlet who would 
eventually become President of the Bank of the Mississippi in the late 1810s.47 
More importantly, however, Selsertown was almost equidistant between 
Greenville and Washington, thus serving as a helpful compromise. Though this 
may appear surprising considering John Girault’s strong ties to Natchez, it’s 
worth noting that the rest of the committee included Thomas Marston Green, 
David Ker and William Lattimore.48  Thomas Marston Green cancelled out 
Girault’s partisanship as a devoted member of the Green-West network, 
though David Ker may have offered more support for Greenville, and William 
Lattimore provided a degree of impartiality as the elected representative to 
Congress for the Mississippi Territory. This was as close to an impartial and 
balanced committee as was possible; it had close links to the territorial 
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government, as well as two of the major factions, and its proposal was clearly 
designed to bring progress to discussions.  
Yet the proposal of Selsertown was also rejected, further strengthening the 
assessment that partisanship was rife within the Board, meaning any progress 
had stagnated for over six months. Even though David Ker’s supposed 
partisanship was reined in by the other members of the new committee, leading 
to the objectively neutral suggestion of Selsertown, almost equidistant between 
Washington and Greenville, this still wasn’t enough to convince the Board. It 
would appear that, in this case, compromise was not the solution after all, and 
that a political victory would be won one way or another. To compromise on 
Selstertown would also have been to compromise on the lucrative endowment 
of the College, and this was deemed unacceptable.  The remaining question 
would be whether or not those purporting to be Republican could put their 
interests aside and make a decision that would benefit either the Green-Wests 
or the Claibornites; if not, any notion of party loyalty must have been absent. 
Unfortunately, there appears to be no indication that any compromise between 
the two networks was forthcoming. A proclamation of the Board of Trustees, 
dated 10th June 1803, declared that they intended to “precure a Building 
suitable for the present at the Town of Washington” in order to commence the 
teaching of literature, classical languages and geometry as soon as possible.49 
This was built upon by a further petition to the Legislative Council from the 
Board of Trustees, declaring that they had, “accepted of a plat or survey of 
land near the town of Washington and included a large Spring, by the Name of 
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Ellicott’s Spring, given by Msrs John and James Forster and Randal Gibson for 
the site of Jefferson College, and having determined by vote, that the building 
of said College, shall be erected either on said survey of land or on such other 
adjoining spot as they may hereafter procure for that purpose.”50  
Hamilton and Haynes both suggest that this was the result of an agreement 
between the Claibornites and Natchez “Federalists”, which would suggest 
there had been a complete collapse in the relationship between Claiborne and 
the Green-West faction, despite their supposed Republican loyalties.51 Indeed, 
the dispute was clearly long lasting and bitter, and did not go unnoticed in the 
wider Mississippi community. Edward Turner, in November 1803, wrote that: 
“there has lately been a great difference about the site of a College, which has 
produced many personal prejudices.”52 The emphasis that the dispute had taken 
on a personal tone is significant, highlighting that this was not a debate over 
the wellbeing of Jefferson College or over the future of education in the 
Mississippi Territory. The debate over the location of the College was deeply 
personal, dictated by loyalty to the networks and factions of the Mississippi 
Territory and by private interest and alliance. The fact that these private 
interests could not be put aside for a venture which was supposedly bipartisan 
and in the interests of the Territory is striking.  
What is more, even though the plans to establish Jefferson College were 
bipartisan, the proposal as a whole was distinctly Republican. It is worth 
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noting the similarities between the words of William Claiborne when he 
established his plans and those of other founders of colleges and universities in 
early America. Claiborne discussed a place where “our Youth would be 
collected into one community, and would form the early ties of intimacy, 
which would bind their Hearts in union & friendship through Life.”53 The 
words are interesting in themselves, seemingly challenging the factions and 
networks of the Territory and suggesting that the College could be a solution to 
the division in Mississippi’s society. In comparison, when plotting the 
foundation of the University of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson called for a 
“University on a plan so broad & liberal & modern, as to be worth patronising 
with the public support, and be a temptation to the youth of other states to 
come, and drink of the cup of knolege [sic] & fraternize with us.”54 The 
distinctly Republican message is similar here – the foundations of these 
educational institutions were to improve the quality of individual in the United 
States, giving its youth the opportunity to forge their own livelihoods and 
inviting the rest of the States to share in that knowledge. In the context of the 
Mississippi Territory, it’s clear that Claiborne envisaged that the College 
would grant legitimacy and improve the Mississippi Territory’s reputation at 
the national level, particularly in the eyes of the Republican federal 
government. The fact that the dispute over the location of Jefferson College 
divided the two factions claiming to represent Republicanism in the 
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Mississippi Territory surely confirms the assessment that they were barely 
Republican at all.  
Despite all of this, and much to the chagrin of the Green-Wests, it appears that 
the Board had settled on Washington as the site of the College once and for all. 
Yet, by the end of the year, the future of the College looks to have been in 
doubt yet again. In December 1803, Cato West, in his role as Secretary of the 
Territory, declared that he intended to, “locate the donation of an out lot of 
thirty acres ajoining [sic] the City of Natchez by the act aforesaid made to 
Jefferson College.”55 The Act that West referred to here was an Act of 
Congress from March 1803, regulating the disposal of land in the Mississippi 
Territory. The act declared that “thirty six sections” were to be “located in one 
body by the secretary of the Treasury for the use of Jefferson College, and also 
with the exception of such town lots not exceeding two, in the town of 
Natchez, and of such an outlot adjoining the same not exceeding thirty acres, 
as may be the property of the Mississippi Territory.”56 Evidently, the Federal 
Government granted this land to the College in order for it to have been a 
source of income, which took on a whole new level of importance when the 
lotteries intended to fund the College failed, and private donations were not 
forthcoming. By the time of West’s proclamation, he was Acting-Governor of 
the Mississippi Territory, as Claiborne had left to assume his new position of 
New Orleans. The problem this caused seems somewhat predictable. As the de 
facto leader of the Green-West faction, West must have been frustrated, even 
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angry, by the way in which Greenville had been overlooked for the College, 
and his actions when it came to the land in Natchez suggest a degree of 
obstructionism.  
Earlier in the year, Governor Claiborne had ring-fenced a portion of land in 
Natchez “on which stands the house formerly occupied by the Priests of that 
place, and in which the courts of justice for the District and county of Adams 
are now holden, and also the lot adjoining the before mentioned lot, for the use 
of Jefferson College.”57 Cato West’s proposed plans however, were more 
contentious, encompassing plots of land which were in active public use and of 
considerable value. This would change the debate around the College. No 
longer would the dispute rest between the Claibornites and the Green-Wests, 
but instead it would centre around Natchez and its inhabitants. Certain plots of 
land in the city were, of course, more valuable than others, and the merchants 
of the city knew this more than most.  
The thirty acres allocated to the College by Cato West were to be, “beginning 
at the south end of the front street of said city and running at right angles with 
the same, westwardly to the highest part of the River Bluff thence northwardly 
along said bluff and eastwardly to the front street.”58 Front Street, Natchez 
was, at the time, one of the most prominent streets in the city, running centrally 
through the main urban area. If we trace the borders of the acreage as outlined 
by West, it becomes apparent the land would also have bordered the 
Mississippi River. This was clearly valuable land. While Claiborne had 
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allocated land on which disused buildings stood (the Committee found them in 
“very bad repair”), Cato West seemed to have offered some of the most 
valuable land in the City.59 Of course, West may have claimed that in doing so, 
he was securing the future fortunes of the College as the land would be easily 
monetised, it’s easy to see why the people of Natchez would have been 
unhappy that such land was being given away to an outside organisation. 
Whether West actively did so in order to claim revenge against the rival 
factions who dismissed Greenville by taking away valuable land in Natchez 
may never be certain but is certainly worth exploring. If this was the case, 
Jefferson College, or at least the idea of it, had again devolved into a political 
bargaining tool used to score cheap victories over rivals.  
There was apparently a great deal of confusion over the situation with the 
Natchez lots. In October 1804, nearly a year after the original offer from Cato 
West, the Board of Trustees petitioned that it was “not until we saw the 
publication of a Petition to Congress from the City of Natchez did we know of 
any claim, or pretended claim of the city to any of the public lands, within, or 
adjoining it.”60 The root of the problem was not simply over the value of the 
land to the city and its inhabitants, but also over whether Congress even had 
the rights to grant it to the College. According to the City of Natchez, the lots 
of land that had been allocated to Jefferson College by West, as per the 
ordinance of Congress, had been marked out for public use by the former 
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Spanish Governor, Manuel Gayoso. According to one deponent in the legal 
case which attempted to solve the dispute in 1804: 
His Excellency Governor Gayoso did inform him together with any others, that the present line 
of the front Street should forever be continued in front of the Town, and that no buildings 
whatsoever should be permitted to be raised on the green between said line and the Bluff, 
unless it might be found necessary to build a market House, which the People were at liberty to 
do so, at their own Expence, for the convenience of the Town.61 
There was apparently no formal record of this declaration available at the time 
or at present, but it was claimed that regular applications had been made for 
small tracts of the land, but they had always been refused, with the reason 
being that “the land was purchased from an Individual by Government, for the 
express purpose of laying off a Town” as well as to ensure that a certain area 
of land between the town and the river should stay clear, “in order to contribute 
to the health of the Settlers.”62 Regardless of whether or not this was a formal 
and legal arrangement, it must be assumed that Cato West knew of it if it were 
the case that several requests to build on the land had been denied. Indeed, 
these developments must surely have brought up in the minds of the 
inhabitants the ghosts of the Yazoo Scandal; the idea of engaging in disputes 
over archaic Spanish claims once more must have been disconcerting.  
A number of witnesses called to provide evidence of Governor Gayoso’s 
ruling by the City of Natchez. What is apparent from these is that a significant 
proportion of the inhabitants of Natchez would rather retain the parkland and 
public space that Gayoso had protected rather than see a College opened, 
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which would theoretically have done a lot of good for the Territory as a whole. 
Perhaps the issue lay in the fact that the College would not actually have been 
built there, but that the public land would only have been used to provide 
financial aid to the College. The framing of the debate here is interesting. One 
deposer argued that “it would be a peculiar hardship to divest this growing 
City of the right of so great a privilege as that of the Common and of so 
necessary an Acquisition besides an Eclipse to the glory & splendour 
thereof.”63 That is to say, the deponent clearly saw the growth and 
improvement of the City of Natchez as being more significant than the 
development of a higher education institution for the Territory as a whole. It is, 
perhaps, worth noting that the man responsible for gathering these depositions 
was Lyman Harding, acting as a committee member of the “common council 
of the city of Natchez”.64 As has been mentioned previously in this thesis, 
Harding was an ally of William Dunbar and was a key member of the Natchez 
mercantile faction. There is a connection to be made, therefore, between this 
debate and the continual struggle between the major factions of the Territory. 
While the merchants of Natchez had supported the Claibornites in securing 
Washington as the site of the College, there was evidently some backlash when 
it became apparent that the College intended to use prime Natchez land for 
financial gain. Clearly, there was a reluctance to see a rival town gain all of the 
prestige of being the site of the College, while to some extent footing the bill. 
This argument takes on another layer when one considers that Cato West, 
leader of the third faction, was the instigator of this dispute. Whilst it may be 
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an exaggeration to suggest that he masterminded such a plan in order to ensure 
the Claibornites and the Natchez merchants didn’t remain in coalition, there 
was surely some foul play involved.  
Taking a closer look at the depositions, many of the names are not particularly 
notable as, in order to have been able to provide evidence, the deponent would 
have to have been an inhabitant of Natchez since the time of Gayoso’s 
governorship. Though they had been gathered by the committee of the City of 
Natchez for political reasons, their depositions seem somewhat apolitical and 
sincere, reflective of an appreciation of the city they had lived in. Of the three 
deponents recorded by Clarence Carter’s Territorial Papers of the United 
States, only one is of genuine note. The other two, Ebenezer Rees and Polser 
Shilling never appear to have held political office, though Rees was evidently a 
successful merchant due to his regular appearance in court records of his 
purchases and sales.65 Both affirmed that they had lived in Natchez since the 
1780s and insisted that Gayoso had enforced “that the space before mentioned 
should always remain open and unoccupied for the health and convenience of 
the Town”, except for a publicly funded market house, which had been opened 
with Gayoso’s permission, highlighting another complex element to the 
College debate – environmental variability.66 The third deponent was Anthony 
Hutchins, who had famously enjoyed good fortune in Gayoso’s administration 
and was the former patriarch of the Green-West faction, before having been 
overtaken by Cato West. Evidently, something had changed in Hutchins’ 
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political views. Hutchins was perhaps the biggest proponent of the Spanish 
government left in Natchez, so it is evident why he would have wished for 
Gayoso’s laws to remain intact.  Furthermore, by 1804, Anthony Hutchins was 
no longer simply affiliated to the Green-Wests. While one of his daughters had 
married Abner Green and one had married Thomas Marston Green,  another of 
his daughters had married Ferdinand L. Claiborne, brother of Governor 
W.C.C. Claiborne.67  This adds strength to the Claiborne’s decision to side 
with Cowles Mead and George Poindexter in 1808, but at the time may have 
simply pushed Anthony Hutchins into a neutral position, where he was 
unwilling to take sides in this dispute. Hutchins’ extended family also 
highlights the fluidity of networks in the Mississippi Territory, showing how 
one individual could hold links to every faction of the Territory. 
The City of Natchez was clearly determined to retain its common space, 
supposedly for the health and prosperity of the population. Unsurprisingly, the 
Board of Trustees of the College were less than enthused by this response. 
Addressing Congress directly, they highlighted the fact that the land had been 
granted to them as a result of an Act of Congress, and that the City of Natchez 
“have no colour of Title to those Lots; they can have none founded either in 
Law or Equity.” They clarified that comment by stating that Natchez was built 
on: 
…a Tract of land purchased by the Officers of Spain, from Major Stephen Minor who then 
resided on it, for the purposes of establishing a Town thereon; part of which tract was laid out 
in lots, and the residue reserved by the Governor, until the demand for lots should make it 
necessary to extend the Town. The out-lot located and claim’d for the Use of Jefferson 
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College, is part of the reserv’d lands of the aforesaid Tract. The two Town lots remained the 
property of the Government, were appropriated for the Use of the Clergy of the place, 
consequently those lots and lands became the property of the United States, without any 
possible room for a question. And that the authority of the City of Natchez (not two Years in 
existence) can pretend to claim any of the public Lands within it’s [sic] limits is to us a matter 
of surprise.68 
This had become a somewhat unusual event, whereby the trustees of Jefferson 
College were defending the Federal Government’s claim to land to the Federal 
Government. Moving on from a legal standpoint, they went on the offensive, 
arguing that, “if buildings erected between the present Town and the river 
would affect the health of the Citizens, Towns in no situation, to be healthy, 
ought to exceed very circumscribed limits,” and that they “are deeply 
interested in the prosperity of the City of Natchez.” They further returned to 
the College’s mission statement, arguing that “without one literary Institution 
in operation among us, and seeing our Youth growing up in Ignorance, and 
consequently unqualified for the Duties of good Citizens, what must be our 
Impressions?”69  
The Trustees’ argument was largely an idealistic one, harking back to the 
Republican idea that uneducated citizens were not useful to the Union. Yet 
there was also a legal angle to the debate. Their assessment was that, if the land 
was under the ownership of the Spanish government in the 1790s, then that 
ownership must have transferred to the US government after the Treaty of San 
Lorenzo in 1795, not to the City of Natchez itself. This, they believed, was the 
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federal government’s land and therefore Cato West was at liberty to give it to 
the College. Although the depositions from the City of Natchez arrived in 
October 1804, the issue had clearly been rumbling on since December of the 
previous year, when West first announced the plans. So much is clear from a 
letter in April 1804 to West from William Lattimore, the Territory’s delegate 
to Congress.70 From this letter, it’s clear why there was such a problem – all 
the legalities of the land disputes had happened in such a short space of time 
that it was unclear which ones predated which.71 Most interesting, Lattimore 
provides an assessment of the actual health risks of building on the site: 
 Does the college essentially depend upon the possession of the lands in question? Certainly it 
does not, seeing that it may be otherwise supported, whether by equivalent donations from 
Congress or additional contributions from individuals. Will the actual lot so called be built 
upon, be possessed by the college? It will in all probability. Can it be done without materially 
affecting the health of the town? Observation and reflection convince me that it cannot, and in 
this opinion I have the concurrence of the most scientific and best informed men in Congress. 
The diseases which of late years have been alleviated with such mortality in our seaport towns, 
are general perhaps invariably to be discovered to arrive in the immediate vicinity of the town 
where the houses are expanded, and consequently where the air is confined. Space for the free 
circulation of pure salubrious air, which is now desired in vain for those towns, yet remains to 
the town of Natchez, but if it should be occupied by buildings, I have no doubt that it will 
become a source of frequent and fatal disorders. What equivalent can be given for the loss of 
that advantage?72 
 
70 Lattimore, it should be remembered, was also a member of the committee of Jefferson 
College which was chosen to scout out potential sites for the foundation of the College, so did 
hold a vested interest. 
71 William Lattimore to Cato West, 20/04/1804, Founding of Jefferson College Records, 1803-
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240. 
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To Lattimore’s mind, building the College upon the site actually did pose 
serious health risks to Natchez. This is particularly prescient considering the 
problems that Yellow Fever caused up and down the Mississippi River, but 
especially in New Orleans.73 On this, he concluded that, although Cato West 
expected him to support to claims of the College, he could not do so. It would, 
he claimed, have done more harm than good for the College, in its infancy, to 
be associated with the deterioration of health at the heart of the Territory. To 
him, the general opinion of the Territory, and the standard of its inhabitants as 
citizens, would be far worse should the health and wellbeing of Natchez 
decline, than if it did not have a College.  
Lattimore summed up his opinion in a letter to Secretary of State James 
Madison, which was also forwarded to Cato West, labelling the debacle as 
“this interfering and embarrassing act,” without which, a compromise could 
have been achieved far sooner.74 Indeed, he may well have been correct. A 
conclusion to the sorry affair did not arrive until November 1805, when 
Governor Robert Williams arrived and finally settled the matter with a degree 
of impartiality. He decided that, although no formal claim to the land was ever 
found, he and his commissioners could never be certain that the land that West 
had allocated to the College were the government’s to offer, and there fore “the 
College can derive no claim and right of title to the same.”75 He could not 
resist a slight dig at West and Claiborne however, proclaiming that: “In order 
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Document 241. 
75 Proclamation of Governor Williams, 18/11/1805, in Carter (ed), Territorial Papers of the 
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therefore that the interest of the said College may not be jeopardized, and the 
Governor for the time being embarrassed, should any or a part of said lots 
located aforesaid be found not to be the property of the United States… [they] 
may be made to the greatest possible advantage for the use of the College, as 
soon as the land the property of the United States shall be regularly 
ascertained.”76 That slight of West and Claiborne is a reminder that partisan 
attitudes were very much at play across this entire ordeal. Jefferson College 
may have begun life as a Jeffersonian-Republican idea to improve the 
standards of the Mississippi Territory, bringing the frontier Territory closer to 
the Union and allowing democracy to flourish there, and mobilising a watchful 
and cynical kind of bipartisan support, but it did not end as such in this era. By 
the time the College finally found appropriate funds and lands, the Territorial 
period was over – it was not until 1818 that lands were granted, near the town 
of St. Stephens on the Tombigbee River.77 
What then, can we learn from the trials and tribulations of the Board of 
Trustees of Jefferson College in the early Territorial period? Although, as was 
highlighted in the early part of this chapter, there seemed to have been a 
sentiment of conciliation and a desire for progress among the major factions of 
the Territory when it came to the College, this appears to have been at best 
premature, or at worst disingenuous. Their venture was marked by failure at 
every juncture; when it came to uniting in order to find a suitable site, when it 
came to securing funds, and then when it came to securing land in Natchez for 
investment. The way in which the factions acted and reacted to each other in 
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this instance is worth exploring individually as, while all engaged with the 
College differently, each one put their own interests above those of the College 
and, by association, the Territory and its inhabitants. The two supposedly-
Republican factions are perhaps most interesting here, because it is over 
Jefferson College that we see any semblance of party loyalty dissipate. The 
Green-Wests clearly assumed they had taken the upper hand when David Ker 
proposed the site of Greenville, only to have been denied by what appears to 
have been an alliance between the Natchez quasi-Federalists and the 
Claibornites. They subsequently withdrew their support and, according to 
Hamilton, their financial support, in order to deny the success of the College’s 
plans to settle in Washington.78 Cato West’s subsequent plans to provide land 
for the College in Natchez were at best ill-conceived, and at worst devious. 
Although the quasi-Federalists and Claibornites appear to have united over a 
rejection of Greenville and decision over Washington, they were split apart 
once again by West’s offer of land, as it pitted those whose interests rested 
with Natchez over those who wanted to see a successful College be founded in 
Greenville.  
Whilst W.C.C. Claiborne was the most instrumental figure involved in the 
beginnings of Jefferson College, even he was not immune to the partisan 
politicking which so hindered its progress. It’s already been shown that he was 
willing to stand back and allow one of the judges on Mississippi’s Supreme 
Court to be attacked by the rest of the College’s Board of Trustees, and to 
allow a decision that had been voted on, albeit by a depleted Board, to be 
overturned. Although Claiborne did not stay in the Territory to see the Natchez 
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debacle unfold, having moved to New Orleans, he was undoubtedly partly 
responsible for its lack of progress before that time. Indeed, the faction of his 
supporters that he represented in Washington, whilst potentially being less 
obstructionist than the Green-Wests, demonstrated no willingness to 
compromise with those they supposedly shared political beliefs with. Though 
Claiborne would certainly have argued that his faction were a truer 
representation of Republicanism than their Greenville counterparts, they were 
much more willing to align with those they deemed to be Federalists, that is to 
say the Natchez merchants, than they were with their fellow quasi-
Republicans. Like their rivals in Greenville however, they demonstrated that 
their own personal successes came before those of the College, and therefore 
by their own admission, the Territory itself. By refusing to reach a compromise 
over the location, both factions of “Republicans” demonstrated their own 
personal grudges came first, much to the detriment of the College, and to the 
reputation of the Territory.  
The quasi-Federalists of Natchez are very much the third party in this story. 
Although William Dunbar and Isaac Guion were active members of the Board 
of Trustees, they seemingly took a step back when it came to negotiations over 
the location of the College and, importantly, acting as mediators in the process. 
Guion certainly must have played a key role, as chair of the committee, in 
suggesting the objectively neutral site of Selsertown, but that appears to be 
where their neutrality ended. To all intents and purposes, they aligned with the 
Claibornites in order to secure the site in Washington but, as has been 
observed, this coalition was disrupted by the problems caused by Cato West in 
Natchez. It’s difficult to establish whether or not the faction actively played a 




role in bringing together the depositions and legal argument in order to block 
the College acquiring the land in Natchez, but if this was the case, it certainly 
points to them putting their own fortunes, and those of Natchez, above those of 
the Territory. Indeed, bearing in mind their common membership of the 
Mississippi Society for the Acquisition and Dissemination of Useful 
Knowledge, their role in delaying the land acquisition, as highlighted by the 
role of Lyman Harding, suggests where their loyalties and priorities lay. Even 
if the key members of the mercantile faction who sat on the Board of Trustees 
were not the ones blocking the acquisition of land, this still demonstrates the 
extent to which the people of Natchez prioritised their own fortunes above 
those of Mississippi as a whole.  
Ultimately, the case of Jefferson College demonstrates that, even when 
preaching a message of inclusivity, development and bipartisanship, the 
inhabitants of the Mississippi Territory failed to unite over a common goal. 
The earlier section of this study showed that, for all the attempts of the Board 
of Trustees to galvanise the populace to aid in financing and supporting the 
institution, they only received a widespread apathy in return. This highlights 
the general lack of support for Governor Claiborne’s enterprise, which he 
claimed would benefit the entire Territory and improve its standing on a 
national level. Clearly, and fairly, the inhabitants of the Territory preferred to 
look after their own private interests before putting money into an institution 
such as Jefferson College, which was not receiving financial aid from the local 
government itself. Furthermore, the College’s failure shows that that private 
self-interest even spread to those who were seeking to establish the College 




itself. Although it appeared that the bipartisan Board of Trustees was designed 
to remove party and factional loyalties from the debate, it only served to 
exacerbate them. 
***** 
This far, this thesis has been concerned with the early Territorial period, 
discussing the unrest and upheaval in the era up until the crisis of Governor 
Williams’ administration, which also encompassed the majority of the debate 
over Jefferson College. The second case study moves beyond that period to 
look at how the Territory and its inhabitants evolved once a period of relative 
political stability arrived in the region. By focusing such a study on the Bank 
of the Mississippi, the first banking institution in the Territory, one can see 
how factions had evolved in the face of the Territory’s growth, in the context 
of the nation being embroiled in an international war, and then in the period of 
relative stability that followed. The catalyst for that stability was the arrival of 
the fourth permanent governor of the Territory, David Holmes of Virginia, the 
last territorial governor and first state governor of Mississippi. That his 
appointment was confirmed in 1809 and endured throughout the 1810s speaks 
to his enduring, unifying role, especially considering that this period coincided 
with a national crisis over the War of 1812. Holmes would serve as the state’s 
governor until 1819, before taking up a seat in the Senate representing 
Mississippi until 1825, and then finally returned for a second term as 
Mississippi’s governor until retiring due to ill health in 1826.79 It is perhaps 
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telling that J.F.H. Claiborne who, as has been demonstrated was known to be a 
partisan historian, claimed that Holmes “assuaged the violence of party by the 
suavity of his manners, the blandness of his temper, and his inflexible official 
and personal integrity. He had no enemies.”80 Even while treating Claiborne’s 
work with a degree of scepticism, it’s fair to say that Holmes had a remarkable 
impact upon the Mississippi Territory.  
That impact was visible when it came to the Bank of the Mississippi. The Bank 
was comparable to Jefferson College in that it was a moment in which the 
private and the public interests of politicians might have merged, but also in 
the individuals who worked to establish it. It was also comparable in that, just 
as Jefferson College was a distinctly Republican venture, the establishment of 
a Bank was a quintessentially Federalist move, designed to support the 
merchant class which made up much of their support base. Furthermore, much 
like Jefferson College, the Bank’s board was comprised of individuals from 
across the networks of the Territory, drawing on the influence of merchants, 
planters and politicians alike. In one of the few studies of the Bank of the 
Mississippi to date, Robert C. Weems Jr. suggests that five of the Board were 
Federalists and “at least seven were staunch Republicans.”81 The implication of 
this assessment from Weems is that the leading figures of the bank were a 
bipartisan group who, as with Jefferson College, had come together for the 
benefit of the Territory. That benefit, admittedly, was more pragmatic and self-
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serving. Even more so than with education, providing a strong financial 
institution for the Territory directly aided those wealthy merchants and planters 
who helped to establish it. However, if the board of the Bank is considered 
from a different angle, it appears more pragmatic than it does bipartisan. 
Considering the fact that those that have been defined as Federalists in the 
historiography were more likely to have been financially savvy merchants and 
businessmen, it makes sense that the more agriculturally minded, rural 
“Republicans” would have wanted their advice and support. Indeed, it makes a 
great deal of sense that the Bank of the Mississippi sought advice from a 
variety of economic groups. Weems explains this himself to some extent, 
noting that at least four of the committee were lawyers, three were professional 
businessmen or merchants, and several more were landowners and planters.82 
These people were not selected because they represented a variety of political 
views, but because they all brought individual expertise. Rowland highlights 
how intentional this was, recording that the subscribers to the stock of the 
Bank were to be “a body politic and corporate.”83 This demonstrates a marked 
shift from the policies of Jefferson College, and perhaps suggests that, by 1811 
when the Bank began operations, it was possible to bridge the earlier rifts 
between the networks of the Mississippi Territory.  
Pertinent to this is the rehabilitation of the former Governor, Winthrop 
Sargent. As was shown in the first chapter of this study, the administration of 
Winthrop Sargent was the catalyst for the division and factionalism that would 
shape the early Territorial period. Thus, the fact that Winthrop Sargent was 
 
82 R.C. Weems Jr., “The Makers of the Bank of Mississippi”, Journal of Mississippi History, 
Vol. 15, No.3 (July, 1953), p.141. 
83 D. Rowland, Encyclopaedia of Mississippi History, Vol. 1 (Madison, 1907), p.181. 




chosen to be the first President of the Bank in 1809 suggests either a 
remarkable transition in his image, or that politics were not important to 
stakeholders at all. Indeed, by this time, the most important aspect to Sargent’s 
career to those stakeholders must have been his successful plantation, 
Gloucester, on the outskirts of Natchez, recorded as being one of the largest 
estates in the region.84 Though very little documentary evidence survives of 
Sargent’s role in the Bank, it’s clear from the archival record that his tenure as 
President was not a particularly long one, as he resigned from the role on 14th 
June, 1811.85 Evidently, Sargent’s role between 1809 and 1811 was to get the 
bank up and running, ensuring it had a stable foundation from which to 
develop and prosper. That Sargent was the one that the Territory turned to 
suggests a transition in the thinking of the leading figures of the Mississippi 
Territory. No longer were they entirely dictated by partisan sentiments and the 
intense feuds of the past. Instead, they were more forward thinking and 
pragmatic, assessing their peers by their private enterprises and expertise, 
rather than either their political views or their personal relationships.  
Indeed, Sargent’s allies were also influential in the establishment of the bank, 
with Lyman Harding and Abijah Hunt among those traditionally seen as 
Federalists involved in the process, implying that the leaders of the Territory 
favoured strong, secure financials and business expertise over political views. 
Some caution must be used here, however. Although it has been noted that the 
creation of the bank coincided with a downturn in partisan actions in the wake 
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of Holmes’ arrival in the Territory, all was not entirely well within the political 
elite. As was noted in the previous chapter of this study, Abijah Hunt was 
wounded in a duel with the Territory’s delegate to Congress, George 
Poindexter. This is pertinent to the Bank’s fate for, as Weems notes, this duel 
came two days before the opening of the Bank in 1811.86 Whilst the duel was 
over issues of honour rather than being explicitly political, there is no doubt 
that the partisan tensions generated between 1806 and 1808 were 
consequential, with Poindexter and Hunt hailing from two opposing factions - 
Poindexter allied with the Green-Wests and Hunt was a key member of the 
Natchez elite. This implies then, that instead of there being a complete calming 
of factional dispute in the Territory, we should see a growing divide between 
politics and economics. Even though the Bank was comprised of many of the 
leaders of Mississippi’s factions, it’s clear that they were able to look past 
those very public differences in favour of an institution which would support 
and improve their private enterprises. Perhaps it is no coincidence that 
Holmes’ arrival brought in an era of relative economic prosperity for the 
Territory, and this encouraged the politicians of the Territory to utilise the 
strengths of their rivals for economic gain.87  
That development in ideology brought success with it, in that the major 
distinction between the Bank and Jefferson College is that the Bank of the 
Mississippi was far more successful, not only in bringing the Territory’s key 
figures together, but also in the results of the venture. Over the remainder of 
the Territorial period, the Bank established itself as one of the most reliable in 
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the entire nation.88 For the purposes of this study, this reliability can be best 
seen through the prism of the War of 1812. The actions of the Bank’s directors 
during the national crisis of 1812-1815 help to illuminate the ways in which 
the political class of the Territory engaged with the Federal government and 
allow us to gain an insight into the state of the Territory’s identity at this time. 
Were they still acting out of self-interest, even though partisan differences had 
faded, or was there an increasing desire to do well by the Territory and the 
nation as a whole? Alternatively, were they simply trying to protect their own 
shared investments? Of course, by using the bank’s records, we can also see 
the ways in which the people of the Territory interacted with the institution, 
tracing its popularity through its transactions across the War. From this, we can 
learn how heavily affected the businessmen and planters of the Territory were, 
and how invested they were in the bank itself. As this chapter will go on to 
demonstrate, there was a marked difference in this regard between interactions 
with the Bank and interactions with the Jefferson College lottery, for example. 
Throughout all of this, it must be remembered that it was in the interests of 
said businessmen and planters to have a strong bank in the Territory, and the 
incentive was much more direct than it was for the College – an operational 
bank’s benefits far exceeded those of a College on a private, economic level. 
Although the Bank of the Mississippi was not the first, or only, bank in the 
Territory, J.F.H. Claiborne’s writing makes it clear why it was necessary.89 As 
he notes, “up until 1809, the circulating medium of the Territory was chiefly 
Spanish coin- doubloons, dollars, halfs, quarters, pistareens and picayunes. The 
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only currency was the receipts given at the public gins for cotton deposited 
there to be ginned.”90 The lack of regulation and control here, plus the 
lingering involvement of the Spanish government, at least in name was clearly 
of some concern to the Territory’s government, as well as its planters, just as it 
was with Jefferson College. Claiborne goes on to explain that “the ginner was 
bound by law to deliver the proceeds baled to the holder of the receipt within 
four months, under heavy penalties,” but even then, there must have been a 
degree of concern that their finances were entirely reliant on this credit system, 
based solely upon the good faith of others. Although that credit system would 
not entirely go away with the advent of the Bank of the Mississippi, such a 
development added legitimacy and further regulation to the system. Although 
Claiborne’s overview of the bank is certainly helpful, his opinion of its value is 
particularly interesting. Discussing the efficacy of the bank, he noted that 
“from its outset to its close, [it] was wisely conducted, in the interest of the 
whole community, and supplied a currency that was never dishonoured. It had 
no favorites; was ruled by no clique; was never used to favour monopolists and 
speculators; to depress and augment prices; or to practice any of those frauds 
that have made the American banking system so justly obnoxious.”91 As with 
all of Claiborne’s assessments, we must take this with a degree of scepticism, 
due to his well-documented biases, though that concern is less of an issue with 
this institution. As has been noted, and as Claiborne comments, the bank was 
governed by “no clique” – the Board was formed of a diverse group of 
individuals, therefore benefitting a far wider group of inhabitants that it might 
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otherwise have done. It speaks a great deal to the improvement of relations 
between the political networks in the Territory in the wake of Holmes’ arrival 
that the inhabitants would put such faith in a private institution (albeit with the 
government’s approval), rather than simply working within their own factions. 
The faith that was instilled in the Bank is evident from its credit records. The 
Bank kept thorough records, from which it is possible to see a great deal of 
consistency in its business, even during wartime. In records dating from 1811 
to 1814, it’s clear that, while the bank’s systems were refined over time, the 
bank did get busier. Indeed, there was no significant drop off of business 
during the disruption of the War of 1812 whatsoever, even with the lingering 
presence of the British in the Gulf. Though wars were often good for business, 
the Mississippi Territory was in a compromising geographic position, 
surrounded by British and Native American enemies. Unfortunately, credit 
notes were not uniformly dated, and bank officials did not seem to store them 
in a uniform manner, or divide them with any consistency. The following 
charts demonstrate the number of credit notes in the first halves of the years 
1812, 1813, 1814 and 1815. Due to the ways in which these records are stored, 
it is difficult to accurately sort the notes into regular time periods. However, 
these charts remain instructive, and offer a representation of the activity of the 
Bank across a turbulent period. Furthermore, the records are far less consistent 
for the second halves of the year, and it is not clear whether there was always a 
downturn in activity after August, or whether it is simply due to a lack of 
records. It is possible that harvest times affected the bank’s business, with 
loans and another activity likely taking place in order to help planters to 
prepare for the harvest, with profits coming in at the start of the year. Of 




course, it is also likely that winter affected mercantile business, particularly as 
business was so dependent on trade coming down the Mississippi River. The 
charts below demonstrate such consistency, showing that, over the course of 
the War of 1812, there was no significant change in the business of the bank, at 
least in the first halves of the year, where records are more detailed. Though 
records do survive for 1811, they are far more sporadic as the practices of the 
bank were only just being established. It was not until later in that year that a 
regular template for credit notes was developed, meaning that it is difficult to 
draw any reliable conclusions from the year as a whole.92 The left hand axis of 
the graphs represent the number of credit notes stored in the Bank’s archive. 
These credit notes mostly formulaic slips of paper, acknowledging a business 
transaction between two individuals and signed by the cashier. They do not 
reveal a great deal about the nature of the transactions, but the consistent 
numbers of notes stored in the Bank suggests that public trust in the Bank was 
not greatly disrupted by the War of 1812 and that business continued to flow 
through the Bank, demonstrating the effective public service that the Bank was 
offering.  
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Figure 4: Credit Notes stored in the Bank of the Mississippi in the first half of 181293 
 
Figure 5: Credit Notes Stored in the Bank of the Mississippi in the first half of 181394  
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Figure 5: Credit notes in the first half of 1813





Figure 6: Credit Notes Stored in the Bank of the Mississippi in the first half of 181495 
 
Figure 7: Credit Notes Stored in the Bank of the Mississippi in the first half of 181596 
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Figure 7: Credit notes in the first half of 1815




These credit notes also give some indication of the trust that inhabitants 
quickly placed in the bank. By and large, the notes consisted of requests from 
individuals to the cashier, at this time Gabriel Tichenor. Ranging in value from 
around fifty dollars up to eight hundred dollars, the notes requested that money 
be delivered from their accounts to that of an associate, meaning that Tichenor 
was responsible for the smooth running of business in the Mississippi 
Territory.97 That one man was trusted to do such a task is striking. Monthly 
dividend reports suggest that Tichenor was extremely capable of the role, with 
excellent recordkeeping apparent throughout, and he must have been in some 
way responsible for the bank’s progress.98 Furthermore, Tichenor would later 
become responsible for the processing of Revolutionary War pensions in the 
Mississippi area during the 1820s and 1830s, implying that his smooth 
operating of the bank led to greater things individually.99 In addition, the 
records give some idea of the standing of the bank’s clientele. Perhaps it is 
unsurprising that founding members of the Bank such as Ferdinand L. 
Claiborne, Cowles Mead, Abner Green and Abijah Hunt would have entrusted 
their finances to Tichenor and the Bank, but it still highlights that this bank 
catered to the top end of society, politically and economically speaking.100   
On such a note, it is worth exploring the bank’s founding mission in more 
detail, or at least how the directors envisioned it. Writing to the Territory’s 
Legislative Council in 1814, the directors stated that “This institution was 
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created for the furtherance of the agricultural and commercial interests of the 
territory, and your memorialists believe this has been managed with the most 
impartial view to the objects of its creation.”101 Evidently, the directors 
claimed to be working towards the economic security of the Territory, with the 
entire population’s interests at heart. Yet there was clearly something more 
pragmatic about the bank’s role which was, to an extent, self-preserving. This 
particular memorial focused upon plans to pass a bill in the Territory which 
would levy a tax of fifty cents on every one hundred dollars of capital stock in 
the bank, suggesting that the bank ought to be exempt from direct taxation. 
Addressing the Council directly, they wrote that “every stockholder vested his 
money in the full belief that the Government which created the institution 
would never impose on it an insupportable burden by such taxation.” This was 
backed up by the claim that the “stock at no time has been above par, clearly 
showing that no abusive advantages have been obtained.”102 The stance taken 
by the bank’s directors here is fascinating. We’ve already seen how many of 
the bank’s original directors were, first and foremost, politicians, or at very 
least local office holders. This represents a marked difference between these 
individuals’ public lives and their private interests. 
Of course, it is also worth considering why the local government attempted to 
introduce this tax, allowing an important insight into the state of the Territory, 
and the nation from the perspective of Mississippians, in the latter years of the 
War of 1812. It is noted that “the government of the union… where every 
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possible source of service was necessary to be resorted to, have indirectly 
taxed the operations of all banking institutions to the full extent it was 
supposed they could say, when the assumed principle that they were free from 
all over taxation, this revenue is raised by stamps on bank notes and discounted 
notes.”103 This would surely have hit the Bank of the Mississippi hard, based 
on the amount of business conducted via bank and credit notes by Gabriel 
Tichenor. However, the Directors claimed that it would barely do a quarter of 
the damage that the Territory’s proposed tax would have brought in.104 
Somewhat curiously, the Territorial Papers of the Mississippi Territory do not 
contain any legislation of government correspondence relating to the bank at 
all, but the fact that the Territorial Government wished to impose such a 
seemingly harsh tax upon the Bank requires questioning.105 In 1811, the Board 
of Directors had written to the Treasury Secretary, Albert Gallatin, stating that 
“the board of directors of the Bank lately established in this place have directed 
us to tender the services of our Bank to the offices of the Governor in any way 
that might be useful.” This included, in their words, protecting the “public 
money” and being responsible for the security of the Territory’s income.106 
Indeed, there is some indication that the Bank continued to support the local 
government in a significant fashion. As was mentioned earlier, Gabriel 
Tichenor became responsible for the administration of the region’s pensioners 
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in the 1820s, but the records show that this process had actually begun in 1818, 
when the bank was made responsible for selecting an agent for the payment of 
all military pensions.107 Of course, the major reason for this is that, with the 
Territory transitioning into a state, the bank became the official state bank, 
transferring out of private ownership.108 For this to have happened, there must 
have been a strong relationship between the bank and the Holmes 
administration. That, despite this, the Territory sought to tax the bank harshly 
suggests trying economic times in the Mississippi Territory. Furthermore, the 
fact that the bank’s directors attempted, and seemingly succeeded, in striking 
down the bill suggests an increased disjuncture between the private roles of its 
directors and their roles as statesmen in the Mississippi Territory, reflecting the 
complex dual roles undertaken by politicians and planters in the Jefferson 
College debacle years earlier. Yet another angle on this issue of taxation is the 
way in which the bank responded to indirect taxation from the federal 
government, which was seemingly more amenable to them than a direct tax 
from the territorial government. This indicates another shift in the identity of 
the Mississippi Territory, and the bank was significant in this process. As will 
be shown in the remainder of this chapter, the Bank of the Mississippi was 
integral in seeing the burgeoning of a relationship between the Territory and 
the rest of the United States beyond politics, helping Mississippi to become an 
economic player on the national stage, rather than just as a provincial, frontier 
territory.   
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As has been shown, the foundation of the Bank of the Mississippi helps to 
illuminate the ways in which the Territory’s society had evolved since the Burr 
affair. Yet the actions of the Board in the latter years of the War of 1812 also 
provide some of the most compelling information available with regards to the 
Territory’s place within the United States. As the Bank grew in strength, the 
decisions that it made over the course of the War reflect the relationship 
between the Territory and the southern states, but also the Territory’s 
connection with the Federal Government more broadly. Such evidence clarifies 
how the War affected the Territory beyond military matters, and demonstrates 
where the loyalties of the region lay. Central to the business conducted by the 
bank during the War of 1812 was the safeguarding of specie, from where the 
bank could acquire it. Detailing the importance of specie payments to the 
Territorial government, the Directors claimed that, “This Mississippi Bank, 
with a view to support public credit and foster the agricultural and commercial 
interests of the Territory, has used extraordinary exertions to supply the vaults 
with specie, and continue to honor all its engagements, which it will continue 
to do, if protected by your honorable body.”109 Although, as has been shown, 
much of the bank’s business was based on credit, its control of currency in the 
Territory was one of its fundamental purposes. Finances aside, the coinage of 
the Territory was something of an ideological matter. As we’ve already seen, 
the Territory was dependent on Spanish currency, and transitioning into an 
economy dependent on US specie was vital should the Territory wish to apply 
for statehood, for it would have improved the efficacy of trade routes up and 
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down the Mississippi River. Achieving this would require an influx of specie 
from outside of the Territory, the most logical choice being from the 
established banks of New Orleans.  
Such a link between the Bank of the Mississippi and those of New Orleans, 
which became de facto partners, was ideal for the Territory, providing access 
to specie payments from a reliable, nearby source.110 Unfortunately for the 
Directors of the bank, however, the War of 1812 would soon disrupt the flow 
of specie into their vaults. In the same memorial to the Legislative Assembly 
as was mentioned above, the Directors explained the issue: “Your memorialists 
further state, that from the unforeseen calamity of the times, many respectable 
banks have declined their payments in specie and these in Louisiana, with 
which ours was most connected, have long since done so.”111 As such, in the 
midst of the trying economic climate in wartime, the bank found itself without 
a regular source of specie payments. Not only that, but this further highlights 
the stability of Mississippi’s bank, which was able to continue its operation for 
a significant amount of time after those more established banks of the South 
had. All the same, the issues this created were enormous. Consequently, the 
directors of the Bank had to turn to the North to secure specie, at a much 
increased cost.112 
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This was an important moment for the Mississippi Territory as a whole. The 
War of 1812 is generally seen as a war which crystallised some form of 
American national identity, but the Mississippi Territory was far removed from 
the major theatres of battle.113 Instead, the Bank of the Mississippi played an 
integral role in bringing the Territory and Northern banks and business 
together. By looking north for specie payments, the Directors demonstrated 
that the Mississippi Territory was a legitimate market for northern banks to 
become involved and invested in. This action was as symbolic as it was 
practical; while it certainly helped the bank’s financial situation in the short 
term and allowed it to keep operating, it was also an important step in 
integrating Mississippi into the Union, at a time at which calls for statehood 
were on the rise.  
Unfortunately, specie payments from the north were not particularly long 
lasting, further suggesting that the action was more symbolic than otherwise. 
Although the memorial mentioned above was dated from December, there’s 
evidence to suggest that the specie payments from the North were already over 
by then. In October 1814, a collective of merchants and traders from Natchez 
petitioned the directors of the bank to suspend specie payments, resulting in a 
resolution that the bank would, “discontinue payments in specie when the 
amount in the vault shall not exceed 15 thousand dollars.” This, they declared, 
was the result of American currency being “directed to the illicit trade in 
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British goods at Pensacola.”114 Evidently, the war was beginning to affect the 
finances of the Mississippi Territory by this point. Dunbar Rowland offers 
some elaboration here, suggesting that the northern banks ceased specie 
payments due to British agents attempting to “drain the North of coin”.115 This 
is in keeping with the claims that the merchants seemed to be making in the 
Mississippi Territory, suggesting that the British were attempting similar 
tactics in the Gulf of Mexico as well. Indeed, the bank itself resolved to 
actively respond to the problem, stating that they sought to, “discourage a drain 
of money from the directory for the purchase of British goods, whereby the 
invading enemy is fashioned with his means of annoyance.”116 Here, again, it’s 
clear that the Bank of the Mississippi was at the forefront of events, even going 
as far to dictate policy in order to try and disrupt British operations in the 
region. Thus, the bank must be seen as having played a key role in the 
development of the Mississippi Territory as a candidate for statehood in the 
early 1810s. It quickly became the most stable, visible institution in the 
Territory, therefore becoming a vehicle for trust and security, which would 
have been particularly importance for national perception of the region and its 
stability. It demonstrated remarkable financial maturity, even claiming itself 
able to remain in operation throughout the crisis of late 1814, stating that: “the 
directors believe that by a judicious management of this institution, they will 
be enabled to continue their business in its usual role, and taking into view the 
great spark to public credit which the measure solicited would produce, deem it 
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their duty to thus continue, until the government shall direct otherwise.”117 
More than any other institution or individual in the Mississippi Territory, the 
bank proved that Mississippi was more than a backward frontier territory, and 
could operate independently even in the harshest economic climates. 
Ultimately, this chapter has sought to align private interests with corporate and 
public initiatives, demonstrating how members of the political class of the 
Mississippi Territory developed their private interests over this period. By 
contrasting the failure of Jefferson College with the success of the Bank of the 
Mississippi, it has been shown that partisan politics and the networks which 
dictated them had changed significantly in the wake of the Burr affair, 
coinciding with David Holmes’ tenure as governor. Whereas the development 
of Jefferson College was totally disrupted by partisan clashes based around the 
geopolitics of the Territory’s networks, these networks came together and 
worked alongside each other, lending their own strengths to the operation, in 
order to secure its success. For all that the founders of Jefferson College 
declared their desire to improve the Territory through the Jeffersonian-
Republican ideal of education, they were unable to move past their political 
disputes at the local level, and the College stagnated as a consequence. Yet, by 
1809 and the establishment of the Bank of the Mississippi, the opposing 
factions were able to work together in order to achieve a common goal, and 
actually built an institution which would help to shape the future of the 
Mississippi Territory.  
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Thus, two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the political leaders of the 
Mississippi Territory were far more willing to put political disputes aside when 
the benefit to their private, economic affairs was evident. Whilst this may not 
be surprising, it stresses that we cannot take territorial politicians’ words at 
face value, as while they spoke of working together for the good of the 
Territory, their actions prove the opposite was the case. It also further stresses 
that the so-called Republicans of the Mississippi Territory were not wedded to 
that party for anything other than the name and for the political gain that came 
with it. Jefferson College was a plainly Republican idea, but the two 
“Republican” factions’ arguments were the major reason it failed. Even if they 
did hold Republican political views, they were secondary to their own personal 
ambitions. The contrast with the Bank of the Mississippi is stark. Here, we see 
“Republicans” siding with their most intense rival, Winthrop Sargent, in order 
to establish a bank which would further their business and mercantile interests. 
Indeed, the bank itself was undoubtedly a Federalist notion, so their 
willingness to help it succeed further demonstrates their pragmatism, and that 
their private interests trumped all, and further demonstrates how concepts of 
Federalism endured beyond its political heyday. Indeed it is clear that there 
was a significant change in the ways planters approached notions of virtue and 
collectivity across the Territorial period. In the earlier period, “Republicans” 
would align with their Federalist rivals in order to score points over their 
“Republican” rivals, but by the time of the Bank, all parties were willing to 
work together, demonstrating a more sophisticated mindset and a more stable 
economic climate that both planter and merchant elites were invested in, 
through the more opaque “institution” of slavery. 




Secondly, it is evident that the Bank of the Mississippi became hugely 
important in developing the Mississippi Territory as something of an economic 
force in the United States, helping to transform it from a backwater to a 
productive region with a modern economy. That the planters and merchants of 
the Mississippi Territory were able to engage further with the Federal 
Government and even disrupt the British in the Gulf of Mexico during the War 
of 1812 is testament to the political power the bank wielded. This is, of course, 
in keeping with recent historiographical trends, which have seen the planters of 
the Deep South cast as empire builders who were responsible for the moving 
of the frontier and for driving the United States westward.118 Whilst the 
records of the Bank of the Mississippi are far from complete, it’s clear that its 
creation was a defining moment in the history of the Territory, granting it 
credibility and demonstrating its inhabitants’ ability to build a lasting, effective 
institution in a way that they were not capable of doing only a few years 
earlier. The bank’s success implies that the Territory came out of the disaster 
that was the Burr Affair looking to rebuild its reputation, and in doing so, 
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Land, Settlement, and the Road to Statehood 
 
While the three previous chapters have been concerned with local politicians 
and influential planters in the Mississippi Territory, largely within the Natchez 
District, this chapter aims to take a broader view of the Territorial era. Using 
the slow crawl towards statehood as a lens, it investigates the key facets of that 
process: migration, settlement, land acquisition and population growth. In 
doing so, it reveals the true complexity of the development of identity on the 
frontier. It also highlights the unique nature of that local identity, thanks to the 
challenges that politicians and inhabitants faced from Indians, old settlers from 
previous governments, squatters, the government itself and, in what has been 
an undertone to this entire thesis, the libertarian heritage of the American 
Revolution. By their very natures, these are complicated issues. This thesis has 
shown that it is impossible to map national political loyalties and labels onto 
existing parties in the Territory, and this chapter further reveals that it is 
impossible to simply map settlement onto the federal government’s blueprint 
for the Territory. Furthermore, it is important not to simply see migration as an 
economic issue, or citizenship as a political one, as the two were inextricably 
linked and interchangeable. 
The chapter focuses upon a Territory not simply in transition, but one that was 
under transformation. While many of the broader themes discussed here are 
not new to the historiography of the South in this period, this chapter argues 
for a new, far more local approach to these issues. It seeks to demonstrate how 
the individuals at the heart of this thesis began to understand the true economic 
potential of the land they held. The foundations of Mississippi’s cotton 




economy were developed in the Territorial era, thanks to the ways in which 
planters and wealthy merchants dominated the developing landscape of the 
region. However, the chapter will also highlight migration into the region more 
broadly, exploring how poorer migrants and settlers engaged with 
Mississippi’s culture and society, using a little-known land dispute as a case 
study to demonstrate the apparent land hunger which came to represent the 
Territory’s later period. This chapter, therefore, focuses upon Mississippi’s 
inhabitants far beyond the borders of the Natchez District, of Adams, Jefferson 
and Washington County. It demonstrates the hugely significant role plantation 
slavery played in defining the settlement pattern of the Territory, and the 
impact that had upon the region’s identity and society. Ultimately, this chapter 
is a study of Mississippi’s road to Statehood, reflecting on how all these factors 
combined to create a distinct identity in terms of both politics and the region’s 
place in the Union. It will be argued that the planters and local politicians of 
the Territory had to circumnavigate a unique set of challenges and difficulties 
in order to transition from a Territory to a State, but that at the heart of the 
problem were their own pragmatic, partisan and private interests, which 
fundamentally shaped local identities in the Mississippi Territory in a far 
greater way than has traditionally been appreciated. 
The issues discussed in this chapter, such as land, migration and economics, 
have received far more attention in histories of the period than any others. 
Hamilton’s socioeconomic study of the Territory on the eve of statehood is a 
highly useful synthesis of population statistics, demographics and economics 




which provides a solid foundation for any discussion such as this.1 In the same 
edition, John H. Moore discussed Mississippi’s struggles to find a profitable 
crop, and Winbourne Magruder Drake discussed the framing and context 
surrounding Mississippi’s first constitutional convention.2 Both these essays 
are dependent on secondary literature, with a lack of primary research present 
for the areas of Moore’s study which focus on the Territorial period. It focuses 
more on publications from the mid-19th century, reflecting a wider issue with 
the historiography of the period. Published around the same time, D. Clayton 
James offers a more comprehensive overview of the issues surrounding the 
Territory’s development from territory to state, though the author was better 
known as a scholar of General McArthur during World War Two and the 
Korean War, and consequently his work on Natchez tends to lack originality.3 
More recently, David J. Libby focused specifically upon slavery in frontier 
Mississippi, providing a strong overview of the relationships between slaves 
and slaveholders in the region, which naturally intersects with the issues 
explored in this chapter.4 As ever, Robert Haynes’ study of the Mississippi 
Territory is a useful starting point for exploring these issues, though the 
problems apparent with his analysis, as discussed in this thesis, remain clear.5 
Ultimately, the literature presented here demonstrates a fundamental issue with 
the historiography of the Territory. While they all remain helpful, they are now 
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somewhat dated – while they provide interesting factual notes and are worth 
reading, their focus on economics and politics respectively has meant that there 
remains a need to discuss how such matters became integrated and, in the 
process, helped to shape Mississippians’ emerging sense of relational identity.  
Other academic studies of slavery and migration in the early 19th century South 
take less of a microhistory approach and generally explore beyond the 
Mississippi Territory both in geography and chronology. Exploring the wider 
Mississippi River Valley, Adam Rothman’s Slave Country is a key study of 
how migration and slaveholding helped to shape the region, contrasting 
Thomas Jefferson’s ambitions with those of planters in the area, thus 
demonstrating the ways in which slaveholders were in part responsible for the 
expansion of the Deep South.6 Similarly, Walter Johnson’s River of Dark 
Dreams explores the concept of a slaveholder’s empire by studying 
Antebellum Louisiana.7 While they have a different overall ambition, with 
differing time periods and geographies, these studies are reflective of recent 
historiographic trends which demonstrate the importance of migration, land 
ownership, and slave holding in the development of the American South in this 
period. By moving away from a Jefferson-oriented narrative, scholars have 
argued that identity in these regions was not created and shaped by politicians, 
but by planters.8 This chapter seeks to demonstrate how there was a distinct 
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lack of liberty in the settlement of the Mississippi Territory. This thesis has 
already demonstrated that the Mississippi Territory was not the Turnerian 
crucible of American identity that has previously been perceived, and this 
chapter will demonstrate how land, and the way in which it was shaped by 
slaveholding, was as significant as politics in defining Mississippi’s identity. 
Migration is typically understood as an economic issue, defined by push/pull 
factors such as land hunger, which encouraged migrants to venture to the 
frontier. However, the history of the Mississippi Territory imposed a 
distinctive political framework over the economics and demographics of 
migration. As with the institutions discussed in the previous chapter, 
factionalism, authority, and self-interest shaped opportunities and alignments 
in particular ways, and at times threatened to destabilise the entire territorial 
process. 
In November 1803, a group of inhabitants from “Washington District”, 
situated on the “Mobile Tombecbee and Alabama rivers [sic],” wrote to 
Congress appealing for “a division of the Territory and that a Seperate [sic] 
Government be established within the now District of Washington independent 
of that of the Mississippi Territory.”9 This was not the first time that residents 
on the Tombigbee River had voiced their discontent; they had previously done 
so in 1800 in order to protest against Cato West’s intentions to progress 
Mississippi to the second stage of territorial government. At that time, they had 
declared that Mississippi’s population consisted of a “heterogeneous 
assemblage of persons who have been mostly educated under monarchical 
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governments, unacquainted with the beautiful fabric of the American 
constitution, and of Americans who have long since been disused to a system 
of representative legislation.”10 Evidently, these petitions pose significant 
challenges to a study of identity in the Mississippi Territory, and are reflective 
of the huge gulf between the established local factions of the Natchez region 
and the wider Territory. At the heart of this gulf were issues of land, 
settlement, property and self-government. 
Observing that “we cannot partake of the full benefit of this Territorial 
Government,” Washington District’s residents implied that politicians in 
Natchez served only themselves.11 Yet this wasn’t simply an issue of politics, 
but one of population and identity: 
From the late and rapid migration to this District from the State of 
Georgia and other parts of the United States, the number of our 
inhabitants is estimated as more than three thousand, all of whom 
now reside within the District of Washington and are subject to the 
Laws of the Mississippi Territory, which are enacted at the 
distance of nearly three hundred miles from us, all of which 
distance is a howling wilderness with its usual inhabitants of 
Savages and beasts of prey… That part of the Territory on the 
Mississippi and the settlements on the Mobille Tombecbee and 
Alabama rivers [sic] are composed of people different in their 
manners and customs, different in their interests, & nature appears 
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never to have designed the two countries to be under the same 
Government.12 
To the people of Tombigbee, being governed by the legislature and executive 
in Natchez or the town of Washington was hardly any different to being 
governed directly by the Federal Government, or some imperial power. They 
saw few of their interests represented in Natchez’s assemblies, nor in the 
factional disputes which threatened the Territory’s future. Indeed, they noted 
that “the inhabitants of his District labour under all the disadvantages of being 
subject to an authority far removed from us without an opportunity of 
receiving benefit or assistance from it.”13 The rhetoric here is familiar, being 
similar in tone to that used by Cato West only three or four years earlier, but 
also harks back to the mantras of the American Revolution. More broadly, the 
lamentations of the inhabitants of Washington District represent a new 
problem for the Mississippi Territory. The Territory was supposed to be on the 
road to statehood, but how could it achieve that goal when half the Territory 
seemingly wished to secede?  
Fundamentally, the purpose of the United States’ territorial system was to 
bring new states in the Union. However, throughout the first decade of the 
Territory’s existence, there were no great signs of progress for Mississippi. 
Though the population of the Territory had grown, by 1810 it was nowhere 
near the necessary threshold. While it can be difficult to establish accurate 
population statistics, in that inclusion or omission of slaves in population 
figures can often distort statistics, the most detailed study was published in the 
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1960s by W.B. Hamilton. Writing a socioeconomic analysis of the Territory’s 
population, he established that, of a total estimation of a population of 46887 
by 1816, 25447 were white, and 21440 were non-white.14 Yet, he also 
estimates that the Territory’s total population in 1810 was 40112, suggesting a 
marked lack of growth.15 Mississippi’s politicians would all have been paying 
close attention to the number, as they required around 70,000 inhabitants in 
order to apply to Congress for the right to hold a Constitutional Convention. 
For those with an interest in the Territory’s transition into statehood around 
1810, the population figures may well have been concerning. Though the 
population had grown, the rate of migration into the Territory was relatively 
minute, and would come to a near halt during the War of 1812. While that’s 
not necessarily to say that the Territory was lagging behind in its journey 
towards the Statehood, population growth was certainly stagnating. There was 
only one precedent for the territorial system thus far, with the Northwest 
Territory taking sixteen years to transition into the State of Ohio between 1787 
and 1803.16 However, as this chapter will explore, there was a sentiment that 
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the Mississippi Territory was struggling towards that threshold. Thus, the 
potential dangers of a division of the Territory, as requested by the Tombigbee 
settlers mentioned above, were worrying for those who wished for statehood, 
to say the least. The leading factions of the Mississippi Territory, even while 
they pursued self-interested positions, recognised the wider benefit of 
incorporation into the Federal Union, and all their fighting and jostling for 
position came with the expectation that statehood was on the horizon. 
In order to understand how migration and settlement worked in the Territory, it 
is important to return to the Ordinances upon which the Territory was founded. 
Indeed, although established long before the Mississippi Territory, the 
Northwest Ordinance and the 1785 Land Ordinance had pronounced effects on 
how the people of the Mississippi Territory saw themselves in relation to the 
United States as a whole.17 Assessing the relationship between the Mississippi 
Territory and the Northwest Ordinances is a complex task.18 As such, it is 
necessary to briefly discuss the legislation itself in order to understand the 
connections between the laws governing the Mississippi Territory and those 
already in existence. Firstly, therefore, one must understand the individual 
functions of the two Ordinances in question. The Northwest Ordinance, passed 
in 1787, referred to “the government of the territory of the United States North 
West of the river Ohio”, and details the governing structure of the Northwest 
Territory. It provided for the appointment of a governor, a secretary, and a 
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court of three judges to form the basis of a territorial government, and an 
elected assembly once there were “five thousand free male inhabitants of full 
age in the district”, thus forming the territory’s legislature.19 The Ordinance 
then details six articles, governing freedom of religion, the right to trial by 
jury, the means by which the territory can become a state and its relationship 
with the existing states and, finally, the criminalisation of slavery. 
Whilst the Northwest Ordinance dealt with the governing of the territory, the 
Land Ordinance of 1785, officially entitled “An Ordinance for ascertaining the 
mode of disposing of lands in the Western territory”, is concerned specifically 
with the distribution of land.20 It lays out the means by which unsettled land 
was to be surveyed, in the aftermath of cessions from both individual states 
and from, in the future, the native inhabitants. As the Act reads: 
The Surveyors, as they are respectively qualified, shall proceed to divide the 
said territory into townships of six miles square, by lines running due north 
and south, and others crossing these at right angles, as near as may be, unless 
where the boundaries of the late Indian purchases may render the same 
impracticable, and then they shall depart from this rule no farther than such 
particular circumstances may require.21 
The Land Ordinance essentially ordered the land in the Western territory to be 
divided into a grid, with a large network of surveyors trusted with the task 
working alongside the Geographer of the United States. This was not a 
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metaphorical grid but rather a physical one, not to be drawn on a map but 
instead, “The lines shall be measured with a chain; shall be plainly marked by 
chaps on the trees.”22 The process was a huge undertaking, with each surveyor 
simultaneously aiding the government to chart the new territories and being 
responsible for even distribution of land in these regions.23 
This process of surveying and dividing up land was the same process which 
was undertaken in the Mississippi Territory, led by the chief surveyor, Isaac 
Briggs.24 Furthermore, the process by which this land would be then 
distributed was the same as was outlined in the ordinances of the Continental 
Congress. In March 1803, “An Act regulating the grants of land, and providing 
for the disposal of the lands of the United States, south of the state of 
Tennessee (a)” was passed, providing a means by which the government could 
sell land in the Mississippi Territory.  
That, for the disposal of the lands of the United States within the Mississippi 
Territory, two Land Offices shall be established in the same; one at such place 
in the county of Adams, as shall be designated by the President of the United 
States, for the lands lying West of "Pearl River", sometimes called "Halfway 
River"; and one at such place in the county of Washington, as shall be 
designated by the President of the United States, for the lands lying East of the 
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Pearl River; and for each of the said offices a Register and Receiver of Public 
Moneys shall be appointed.25 
This process of dividing and distributing land via two land offices 
demonstrates an attempt by the federal government to ensure continuous 
settlement of the Mississippi Territory could occur. This was in keeping with 
the regulations detailed within the 1785 Land Ordinance, which went further in 
detailing exactly how land would be distributed by the land offices, including 
the language of the land patents settlers would receive.26 However, few settlers 
could afford the 640 acre plots of land that the survey created. Thus, these 
plots of land were regularly split up and sub-divided to create more 
manageable and affordable squares of land. Indeed, many slaveholding 
planters often only claimed 320 acre plots. This was, at least in part, due to the 
fact that land was to “be sold under the price of one dollar the acre,”27 ensuring 
that such plots were only accessible to the wealthiest of planters, and even the 
smallest of claims were out of the reach of many. As such, poor settlers and 
immigrants had to resort to alternative methods of acquiring land in the West. 
Neither the Land Ordinance of 1785 nor the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 
explicitly mentioned the government’s policy on squatters – those who had 
settled on unclaimed land prior to the surveying of land. Indeed, they also do 
not provide any guidance on how the Mississippi Territory should have dealt 
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with competing land grants from British, French or Spanish governments, for 
obvious reasons (the Northwest regions did not have such issues with 
competing claims). Thus, the 1803 statute relating to the Mississippi Territory 
is entirely original in this respect. With regards to British and Spanish claims, 
the Act dictated: 
That any person or persons, and the legal representatives of any person or 
persons, who were resident in the Mississippi territory on the twenty-seventh 
day of October in the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, and 
who had prior to that day obtained, either from the British government of West 
Florida or from the Spanish government, any warrant or order of survey for 
lands lying within the said territory, to which the Indian title had been 
extinguished, and which were on that day actually inhabited and cultivated by 
such person or persons, or for his or their use, shall be confirmed in their 
claims to such lands in the same manner as if their titles had been completed. 
Furthermore, in dealing with squatters, the Act legislated that those who 
inhabited land the region once it became a territory in 1798 could be granted 
their land as long as the inhabitant did not already own land granted by some 
other government, and the land in question was not subject to any other land 
claim.  It also stressed that said individual would be entitled to a preference in 
becoming the purchaser of that land from the federal government at the same 
price as other land in the territory.28 
Thus, the act did include some provision for those who already occupied land 
in the Mississippi Territory to retain it and purchase it, though it should be 
noted that this land was not free. This Act, that is to say, was not some late 
variation of colonial headright schemes, nor an early incarnation of the 1862 
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Homestead Act, whereby land could be granted to citizens for free after five 
years of improvements. Indeed, whilst the legislation for the Mississippi 
Territory differs from the Northwest Ordinances in its noting of squatters, it is 
inadequate for dealing with them, considering many would have been too poor 
to purchase their land under the law. Furthermore, allocating land to these 
squatters was a difficult process. The federal government’s surveyors worked 
towards establishing a formulaic, rectangular, structured system and land 
occupied by squatters did not fit into this system. Prior to the organization of 
the Mississippi Territory, land occupation was sporadic and irregular, with 
settlers claiming land as they pleased. Evidently, as surveyors attempted to 
place a grid over this land, clashes occurred.  
Of course, the settlement patterns of white inhabitants were not the only barrier 
to the structured organization of land in the Mississippi Valley. Key studies of 
the Mississippi Territory’s formative years have neglected the extensive Native 
American population of the region.29 Settlers emigrating from the eastern 
states were not moving into empty land, but land occupied by several Native 
American tribes. Furthermore, the settlement patterns of the native Chickasaw, 
Choctaw, Red Stick and other Creek tribes were even more diverse and 
sporadic than those of white squatters. Thus, the only way that effective 
implementation of the federal government’s land policy could occur would be 
via the acquisition of Indian land. Here, officials returned to the guidelines laid 
out in the 1785 Land Ordinance, which was designed with land “purchased of 
the Indian inhabitants” in mind. It stipulated that, should the boundaries of any 
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subsequent Indian purchases render the grid set up to be impracticable, then the 
surveyors would have the ability to depart from the rule as far as necessary. 30 
This, however, only answered one problem for surveyors. Whilst they were 
granted the power to adjust their surveys to take into consideration the 
unpredictable pattern of land acquired from Native Americans, this did not 
solve any issues when it came to land that was still inhabited by the tribes.31 
As was a problem for Native Americans across the continent, the native tribes 
of the lower Mississippi Valley were characterised by disunity throughout the 
early nineteenth century. Furthermore, it proved challenging for natives to 
adapt to the different forms of government and diplomacy in play during this 
period, as control of the lower Mississippi Valley fluctuated between Spanish, 
French, British and American rule. Yet in the same way, it also offered 
opportunity and the creative space for Native nations to find their own ways of 
exploiting the complex nature of power in the region. The Creek confederation 
had its strongest relationship with the Spanish, whose governors generally 
understood that it was in their interest to cooperate and trade with the Natives. 
Whilst this benefitted Natives at the time, it created issues in the forthcoming 
years, particularly after the sale of Louisiana to the United States. With neither 
the Spanish nor the French showing any real desire to expand further in to the 
continent, the rapid expansion of the Americans into the Mississippi Valley 
represented a new danger to Native Americans. Indeed, this effect was 
worsened by Spanish abandoning their alliances and friendships with the 
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Natives of the Mississippi Valley, forcing them to act alone against a 
“radically new vision of Indian-white relations.”32 
Importantly, the impact of the influence of French, Spanish, British and 
American claims to the territory was to create an “absence of clearly defined 
systems of power.”33 Richard White has highlighted the undeniable issues over 
competing land claims between European and American settlers, as well as 
Native Americans; these competing claims, as well as those of squatters in the 
region, are a crucial factor in understanding the settlement of this territory. 
Furthermore, by utilising the growing collection of census records from 
Louisiana in the late colonial period, Paul Lachance demonstrates how, 
although the Spanish were nominally in control of the area, that power ‘was 
more apparent than real’.34 Thus, there was a real vacuum of political power in 
the years leading up to the Purchase. Indeed, Lachance’s assessment is that 
there was no single dominant population base of white settlers; with 
immigrants arriving from all over America and even further afield, it is 
improbable that any single identity would have emerged amongst southern 
white settlers in the early 1800s. In addition, it is even less likely that any such 
identity would be tied to the growing national identity borne out of the 
northern states during the War of 1812. 
As settlers pushed into the lower Mississippi Valley, armed with “a 
providential sense of American destiny”, many sought to profit from selling off 
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vast “unclaimed” areas, which were actually claimed by various Indians, 
Spanish, Congress and even some states.35 Yet, from the perspective of white 
settlers, acquiring land from Native Americans was not a simple, regimented 
process. As Kathleen DuVal has noted, there was an underlying 
misunderstanding between Native Americans and U.S. Settlers when it came to 
American expansion, largely thanks to the completely decentralized nature of 
the process. 36 Indeed, during the “great land rush”, as defined by John C. 
Weaver, massive territorial expansion was linked to the territorial ambitions of 
private individuals with interests in planting and manufacturing cotton.37 It was 
the cotton planters, not the federal government, who were pushing the 
boundaries of the frontier; a frontier almost entirely bereft of governmental 
oversight. Sven Beckert assesses that the states’ monopoly on violence was 
“still a distant dream”, yet the issue ran even deeper; the state had little to no 
control over settlement on the frontier until 1806 at the very earliest. With 
settlers pushing into their land at will, it was particularly difficult for Native 
Americans to counteract, thus weakening their position when the federal 
government finally moved in to propose land treaties and cessions.38  
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The process of acquiring land from Native Americans via treaties had begun in 
the South with a huge cession of the Creek Confederacy’s lands in Georgia, 
which were subsequently converted into cotton farms in the early 1800s.39 
However, it was not until the defeat of the Red Stick confederacy in the Creek 
War, which ran parallel to the War of 1812, that large scale land treaties 
became commonplace. Indeed, as Rothman suggests, the five years after the 
defeat of the Red Sticks established “the pattern for Indian removal west of the 
Mississippi.”40 Perhaps the most significant of these treaties was the Treaty of 
Fort Jackson, signed in 1814, which brought the Creek War to a conclusion 
following the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. It also included a major land cession, 
one of the largest of the era, opening some of the Mississippi Territory’s most 
valuable to land settlement and would eventually leave to the complete 
displacement of the region’s tribes. However, such a large acquisition of land 
did prove challenging for the federal government. The original survey of the 
Mississippi Territory had been a long and arduous process; Chief Surveyor 
Isaac Briggs regularly aired grievances to his family and colleagues, 
complaining of the difficult landscape and of squatters and eventually resigned 
from his role in 1806.41 It was not until 1812 that the Mississippi Territory was 
fully surveyed and the land office open for sales and acquisitions. In 
comparison to this, the Treaty of Fort Jackson was signed on 9th August, 1814 
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and the ceded land was incorporated into Madison County in June 1815, 
emphasizing the speed in which the area was inhabited, if not entirely legally.  
These land acquisitions and the subsequent land rushes had a plethora of 
effects upon the landscape and society of the Mississippi Territory. However, 
whilst the political implications of the treaties are well covered in the 
historiography of the region, and the wider history of Indian land removal have 
also been studied, the intricacies of the relationship between white settlers in 
the Mississippi Territory and Native Americans is often overlooked. The 
various native tribes of the Mississippi Territory enjoyed a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the Spanish government in the late 1700s, yet this changed 
dramatically once the United States assumed control of the region; it is evident 
that US settlers were far less interested in maintaining the status quo than their 
predecessors. Indeed, as with the settlement of Madison County, the federal 
government had little control over its own citizens. Thomas Jefferson 
envisioned the region as a “training ground” for natives, in order to turn them 
from hunters into farmers, essentially using the Natives to cultivate their own 
land and prepare it for white farmers to come into the region.42 However, as 
has been shown, settlers often rushed into unoccupied land in order to claim it 
as quickly as possible, with little regard for any current occupier, native or 
otherwise. 
One such example is of this tension is the case of John Montgomery, a citizen 
of Amite County. In July 1809, Montgomery wrote to Governor David Holmes 
appealing for his aid following an apparent raid on his land by a band of 
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Native Americans. Montgomery reported that “the Indians burned my house 
and all that was in it except what they carried away”, leaving him “in a state of 
sufferance for want of it.” Montgomery, however, fails to mention the fact that 
a group of white settlers pursued and captured the Natives, tying them up and 
beating them, though this group implied that they did so against his wishes. 
The intricacies of the violence between the whites and the natives are not 
necessarily the most important elements of this tale however.  Moses Foster, 
the man hired to visit the Choctaws to ascertain further details for the case, 
assessed that the quarrel arose over a trade deal. Foster admitted to Holmes 
that his memory of the case had faded over time, the letter dated nearly a year 
after the event, but recalled: “Mr Montgomery let [the Choctaws] have some 
spirits for a best Dear Skin to make a pear [sic] of boots” and then recalls that 
the quarrel began over a bridle.43 This example is just one of countless cases 
which demonstrate how intertwined the experience of the Native American and 
the white settler was. Native Americans had grown accustomed to trading with 
their new neighbours, and had done so effectively with the Spanish, in part 
because it suited the Spanish to maintain good relations. However, American 
emigrants were far more interested in extending either the borders of their own 
nation, or improving their own personal wealth. As has been discussed, the 
Federal government regarded the Natives to be savages waiting to be civilized, 
and individual settlers did not appear to have any real interest in establishing 
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strong trade links with their Native counterparts, playing into the overarching 
idea that the Western lands were “empty” and ready to be settled.44   
Indeed, cases such as this were only exacerbated as the era went on, 
particularly since new tracts of land would be coming available to white 
settlers. In 1806 for example, surveyor Thomas Freeman wrote to the head of 
the General Land Office, Josiah Meigs, informing him that: “The savages have 
very recently committed Murders & Robberies in the tract of the country we 
shall be employed in – Our surveyors will, in a few weeks be scattered over a 
Surface of nearly 200 by one hundred miles in extent, on fatigue, and incapable 
of protecting themselves, a small trespass by even a few straggling Indians 
would drive them out of the field.”45 Freeman went on to decry the lack of 
support offered by the government, stating he had not been offered sufficient 
funds to defend his men.46 Of course, one must take Freeman’s concerns in 
context compared to the huge suffering inflicted upon the Choctaws and 
Chickasaws who were forced off their land in the wake of the War of 1812 and 
Creek War, but it is undeniable that the perceived injustice claimed by US 
surveyors and settlers in the Mississippi Territory contributed to the ways in 
which white Mississippians engaged with the federal government. The 
increased sentiment of self-preservation, that these inhabitants would have to 
look after themselves, may sound Jeffersonian in its essence, but was actually 
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something more.47 It wasn’t that the people of the Mississippi Territory were 
happy to be separate from the rest of the Union, defending their own land in 
their own way, far from the grasps of Congress. Instead, Mississippians 
actually wanted, and asked for, the support of the Federal Government, and it 
was the fact that such aid was not forthcoming which created the isolated 
mentality of the Mississippi Territory. Indeed, in the above discussed letter 
from Harry Toulmin to the President, Toulmin noted “indications of a 
cordiality between the leading men in this district and the persons who have 
been engaged in stirring a lawless war on the Spanish possessions,- the bold 
avowal of a disposition on the part of the federal and territorial governments to 
co-operate with the revolutionists.”48 The mention of the federal government 
here is not implying that Congress was also supporting revolutionists in West 
Florida, but that people of the Mississippi Territory were suggesting that the 
federal government would support them, though this was unfounded. What 
makes this statement significant is the implication that Mississippi’s 
inhabitants were seemingly attempting to engage in an illegal war upon the 
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Spanish in order to protect their own lands, rather than seeking aid from the 
federal government in this matter. The unique geopolitics of the Mississippi 
Territory, isolated from the federal government and bordered by Spanish 
enemies, created this unique relationship between white settlers in the Territory 
and Washington, DC. 
Tension between Native Americans and white emigrants was not the only 
source of unrest when it came to the settlement of the Mississippi Territory. As 
early as 1770, a form of Homestead Act had given farmers the opportunity to 
“gain title to land by clearing it and commencing its cultivation,”49 though this 
was by no means definitive. Well into the 1810s, squatters feared the impact of 
the arrival of the planter class in the Mississippi territory, who came with both 
the finance and political influence to claim any land they desired, often forcing 
poorer farmers away from the land they had spent years cultivating and into 
gullies and onto hills.50 Indeed squatters, particularly those who had settled 
around the Tombigbee River, greatly resented the way the federal government 
had approached the settlement of the Mississippi region. The 1770 Act may 
have offered provision to allow them to gain title for their land, but they had to 
clear it. This did not simply mean clearing trees and foliage for farming; it also 
meant taking, and defending, it from Native tribes. As Haynes notes, 
Tombigbee settlers were particularly troubled by the fact that the majority of 
good, fertile land in the region was already held by Natives.51 Settlers in the 
territory felt the government was not doing enough to help clear these lands. In 
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reality, this was an accurate assessment; the defence of the frontier was largely 
being left to private enterprise, to small farmers who needed to hold onto this 
dangerous land, as it was of little interest to planters who didn’t need to take 
such risks.  
This tension between the native Choctaw and Chickasaw nations had a 
profound effect upon Mississippi’s political identity, as well as affecting white 
inhabitants’ settlement patterns. The threat of attack from indigenous peoples, 
who were perceived to have had strong links with the Spanish governments in 
West Florida and beyond Louisiana, led white settlers to look to the Federal 
Government for aid.52 Whilst this strained relationship between white settlers 
and natives may not appear new, the impact it had upon the development of a 
unique spirit among Mississippi’s white inhabitants cannot be ignored. Almost 
no issue features more heavily in the administration papers of the Mississippi 
Territory than native affairs, and the tension between the two peoples is 
palpable.53 Silas Dinsmoor, an Indian Agent, declared in 1809 that, “Indians 
called for satisfaction on a number of charges against citizens of the United 
States for murder”, and similarly, a few years earlier, Cato West was involved 
in a case involving the murder of a native at the hands of white settlers.54 
These cases, including that of John Caller during the Burr Affair, are indicative 
of the attitude of white Mississippians towards Natives. They were perceived, 
not incorrectly, of leaning towards the Spanish with their loyalties, but it was 
also perceived that the Federal Government would do little, if anything, to 
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defend their citizens. The focus on “citizens” by Silas Dinsmoor is equally 
fascinating in the context of this study, being an example of a Federal Official 
within the Territory defining Mississippians as citizens of the Union. Indeed, 
the link between the Spanish and the Indian nations on the eastern side of the 
Territory was observed by Territorial Judge Harry Toulmin in a letter to 
President James Madison in 1811, writing: “As to the Spaniards; it is said that 
a talk has lately been given to the Indians at Pensacola, creating the 
expectation of a war with the U. States.”55 This would have resonated 
particularly strongly with poorer farmers, who would only have been granted 
their land should they have been willing to defend it themselves, without 
military assistance.  
It is clear then, that at the turn of the nineteenth century, the Mississippi 
Territory was in a state of unrest, with tension between the federal and local 
governments, early settlers, emigrants and natives. At the heart of the unrest 
over migration was a desire among settlers to claim land early and thus, 
surveyors and land registrars became some of the most important individuals 
in the entire Mississippi Territory, responsible for the provision of land which 
would shape both the politics and the economy of the region. This is visible in 
the above reference to Freeman’s letter, in that surveyors were encouraged to 
start surveying land long before it was actually cleared, but it caused most 
problems for the Land Offices themselves. The registrars of the Land Offices 
of the Mississippi Territory often found themselves inundated with requests 
and claims for land, particularly in the wake of new tracts being opened for 
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purchase and settlement. One such individual was Nicholas Gray, appointed to 
the position of Register to the Mississippi Territory in March 1815.56 Gray’s 
name does not appear in Rowland’s Encyclopaedia of Mississippi History, but 
as this study demonstrates, it certainly deserves to, for his actions as registrar 
of the office West of the Pearl River was highly controversial and sparked 
debate across the Territory.57 While Gray has been skimmed over by historians 
of the Territory, his contribution to the process of land settlement in the 
Territory should not be overlooked.  A New Yorker, Gray started off life in the 
Mississippi Territory as he meant to go on – aggressively. Bemoaning his 
appointment, he wrote to the Secretary of State complaining of the measly 
salary of only five hundred dollars per annum. Such dissatisfaction was not 
particularly uncommon among surveyors – former chief surveyor Isaac Briggs 
had resigned his commission in 1806 when he deemed the task unworthwhile 
compared to the hardship it had cost him – but Gray’s proposed solution was 
novel to say the least.58 Gray noted another unfilled position in the Territory at 
the time, that of Territorial Secretary, and suggested that he could also be 
offered that position in order to remunerate him for “the great expense of 
removing my family from New York to Washington Mississippi, and the 
heavy cost I have sustained by residing in New York for these two years 
past.”59 Unsurprisingly, the request fell upon deaf ears and Gray was not 
appointed Secretary, but his bold request does inform a great deal about how 
Northerners viewed the Territory. Moving to the Territory was not just a 
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logistical hardship to them, but it was also perceived as a backwater. Federal 
employees’ attitude to the Territory seemingly reflected Mississippi settlers’ 
perceptions of said attitude and, as will be shown, this resulted in a 
misunderstanding of the political climate of the Territory and the importance of 
fair distribution of land. 
Accusations of impropriety on Gray’s behalf appeared within six months of his 
arrival in the Territory. In December 1815, Josiah Meigs wrote to him, noting 
that “Representations have been made to me that lands have been sold by you 
at private sale pending the late public sales and before they closed.”60 Gray 
was alleged to have illegally facilitated the sale of land that was not yet open to 
public settlement, thus aggravating individuals who were not able to acquire 
land in the process. The fact that a criminal case was brought against Gray 
demonstrates the demand for land in the later territorial period. Indeed, in his 
defence, Gray observed that “the clamour was so great to enter lands which 
had been offered at auction, that the Receiver and myself thought it wisest to 
gratify them, having come from a distance and complaining of the expense of 
waiting.”61 Clearly, not only was there a huge clamour to receive access to 
land, but it’s also telling how apparently far individuals had come to claim 
land. By the end of 1815, migration was beginning to speed up again following 
the conclusion of the War of 1812, coinciding with a series of Native land 
cessions resulting from the Creek Wars in the South. As a result, public land 
auctions such as the one Gray was presiding over, were hugely important. 
 
60 Josiah Meigs to Nicholas Gray, 06/12/1815, in Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, p.597. 
61 Nicholas Gray to Josiah Meigs, 30/12/1815, in Carter  Territorial Papers, VI, p.633. 




That importance is underpinned by the fact that the prosecuting lawyer for the 
Gray case was none other than former Governor, Robert Williams. Since 
leaving office, Williams had taken up residence on a plantation in Louisiana.62 
Thus, much like Winthrop Sargent, Williams had integrated into Southern 
society following his tenure as Governor and had, to all intents and purposes, 
become a planter, thus highlighting another unique facet to Mississippi’s 
history. Former political officials such as Sargent and Williams effectively 
went “native”, becoming local agents of continuity, increasingly institutionally 
minded and local in their outlook. Williams’ interest in a case such as Gray’s is 
evident – as will be explored in this chapter, planters held a vested interest in 
seeing the unpopulated areas of the Deep South used for plantation slavery. 
This was not simply financial, but also part of a civilising mission to ensure the 
region was populated by “useful” agriculture which could help both the 
region’s economy and society thrive.63 Williams apparently became involved 
in the case at an early stage, and seems to have been responsible for bringing it 
to court at all. While the paper trail of the case is somewhat difficult to piece 
together, it’s clear that Williams had a different view on the matter from Gray. 
Writing to one of the owners of the tracts in question, Williams inferred that 
“Nicholas Gray sold you several tracts or Sections of land at private sale, 
before offered at public sale,” on the basis that he had “made sundry charges 
against the Register [Gray] to the Commissioner of the General Land Office 
[Josiah Meigs].”64 The fact that Williams, a former governor and wealthy 
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planter, would be bringing such charges against a fellow public officer, 
especially before having the evidence to prove it, highlights the importance of 
‘correct’ land disposal to the planters of the Mississippi region, and the extent 
to which the process of disposing land was inherently political, though not 
along party lines. Whilst Williams did have some expertise in such affairs, 
having been originally sent to the Territory in 1803 as part of a commission to 
verify land claims in the Territory, this should not be seen as a simple legal 
dispute.65 As much as this was about due process, it was an issue of class. 
Against the backdrop of the Territory desperately trying to encourage 
migration and settlement in order to cross the population threshold for 
statehood, the fact that Williams was attempting to delay the acquisition of 
land suggests that he wanted to ensure the land was going to the ‘correct’ 
people, who would utilise the land in the best way to benefit planters. To them, 
poorer farmers would not have been able to monetise the land in the same way. 
Although, as will be shown, poorer farmers played a hugely important role in 
the creation of Mississippi’s cotton empire, Williams apparently thought 
otherwise. 
Further context for the case is offered in a letter from Williams to Josiah 
Meigs, in which the following circumstances were put forth: 
1st. That the said Section of land being vacant was never sold or 
offered for sale until the public sales of the lands of the United 
States under the proclamation of the President in October last, and 
then being offered was not bid off, but the same was afterwards 
and before the public sales closed sold by the register at private 
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sale contrary to the express letter of the law providing for the sales 
of the lands of the United States.66 
In this case Williams’ accusation is based around a man named Caleb Perkins, 
who it appears was one of the main beneficiaries of Gray’s alleged fraud, who 
acquired a section of land which had been “made by the present Surveyor to 
embrace fractional Section no.96… This is conceived to be contrary to law and 
Justice.”67 Williams went on to allege that the same Surveyor as discussed 
earlier, Thomas Freeman, had assisted Perkins’ claim by “erasing and 
substituting other lines and courses; embracing a much greater land than was 
originally claimed and confirmed leaving the signatures of the former Surveyor 
and his Deputy affixed thereto,” thus certifying “on oath to surveys they never 
made or approved and by which lands declared vacant by the then competent 
authorities are made to appear not so.”68 The situation surrounding Perkins’ 
claim is representative of the problems faced by surveyors of new land in the 
Territory. It was difficult to mark out land claims in order to not clash with 
older, pre-existing claims. With memories of the Yazoo Land Scandal fresh in 
the minds of politicians, inhabitants and settlers alike, it’s understandable that 
individuals would be on the lookout for potential fraud and wrongdoing. Yet, 
what is significant is that court cases such as these flew in the face of efforts to 
encourage settlement across the Mississippi Territory. In 1815, politicians in 
the western side of the Territory increasingly favoured division of the Territory 
for statehood (contrary to their viewpoint in the earlier Territorial period).69 
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Consequently, the region needed a significant population boost in order to push 
it over the required threshold. These legal disputes from planters, represented 
by a former Governor, highlight how planters and their own personal needs 
and interests, now dictated the future of the Mississippi Territory in a greater 
way than their local political representatives, all the while eluding the party 
labels that have been previously assigned to them. While it is true that planters 
would have benefitted from statehood, and that those involved in the Bank of 
the Mississippi appeared to be working towards that goal, there was still a huge 
amount of private intrigue involved in this process. 
This private ambition was encapsulated by another of Robert Williams’ clients, 
William Vousden Cary. Though we have very little information on Cary, it 
must be assumed that he was a descendent of William Vousden, a long time 
inhabitant of the Territory, who had settled near Bayou Pierre in the 1770s, 
when the region was still under British dominion, and had received land grants 
from both the British and the Spanish administrations.70 Thus, this was a 
relatively old family in the Natchez District with significant landed interests. 
Vousden Cary’s caveat was against Charles M. Lawson who had bought a tract 
of land in “Section 39 in Township No. 1 of Range 3 West”, but this was 
believed to actually be land belonging to the Vousden family.71 The accusation 
levelled at Lawson, or rather at Nicholas Gray, was that the land “was offered 
and sold when it was not returned on the maps as vacant, but shaded by the 
Surveyor as covered by a Spanish patent with William Vousden’s name 
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written therein.”72 This resulted in the land “being prematurely sold and in a 
manner which precluded any intended competition and correction 
afterwards.”73 Of course, the reason this case was brought forward was that 
Cary claimed to have “possessed and cultivated this tract and Section of land 
ever since the year 1808.” Cary then claimed to have been waiting until the 
land came up for public sale, so that he could then purchase the land that he 
had cultivated. The fact that Gray had allegedly allowed the land to be sold 
before it went up for public sale therefore robbed Cary of the land that he had 
spent time and money improving.74 This issue, essentially, is the same problem 
that squatters encountered, as touched upon earlier in this chapter. Evidently, 
Cary had been trespassing upon Native lands which had not yet been open to 
US settlers, but had spent time improving and cultivating the land in order to 
add it to his family’s plantations or to sell it on for profit once the land office 
had opened it for sale.  
This legal dispute between the clients of Robert Williams and Nicholas Gray 
includes some of the strongest testimony available for the study of land 
disputes in the Mississippi Territory, and sheds further light on both the 
inequalities inherent in the process, and the inherently political nature of the 
process itsel. From it, the extent of the Territory’s squatting problem is 
apparent. Andrew Williams, of Adams County, also testified that, “he 
purchases the improvements made on a certain section of vacant land, of James 
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Evidently, this is an example of a squatter, having improved the vacant land 
they occupied, selling that land privately without having ever actually owned 
it, only for the land to have been sold by Nicholas Gray at the land office 
without giving Andrew Williams notice. The same case was made by Adam 
Benjamin, who offered more legal grounds than Williams by referencing the 
land act of March 1803.76 David Hunt was another deponent with a similar 
situation, who offered further insight into the case. Arguing that he had 
“resided with his family on said tract or Section of land for upwards of Ten 
years… he became purchaser of the same from the United States; and made the 
following payments but owing to the hardup of the times he as with many 
others had it not in his power consistently with a due support of his family, to 
be so punctual in his payments as to prevent a forfeiture of said tract of land.”77 
Hunt further claimed that he had attempted to repurchase his forfeited land 
only to be informed by Nicholas Gray that the land had already been sold to 
one Thomas Hurst.78 Robert H. Morrow also claimed to have been wronged by 
Gray, arguing that the laws for the disposal of lands in the Territory decreed 
that it was not for the Register of the Land Office to decide between two 
applicants, but for it to be decided by lot. He tried to purchase improvements 
on a tract of land, only to be informed by Gray that he had already sold it to 
Absolom Griffin without giving any notice.79 
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Such issues were clearly complex matters of land ownership, where unclear 
laws did not appear to help formulate any legal precedent. Many disputes were 
resolved out of court. Charles B. Green, for example, revoked his legal claim 
to land that had been sold by private sale after discovering that the purchaser, 
Peter Bisland, had improved the land himself prior to the purchase.80 Bisland 
was a well known planter of Adams County, residing in a large plantation 
house outside of Natchez known as Mistletoe.81 The implication here supports 
the suggestion that planters were hoping to ensure the “correct” sorts of people 
were acquiring new land in the region. Green was clearly aware that Bisland 
would turn the land into an extension of his already extensive plantations, 
therefore benefitting the Territory’s economy and thus was willing to step 
aside from his land claim. Indeed, Bisland had claimed multiple tracts of land 
in Jefferson, Adams and Amite counties in the later 1810s, suggesting that he 
was the owner of multiple plantations.82 This further demonstrates the near-
monopoly that planters held over this process, which would have limited 
opportunities for new migrants into the region, again running contrary to the 
ambitions of the Territory’s government. However, it is worth considering the 
role that Nicholas Gray played in these events, and whether or not one can 
establish his motivations for seemingly breaching so many regulations while in 
office. Fortunately, the records of the case are extensive, but they paint a 
genuinely bizarre series of events.  
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Indeed, several outlandish claims appear within the documents of the case. 
George Ford suggested that, when he made an application Gray for a “fraction 
of land”, Gray, “without the least provocation… abused & insulted, & with 
force put this deponent out of his office”, then tore his application in two.83 
Subsequently, Robert Williams finally documented his series of charges 
against Gray, suggesting that Gray refused to divide large fractions of land in 
order to sell half or quarter of tracts to one person, but then would 
subsequently divide the same land and sell it to others, apparently deliberately 
creating disputes. More tellingly, he was wont to refuse land of less than 160 
acres to people, only to them sell the same amount of land to others. This 
suggests Gray was being highly selective with those he would grant land to, 
but it’s not quite clear whether or not this was to benefit planters, or simply 
those he had relationships with. Williams certainly believed the latter, 
suggesting that Gray sold a tract of land to a New Yorker who had visited with 
him, only to then say that that man had been cultivating the land for “upwards 
of 30 years”, thus valuing the land far higher. He then refused to do the same 
for a Mr Stone of Natchez, who was in “precisely the same situation.”84 Thus 
the implication was less that Gray was favouring a certain calibre of settler, but 
more that he was simply corrupt and engaging in illicit private sales. However, 
that is significant in its own right. It implies that the disposal of land was a 
severely mismanaged process, at least in the Mississippi Territory, and 
suggests that, for all the urgency with which the Territorial Government hoped 
to increase the population, the actions of federally appointed land agents 
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served only to inhibit the process. Local connections, personalities, and 
factional ambitions in the Territory trumped due process or formal alignments. 
The events of the 5th March 1816 seem to have encapsulated the struggle 
between the Territorial and the Federal. Conjuring up a metaphor for the wider 
issue, Robert Williams, a planter and former Territorial politician, and 
Nicholas Gray, a New Yorker, former army colonel, and federal appointee, 
came to blows in the offices of the Land Office. According to the written 
testimony of several witnesses, Williams attended the Land Office on 5th 
March 1816, a curious move in the midst of an ongoing legal enquiry.85 Upon 
claiming he had business with Gray, Williams was ordered out of the office 
repeatedly, with Gray claiming that “if he did not go he would put him out.” 
Williams responded that “he had business with him as Register, and that it was 
not his Office, but the publics, except as Register, and that every man had an 
equal right to come into the Office, and have his business done with him as 
Register.” Subsequently, “Gray made use of the most abusive language and 
imprecations towards said Williams…Gray got over the Counter, seized hold 
of said Williams, attempting violently to push him out door. Williams resisted 
and a scuffle ensued.”86 Bizarrely, once Williams was forced out the office, he 
apparently patiently waited outside for others to conduct business with Gray, 
before re-entering the office with papers to present to the Register. 
Unsurprisingly, the dispute erupted again, and Gray, “got over the counter… 
and violently seized said Williams… on which a second encounter took place 
between them, with blows by each,” and Gray “positively refusing him 
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peaceable admittance into the office.”87 It’s already been noted that Gray acted 
similarly towards another claimant, George Ford, who was one of the 
witnesses for this event, but the same can be said for a number of settlers. 
Abijah Clark testified that he was pushed out of Gray’s office after claiming 
unfair treatment, and James McKee suggested something more petty entirely. 
He claimed that Gray refused to do business with him on a certain day, but 
McKee insisted as he lived seventy five miles away from the Office. When he 
finally succeeded in acquiring a tract of land, Gray snatched the certificate out 
of his hand and would not return it until McKee had paid him twenty five 
cents.88 All in all, at a time at which the Territory was supposedly uniting, this 
affair cast serious doubts over the respectability and professionalism of the 
Territory’s key office holders. 
In a later statement by William H. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury, to 
Meigs, the significance of Gray’s behaviour was highlighted. The depositions 
in the case, he wrote, “exhibit… a charge of high criminality in a form so 
direct as to render an investigation of the case indispensable to the character of 
that Officer, as well as of the Government.”89 Thus, the implication is clear. 
Not only was Gray’s rude and erratic behaviour unacceptable for a person in 
his position, but it also reflected poorly upon the government as a whole. 
While that connection has been made throughout the thesis, it is significant 
that the Federal Government was taking notice. The fact that the Secretary of 
the Treasury had entered into the debate, encouraging Meigs to organise an 
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investigation “with the least possible delay,” highlights the potential dangers 
posed by the affair.90 Indeed, an individual named Masefield Ludlow had 
earlier written to William Lattimore, the Territory’s delegate to Congress, to 
require of correct procedure in the event that, “the people of a State, or 
Territory, is materially injured by an officer of government.”91 The implication 
is clear – that the actions of representatives of the government, whether elected 
or appointed, directly impacted upon the relationship between the Territory and 
the State. Crawford was evidently aware of this, and must have been concerned 
that the incident would tarnish any positive feelings that the residents of 
Mississippi had towards Congress. At a time of increased cooperation between 
the local and national governments, and in a Territory on the verge of 
achieving statehood, it’s clear that this connection remained fragile at best. 
Land disputes had, of course, always been divisive across the Territory, but it’s 
significant that they showed no sign of settling down across the Territorial era.  
While disputes at the beginning of the era tended to be the result of historic 
claims causing overlaps between plots of land, with individuals having been 
granted lands by successive governments, later disputes were caused by private 
ambition, with influential Territorial planters eager to ensure the potential of 
the region’s land was maximised. 
From the documents available on the case of Nicholas Gray, it is difficult to 
establish an outcome. 92  Either way, for the purposes of this study, it is useful 
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to consider how emblematic the relationship between Gray and Williams was 
of wider relations between the Mississippi Territory and the federal 
government. Previous studies of the Territory have suggested that David 
Holmes had a calming effect upon the populace, helping to cultivate an 
environment in which the legislature could formally begin the process of 
acquiring statehood.93 While this may have been true in a political context, it is 
clear that there was still a great deal of scepticism and resistance to outsider 
involvement and representatives of the federal government in the later 
Territorial period.  
With that scepticism and resistance in mind, Mississippi’s road to statehood 
was a challenging one, sculpted by debates over land such as the one involving 
Nicholas Gray. Mississippi’s vast landscapes were integral to Mississippi 
achieving statehood because migration was an essential part of the Territory’s 
population growth. Mississippi’s future was highly dependent upon that 
population growth as, without it, it would not reach the necessary population 
threshold required for statehood, as outlined in the foundational ordinances 
discussed earlier in this thesis. However, development into a state of the Union 
was not a straightforward process for the politicians and planters of the 
Mississippi Territory. As has been made clear throughout this thesis, there was 
no singular vision guiding the Territory throughout the 1810s. While David 
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Holmes endured as the Territory’s Governor into Statehood, his presence alone 
was not enough to prevent the process from being marred by further divisions 
and disruptions. It would be these divisions, more than any other in the 
Territory’s history, which would shape Mississippi’s future, both in a 
figurative and very literal sense.  
Ultimately, it is impossible to discuss Mississippi’s transition into statehood 
without a focus upon migration. As has been demonstrated earlier in this 
chapter and throughout this thesis as a whole, the success of the statehood 
campaign lay in encouraging migration and settlement into the Territory. It 
was, in reality, the poorer farmer, often known as the yeoman farmer, who 
would really shape the political debates over statehood. The population 
threshold for statehood in the late 1810s was around 70,000, yet even with that 
number of inhabitants, statehood would not have been a certainty. Earlier in 
the 1810s, notions began to appear that the Territory should not be admitted 
into the Union as a single state. If it had, at the time, it would have been the 
second largest state in the Union behind Virginia. Considering the rocky 
political climate across the Territorial period, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
this caused consternation across the region, especially considering how 
localised factional support was. While this study has a whole has focused on 
the western side of the Territory in order to assess the relationships between 
the networks of Cato West, Cowles Mead, the Claibornes and so on, it has also 
touched upon the inhabitants of the Tombigbee District, far detached from the 
machinations of the politicians in the former Natchez District. While, in 1801, 
Tombigbee was the only established and organised region on the eastern side 
of the Territory, it would be later joined, around 1808, by Madison County 




further north.94  Concepts of “country versus the city” were not new to the 
Mississippi Territory, but the push towards statehood added new focus to the 
debates.95  
***** 
It was a telling measure of the localism and regional factionalism in the 
Mississippi Territory that its path to federal statehood itself splintered into two 
constituencies. The early fears and objections of the Tombigbee District, 
discussed above, would culminate in the creation of the Alabama Territory, but 
it is instructive that amidst the disputes over sovereignty and jurisdiction, the 
rhetoric of political identity – including in this case the heritage of the 
revolution – was again carefully mobilised to lend credence to arguments. 
Members of Washington County advocated for two territories to be established 
– one in Mississippi, one in Alabama. Of course, they would prove to be on the 
correct side of the debate in the long term, but such an idea was a dangerous 
one for politicians in the western region. To split the Territory would have 
required an even greater number of inhabitants to push for statehood, and 
members of Adams and Jefferson Counties feared, at least in the earlier 
Territorial period, that a divided Territory might never achieve their ambitions 
of Statehood. In 1814, Congressional Delegate William Lattimore would voice 
his concerns about his desires to see the Territory divided, but, as an inhabitant 
of Natchez he was encouraged strongly to push for statehood for the entire 
region, as politicians in the West believed there would not be enough popular 
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support for a division.96 To politicians in Natchez, Greenville and Washington 
(the town, not the County), finally united, the debate was about achieving 
statehood as quickly as possible, but, to those in the east, the matter was far 
more about ideology, individual freedom, and the right to self-government. 
Calls for division would only get louder with the incorporation of Madison 
County in 1808, but firstly, it’s worth addressing the concerns raised in that 
initial petition of 1803.  
At the heart of the concerns, was a concept of identity: 
 From the late and rapid migration to this District from the State of 
Georgia and other parts of the United States, the number of our 
inhabitants is estimated at more than three thousand, all of whom now 
reside within the District of Washington and are all subject to the Laws of 
the Mississippi Territory, which are enacted at the distance of nearly 
three hundred miles from us, all of which distance is a howling 
wilderness with its usual inhabitants of Savages and beasts of prey. That 
part of the Territory on the Mississippi and the settlements on the Mobille 
Tombecbee [sic] and Alabama rivers are composed of people different in 
their manners and customs, different in their interests, & nature appears 
never to have designed the two countries to be under the same 
Government.97 
The Committee’s words are some of the clearest on the topic of the Territory’s 
identity written across the era, and contribute a different dimension to the 
disputes discussed throughout this thesis. The residents clearly highlight their 
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provenance as largely being from the State of Georgia, but the route from 
Georgia was the most common migration path for inhabitants of the 
Mississippi Territory in general.98 Geographically, this is logical, due to the 
shared border; while migrants did travel from the Carolinas, Virginia and 
occasionally further north, the suggestion that the majority of settlers were 
from Georgia is not unrealistic, especially in Washington County. Yet, the 
same would certainly be said of those in the Natchez area. More likely, the 
inhabitants of Washington County were referring to those in positions of 
authority within the Territory. As has been identified already, Winthrop 
Sargent was a Massachusetts man, William C.C. Claiborne was a Virginian 
who had arrived in Mississippi via Tennessee. It was not really until 1804, a 
year after this petition, that the Tombigbee region really acquired its own 
representative in government, beyond the few members of the Legislative 
Council it sent to Washington. That year, Harry Toulmin was appointed as a 
Territorial Supreme Court Judge, with jurisdiction over the Tombigbee 
District. Although technically speaking, he was a replacement for Ephraim 
Kirby, there’s no suggestion that Kirby’s role was ever specifically for the 
eastern region.99 Toulmin would soon become a significant advocate for 
Washington and later Madison Counties, and became the most influential 
politician in the Territory outside of the Natchez District. Ironically, Toulmin 
was by no means a local, having been born in Somerset, before settling in 
Kentucky and serving as Secretary of State there.100 Toulmin’s appointment in 
1804 certainly helped the region to highlight its plight, and heightened the 
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differences between the East and West. The debate itself provides an 
interesting contrast to the existing feuds that have been discussed throughout 
this thesis. While the majority of disputes took on a partisan angle, with 
political ideology at stake, the debates over division were far less party-
political, instead resting on notions of identity. Of course, there were political 
undercurrents to the statehood debate, but they were much more to do with the 
right to self-representation than any ideological difference. 
Those political ideas of self-representation appeared throughout the petition, 
and particularly prominent is the way in which the petitioners recalled 
ideology of the American Revolution: 
The inhabitants of this District labour under all the disadvantage of being 
subject to an authority far removed from us without an opportunity of 
receiving benefit or assistance from it, consequently there is such a want 
of energy in our Government that society seems rather to work an injury 
to the better part of the community, than to benefit, they having 
surrendered a part of their rights to that society which is incapable, from 
its situation, of securing the balance.101  
Just as Thomas Rodney had during the Burr Conspiracy, and Cato West had 
before him, the members of Tombigbee appealed to the patriotic sensibilities 
of Congress, suggesting that their plight was not too dissimilar to that of the 
Colonies during the Revolution, as they were so far detached from the 
legislative assembly so as to receive none of the benefits. In drawing this 
comparison, they helped to demonstrate just how ubiquitous these claims had 
become. It would be easy to draw the conclusion that appropriating the rhetoric 
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of the Revolution was a sign that the region identified with the new nation and 
that its inhabitants were exhibiting some form of American loyalty and 
identity. However, the way in which this rhetoric became so commonplace 
throughout the Mississippi Territory between 1800 and 1810 suggests that its 
usage was far more pragmatic. To simultaneously suggest that the inhabitants 
of the eastern Mississippi Territory were so far detached in terms of ideology 
and identity but to then use the same tactics to appeal to Congress using the 
rhetoric of the American Revolution implies that, even if they did believe it 
themselves, neither faction truly embodied that revolutionary spirit. This is not 
to say that rival factions could not have regional differences but still celebrate 
being part of America, but such bold declarations of loyalty and identity 
cannot be taken at face value in the context of the Mississippi Territory.102 This 
is in keeping with the findings of this thesis as a whole. Declarations of loyalty 
and party spirit were political tools used across the era, but they were used to 
score political points and win political debates, rather than actually being 
definitive shows of loyalty to the federal political system. 
Ultimately, the early petitions of the Tombigbee region failed, and would 
continue to do so until they picked up steam with the incorporation of Madison 
County in 1809. Meanwhile, life in the Territory continued while these debates 
raged on. Outside of the meeting halls and debating chambers of Tombigbee, 
Washington, Natchez and Pearl River, the Territory and its population 
continued to shift and evolve, as a pertinent reminder that these debates would 
ultimately be settled by the movements of the yeomen farmer and lower 
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classes of citizens, not the planters and politicians. It is harder to grasp an 
understanding of poorer farmers than it is to trace the lives of rich Eastern 
planters; they simply do not leave as many records. One of the most practical 
ways of tracing planters is through the records of the Land Office, which show 
the land claims within the Mississippi Territory. Yet as has been noted, many 
poorer farmers did not attempt to buy land; they simply took it and tried to 
hold onto it. As such, contemporary travel writers act as very useful sources, as 
they intended to document life in the far reaches of the American Republic for 
those who sought a new life away from the Eastern Seaboard. While each 
writer has their limitations, in part due to the fact that the majority of emigrant 
guides, manuals and/or directories were published in the eastern states, they 
provide us with an insight into the early American South, but equally as 
significant, how it was viewed by the rest of the nation. Many were published 
in the 1820s and 1830s, but the early guides of William Darby and Samuel 
Brown are of significant use to this thesis.  
The authors themselves had lofty intentions for their works, with Brown 
noting: 
The chief objects embraced are, Boundaries, Latitude and Aspect of the 
Country, Soil, Climate, Diseases, Vegetable, Mineral and Animal 
Productions, Rivers, Lakes, Swamps, Prairies, Portages, Roads, Counties, 
Settlements and Villages; Population, Character and Customs of the 
Inhabitants, Indians, Antiquities, Military Posts, Situation and Price of 
Lands, Price Current, Trade, Extent of Navigable Waters, Expences [sic] of 
travelling, Directions to Emigrants, etc. etc.103 
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Thus, although writers were not always successful in their aims, the sheer 
volume of work, and the ambition of that work, is of great value to the 
historian. Taken from The Western Gazetteer, a guide produced by Samuel 
Brown, this list is largely representative of the topics of discussion throughout 
the emigrant’s directories of the Mississippi Valley. It would not be 
unreasonable to expect that the latter two sections would take precedence 
throughout the guides, though this is far from the case. Within The Western 
Gazetteer’s sections relating to Louisiana and Mississippi, referred to as a new 
state throughout the section due to the book’s publication in 1817, there is not 
a single mention of the expense of travelling to the territory, or advice upon 
gathering resources for doing so. The Western Gazetteer is described by R.C. 
Wade as “the immigrant’s bible”, yet it is rather selective in the information it 
provides. In a work which covers the entirety of the western frontier, there is 
very little consistency; as an example, the author has far more to say of 
Louisiana than he does of Missouri, Michigan or, indeed, Mississippi. Brown’s 
knowledge of Mississippi appears to be largely based upon letters from those 
who have journeyed there such as ‘Mr Lattimore’ (evidently William 
Lattimore),  and other emigrants’ guides such as that by Bartram, which is 
often relied on for geographical details of the region around Baton Rouge.  The 
book does provide directions and distances to and from the various settlements, 
but they are not explicit and they certainly do not form a comprehensive guide 
to the new state of Mississippi; as a guide for travel around the Mississippi 
Valley, it is inferior to others. 
Indeed, Samuel Brown is never explicit in his advice to potential emigrants, a 
trait reflected across the majority of guides. In contrast to this, the extremely 




detailed The Emigrant’s Guide to the Western and South-Western States and 
Territories by William Darby frequently and explicitly talks directly to 
potential settlers.   As has already been mentioned, Darby’s guide features 
extensive description of the lower Mississippi Valley and could be used to map 
a route across the states far more efficiently than the aforementioned works. 
Indeed, as has been noted, Darby’s guide is full of wisdom and advice for new 
settlers, for example: “Any person from the northern states, intending to 
remove to, or visit any part of Louisiana, Mississippi, or Texas, below 33° N 
lat. would find it for his benefit to go to New Orleans, or Mobile by sea, and to 
arrive in those cities as late as November.” Darby also tailors his advice to his 
varied readership; he recommends that settlers and their families travel only in 
the spring, whilst acknowledging that traders, merchants and seamen may not 
have that luxury.  Beyond this, Darby actively tries to dispel existing 
preconceptions, such as with regards to the climate:  
If the spirit of emigration in the United States was not checked by the 
common, though unfounded belief, that southern situations were less 
favourable to health than northern, a very great change of local population 
would take place.104 
In many respects then, Darby’s guide is the most valuable guide available to 
the historian of the Mississippi Territory. Indeed, Henry Brackenridge, who 
was one of the most widely respected authors, wrote that he was indebted to 
Darby for his “statistical view”, and commented that he “has been engaged for 
a number of years in preparing an elaborate work on Louisiana [and 
Mississippi]. Possessing strong original genius, with considerable 
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acquirements, and indefatigable industry, the public may expect something 
substantially useful in his labors.” 105  His knowledge of what people in the 
Eastern states wished to know is also highly useful; he, as an example, writes: 
“A question is demanded by almost all persons from the eastern and middle 
states, whether this, or any other part of Louisiana, affords good mill seats?”106 
before providing a detailed answer, including comparisons with other states 
and territories.  Thus, Darby’s guide is the first of the earlier wave of 
emigrant’s guides to provide a systematic assessment of the Mississippi 
Valley, tailored to truly benefit potential settlers of any social standing. 
However, not all travel narratives were written by explorers and adventurers 
commissioned by Thomas Jefferson and the Federal government such as 
Lewis, Clark and Pike. Perhaps one of the most insightful narratives is 
provided by Timothy Flint, a “New England missionary who settled in 
Louisiana”.107 Flint’s Recollections of the Last Ten Years in the Valley of the 
Mississippi recounts his voyage down the Mississippi River, through Missouri 
and down to New Orleans. Throughout his narrative, he notes elements of life 
in the Valley that other authors were not interested in; he discusses the 
affection that emigrants had for the land in which they settled as well as the 
disadvantages of immigration, particularly on the moral of inhabitants.108 In 
this way, Flint’s account is somewhat sociological, and thus is extremely 
important for a study of this nature. Yet it is important to note the nature of this 
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travel narrative; it is made up of Flint’s recollections, as the title suggests. That 
is to say, it is not a real time account of his journeys or even an authentic 
journal kept throughout his travels; as the editor to the 1968 edition of 
Recollections of the Last Ten Years notes, Timothy Flint had lost all his daily 
journals from his wanderings “up and down the Mississippi River”.109  Whilst 
such errors do have an impact upon the integrity of the account as a source, it 
also provides an invaluable insight into the life of a non-slaveholder in the 
lower Mississippi Valley, albeit somewhat detached from the Mississippi 
Territory itself. 
McDermott argues that there are, in fact, “compensating values in the 
recollections of one who has lived in a new world for ten years before he 
writes about it, for he can give us a contemplative view of that experience not 
possible in daily jottings.”110 This, he argues, is in contrast to the 
aforementioned, more conventional, travel narratives such as those by 
Meriwether Lewis which are more observational than critical. Flint did not 
intend for his Recollections to be a guide, but it instead a work of general 
interest, aimed at informing those in the Eastern states about the lives of the 
inhabitants of the newer areas of the United States. Thus, for the purposes of 
this project, it is a useful insight into the lives of emigrants to the Mississippi 
Valley, though it must be used with caution due to the inevitable prejudices 
and preconceptions of the author. Flint, for example, attributes “the influence 
of imagination” and “the material of poetry” as having huge impacts upon 
decisions to emigrate, particularly amongst the illiterate, who “are not always 
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aware of all the elements of motive that determine their actions.”111 However, 
Flint suggests that he bases this upon “hearing numberless narratives from the 
people,”112 implying that this is not simply his assumption. Admittedly, he 
does not mention his sources, but it should be asserted that this is a flaw in the 
writing style of the era, whereby authors did not wish to disrupt their narrative 
as is shown below. Yet it gives the sense that this an apolitical narrative, 
therefore providing important insight to this study. This is one of the few 
examples of a writer which genuinely seeks to understand the experience of 
emigrants, both rich and poor. 
Taken together, the guides of Brown, Darby and Flint are a vital insight into 
the experience of settlers in the Mississippi Territory and the surrounding area. 
They are some of the only available sources to discuss the experience of the 
poor farmer migrating to the Mississippi Territory. Despite the caveat that 
much of this evidence is broadly conceived around migration to the lower 
Mississippi Valley, be that Louisiana or Mississippi, they remain useful for 
considering the experience of migration into this region broadly in order to 
ascertain how that related to the politics of the Territory. Thus, returning to the 
concept of squatting in the Mississippi Territory, Darby noted how, “After the 
opening of the land offices in Louisiana, the commissioners found a number of 
claims for land held by actual settlement, without any title.” Darby suggests 
that whilst the land offices did attempt to respect these claims, and many acres 
were appropriated to these land squatters, this was not always viable. Indeed, 
the claims of squatters resulted in competing claims, disrupting the organised 
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settlement envisioned by the Federal government. As is discussed in Darby’s 
account, between the hubs of Natchez, Mississippi and New Orleans, 
Louisiana, there was no appropriate place to form a township due to the 
“irregularity of claims”;113 there may have been free land, but it overlapped 
with the sporadic and uncoordinated settlement claims of yeomen farmers. 
Rothman takes this argument further, demonstrating that local politicians in the 
Territory, such as Harry Toulmin, actively encouraged squatters to settle in the 
Territory, and sought to protect them, arguing that “Men of capital do not like 
to vest their active property in a wilderness,” so the fact that squatters were 
self-scouting and improving land actually helped the process of improving 
land.114 In doing so, squatters tended to improve land value by up to 50%. This 
highlights the extent to which the Jeffersonian vision for the settlement of the 
Mississippi Valley was far detached from reality; whilst the government 
wished to draw logical, straight settlement lines, this simply did not correspond 
with the pre-existing settlement of the territory which preceded US ownership 
of the land. Indeed, whilst the emigrant’s guides and the land offices portrayed 
the official view of emigration, seeing it as coordinated and logical, the process 
was far more complicated and untidy. The process of land division may have 
been effective in the sparsely populated regions further north, but was far less 
practical in the lower Mississippi Valley, due to the substantial number of pre-
existing settlers.115 Not only this, but the local government of the Mississippi 
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Territory actively encouraged less-than-legal methods of settlement in order to 
improve revenues.  
Of course, it must be remembered that many of these squatters and poor 
farmers were not necessarily recent emigrants; this land was not as empty as 
many Americans perceived it to be. This serves to highlights a further 
complication to emigration for the poorer class of settler; there may have been 
free land, but there was a significant deal of competition for that land. Whereas 
richer planters had the finances to fight rival claims, and the governmental 
support to win them, this could not be said for the yeomen, who had to settle 
for what they could find. Furthermore, it is not as easy to understand the 
motives for emigration by poorer farmers compared to the wealthy; the 
economic benefits of moving to the West were less pronounced for yeomen 
and harder to benefit from. As Samuel Brown wrote, the vast majority of work 
in the new state of Mississippi was performed by slaves, each costing around 
one thousand dollars.116 With the price of land as high as it was, it was difficult 
for yeomen farmers to make profit from emigration, as will be shown later in 
this chapter. The traditional view of emigration to the West would have one 
believe that emigration by the poorer classes was a journey of optimism; they 
would venture west with the belief that they could better themselves and find a 
new life for themselves and their family. Yet this assessment is challenged by 
Timothy Flint in his Recollections of the Last Ten Years in the Valley of the 
Mississippi. Flint does not deny the “influence of the imagination” in 
encouraging emigration, though suggests that “the saturnine and illiterate 
emigrant may not be conscious that such motives had any agency in fixing him 
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in this purpose,”117  implying that there was some form of fantastical motive 
behind the emigration of yeomen. However, Flint himself does not seem 
convinced by this explanation. Whilst he admits that very few emigrants 
undertook the voyage simply to find better and cheaper lands (except, he says, 
the Germans), he reports a strong impression that emigrants were not happy to 
have had to leave their homelands. Emigrants into the Mississippi Valley, 
according to Flint, retained a strong affection for their own country, and held a 
disposition to consider their current place of residence as a form of 
banishment.118 
As has been shown in this section, some of the best evidence available with 
regards to emigration into the Mississippi Territory comes from contemporary 
commentators. The opinions and observations of these authors is undoubtedly 
a beneficial source in allowing us to trace pathways of migration, but 
prejudices and generalisations are commonplace and can often mask the 
reality. Actually tracing the journeys from the East coast to the Mississippi 
Territory is altogether more challenging. In terms of the secondary literature on 
this topic, the classic study is that of Frank Owsley, who studied the “plain 
folk” of the Deep South across the 19th century. Owsley identified three major 
columns of westward expansion, splitting the nation’s migration habits from 
north to south. Thus, according to this model, the settlers of the Mississippi 
Territory largely travelled from the southern Atlantic states of Georgia and the 
Carolinas.119 John Otto has expanded upon Owsley’s, now classic, thesis, and 
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asserted that emigration into the lower Mississippi Valley came in waves, as 
the region filled up from the frontier. To summarize Otto’s study, he assesses 
that the “ancestral plain folk” from the backcountries of Maryland, Virginia, 
the Carolinas and Georgia led westward migration up to, and in some cases 
beyond, the southern frontier between the 1770s and 1830s. These poorer 
migrants were followed by wealthier migrants, including large numbers of 
slaveholding planters from the more affluent areas of the southern Atlantic 
states, nearer the coast. Following the southern planters were farmers of 
English and Germanic heritage from Pennsylvania, pursued by their wealthy 
counterparts from the North.120  
However, this perception of the poorer classes inhabiting the frontier and the 
richer inhabiting the areas further inside the territory is flawed. As has already 
been shown, the acquisition of land in the Mississippi Territory is not as linear 
as Otto’s assessment would suggest – Madison County, part of the backcountry 
of Mississippi, was not open to large scale settlement until 1814. He is right to 
highlight that the ‘backcountrymen’ of the Atlantic states led westward 
migration, but that does not simply mean that they travelled further in order to 
find land. Indeed, as was noted earlier, Sven Beckert highlights that it was the 
cotton planters, not their poorer counterparts, who truly pushed the boundaries 
of the new nation. “The frontier planters,” Beckert argues, who were “at the 
rough edges of the Empire of Cotton, had well-dressed and well-spoken 
company.”121 Beckert’s argument further supports the ideas explored in 
previous chapters of this thesis, helping to demonstrate the ways in which rich 
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planters, particularly in their roles as local politicians and businessmen, shaped 
foreign policy and expansion in the Mississippi Territory. Again, the 
dominance of the rich, slaveholding planter clouds the routes of migration and 
settlement undertaken by poor farmers who were, to politicians at least, mere 
statistics when it came to counting populations.  
Yet the initial emigration of the yeomen is only one aspect of this study. One 
must also consider what happened once they arrived in the lower Mississippi 
Valley. It might be assumed that due to the relatively high cost of land and the 
poor road network, which was documented by the territory’s chief surveyor, 
Isaac Briggs, settlers would stay in one place once they arrived.122 However, 
this is far from the case; as Owsley highlights, “the long move from the older 
states into the new territory was seldom the final move… the agricultural 
immigrant after reaching the region of his choice often moved about several 
times within the same general community.”123 Yet, in this respect, Owsley is 
understating the situation; yeomen would move throughout the entire 
Mississippi Territory, not just within a single community. Alexis de 
Tocqueville, the French political thinker, wrote: “In the United States, a man 
builds a house in which to spend his old age, and he sells it before the roof is 
on; he plants a garden and lets it just as the trees are coming into bearing.”124 
Tocqueville perceived a restlessness amongst the American people, fitting in 
with Flint’s assessment of poorer settlers being unaware of their motivations 
for emigration. Thus, even when settlers relocated to the Mississippi Valley 
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and found themselves land to settle, they did not spend their lives in one place. 
Indeed, one of the main differences between the richer and poorer settlers is 
simply the need to create an income. Timothy Flint stresses the difficulties of 
actually making money in the Mississippi Valley. “The difficulty of finding a 
market for the surplus produce,” he writes, "is not a diminutive evil… The plan 
of sending in flat-boats to New Orleans the surplus of the farms, will not 
answer in such an overstocked market as that.”125 Thus, not only could farmers 
not afford to purchase the land they settled, neither could they actually produce 
an income off that land. In fact, it may well have been the case that spending 
one or two years cultivating land, and then moving onwards, was actually more 
profitable. A good example of this comes from the memoirs of the Ramsey 
family, who migrated from Georgia to Mississippi around 1807. The two 
Ramsey sons frequently relocated throughout the territory, with one writing, 
“improving new places and selling them out to other newcomers (and there 
were many) was better for him [the writer’s brother]; more money in it; than to 
remain at one place and make larger improvements.”126This is a departure from 
the argument of Robert Haynes, who argues that yeomen were fearful that 
speculators would buy up lands they had already cultivated;127 it actually 
appears that poorer farmers wanted to sell to the rich. This switches the 
narrative around the poor farmer in the Mississippi Territory. They were not 
simply pawns in the wider political and economic machinations of rich 
planters, but important cogs which helped to develop the economy and 
political model of the Territory. They had far more agency than has previously 
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been acknowledges, with their itinerant settlement and work patterns being a 
positive, rather than a negative.  
This phenomenon is also discussed by John Majewski and John Hebron 
Moore. Majewski demonstrates that planters from South Carolina migrating 
west would bring with them different farming practices from migrants from 
further north – that of shifting cultivation, which required a greater expanse of 
land, as they would allow their land to spend more time in fallow.128 Indeed, 
Majewski suggests that it was this practice which limited the development of 
learning institutions and communities within Mississippi and other southern 
regions, as planters and communities would have to be so far detached from 
each other due to their farming styles. Furthermore, it also made it much harder 
to establish market places and regular trading.129 In this regard, Majewski fails 
to acknowledge that learning institutions and communities did develop across 
the western Mississippi Territory, but the argument certainly helps to 
demonstrate the challenges for both eastern and western politicians within the 
Territory cultivating a sense of unity for a push towards statehood. In addition, 
Moore identifies that, in antebellum Mississippi, “wise cotton growers 
anticipated the destruction of land by acquiring tracts larger than they planned 
to cultivate at the time they were setting up plantations, so that they would 
have a reserve of virgin soil to exploit in the future.”130 This helps to explain 
the experience of the poor, yeoman farmer in the Mississippi Territory. While 
they may have been in the vanguard of settlement in the Mississippi Territory, 
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their role was to prepare land and sell it on, rather than establishing a 
homestead for their families in the long term.  
Furthermore, this presents a distinctly pragmatic view of the settlement of 
Mississippi, different from the vision of Roger Kennedy, who argues that “a 
yeomen might become attached to land he had cleared and planted, where he 
had chosen to live, where his children had been born and his wife had toiled 
beside him.”131 Instead, whereas one may assume that the non-slaveholding 
farmer would take more care of their land because they felt more personal 
pride and attachment to it than a planter who could afford slaves to work it and 
could afford to buy extra land at will, the reality appears to be different. Poorer 
settlers were, at least in this respect, just as economically driven as planters, 
though on a significantly smaller scale. The difference between the two classes 
of settlers is not that the poor looked after land for personal use; they had to 
look after their land so they could sell it on for profit, before moving onto new 
land to cultivate that (likely via squatting, not purchasing land).  Of course, it 
is hard to draw definitive conclusions on the motives of non-slaveholders due 
to the sheer volume of migration and the limited records available, though the 
evidence presented here appears to shatter the illusion that yeomen were driven 
by some romantic desire to find their own land for future generations of their 
family to live off. If one combines Flint’s assessment that migrants didn’t 
really feel a sense of belonging in the Mississippi Valley, with the idea that 
farmers maintained land in order to try and sell it on, rather than out of 
personal investment in that land, one gains a very different impression of the 
settlement of the region. Farmers were almost nomadic out of financial 
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necessity, and were essentially cultivating land for richer emigrants to turn into 
plantations. In this, there is a degree of shared experience between poor 
farmers in the Mississippi Territory and the native nations of DuVal’s Native 
Ground.132 Poor yeoman farmers found ways to exist within the models of 
politics and economies established by the poorer farmers, and were able to 
exploit that for their own enterprise, rather than simply being victims of it. 
Indeed, poor farmers were not individuals whose culture and identity were 
shaped politicians and planters in the Mississippi Territory. They had their own 
agendas and ways of life, and certainly helped to shape identity in the 
Mississippi Territory in their own ways.  
Thus, the experience of the yeoman farmer identifies a number of problems for 
Mississippi’s politicians in the later Territorial period. Firstly, their nomadic 
lifestyles made it challenging to keep track of population growth, as it was 
difficult to identify whether settlers in a region were new to the Territory, or 
had simply moved from a different county. Secondly, although politicians in 
both the East and West habitually made sweeping claims of identity, whether 
separating themselves from the other, or to highlight the community and 
shared regional identity of their region, the nomadic migration patterns of 
yeoman farmers makes it unlikely that any shared concept of identity could 
ever have occurred. In the years following the Burr Conspiracy, individuals 
such as Ferdinand Claiborne travelled the rural regions of the Territory in order 
to gain signatures to overthrow Robert Williams as Governor, in a move which 
supposedly brought rural inhabitants into the political networks of the elite, but 
their settlement patterns suggests that this could not possibly have been the 
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case. Coupled with the divisions and partisanship presented across this thesis, 
the lifestyles of yeomen farmers suggest that any shared identity was either a 
political tool, or a figment of the imagination.  
On a practical level, understanding the impact of this intra-territorial migration 
is challenging, but it is necessary to do so in order to understand why the 
eastern population began to crave a separation of the Territory. As was 
demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter, there is some disagreement over 
the total population of the Mississippi Territory, let alone that of individual 
counties. 133Hamilton identifies a redistribution of the population of the 
Territory from around 1810 onwards, at which point Adams County, 
previously the heartland of the Territory, began to be outsized by the 
surrounding Territories, but his focus is more on establishing percentages of 
the white population in the western Territory. The best available data then, is 
provided by Dunbar Rowland, but this is limited in that it only offers figures 
taken from the US Censuses every decade, and does not take into account the 
multitude of state and unofficial censuses taken between 1810 and 1817 when 
the local government was hoping to push for statehood. The figures recorded 
by Rowland for relevant counties are as follows. The statistics for both 
Madison and Washington counties are not included beyond 1810, as they 
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County 1800 1810 1820 
Territory/State 8,850 40,352 75,448135 
Adams 4,660 10,002 12,076 
Jefferson 2,940 4,001 6,822 
Madison136  4,699  
Washington 1,250 2,920  
Claiborne  3,102 5,963 
Franklin  2,106 4,001 
Amite  4,750 6,853 
Wilkinson  5,068 9,718 
Warren  1,114 2,653 
Wayne  1,253 3,323 
Baldwin  1,427  
Figure 8: Population Statistics by County in the Mississippi Territory137 
Considering the rate at which new counties were being incorporated, 
Mississippi’s local politicians could reasonably expected a rapid population 
boom in the second decade of the 19th century. Yet the first half of the 1810s 
actually saw a great slowing of migration, in no small part due to the outbreak 
of the War of 1812 and the great disruption caused by the Red Stick, or Creek, 
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War in the South.138 Significantly, the growth in Adams County between 1810 
and 1820 was barely 2,000, demonstrating a significant slowing down for the 
former heartland of the Territory. Nearly every other part of the Western 
Territory grew the same amount, or more, suggesting that the Natchez District 
was by no means as attractive as it had formerly been. Indeed, the formal US 
censuses only tell one side of the story here. As Hamilton demonstrates, the 
1815 legislative assembly election saw more votes cast in Madison County 
than in Claiborne, Adams and Wilkinson Counties combined.139 Indeed, 
maintaining his focus upon the white population of the Territory, he notes that, 
“Whereas in the Natchez District there were 17,000 whites,” counted in the 
special Territorial census of 1816, “the section east of [the] Pearl [River] now 
in Mississippi counted 8500 and the Alabama side 19,500. Madison County 
alone turned in 10,000 free whites.”140 The change in fortunes here is stark, but 
also somewhat understandable. One might assume that as the frontier was 
pushed further westward, settlers would flock to the furthest reaches of the 
Republic in order to find opportunity. However, this chapter has demonstrated 
that it was the Western part of the Territory which was most populated, most 
developed, and which had the majority of the improved land. If settlers were 
hoping to find empty land, ripe for opportunity and free from the grasps of 
planters, it would not be found on the shores of the Mississippi River. Indeed, 
the closer one came to the Mississippi River, the easier it was to access the 
markets at Natchez, New Orleans, and beyond. Consequently, the empty land 
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available in the Mississippi Territory was actually in the East. The wave of 
migration into the Territory in the 1810s did not push the frontier, but filled in 
the spaces behind it. The Mississippi Territory was, in reality, no longer a 
frontier region. Thus, the more adventurous, pioneering settler would push 
beyond the Mississippi River and into the Louisiana Territory, whereas the 
richer planter was more likely to purchase pre-prepared land in proximity to 
the Mississippi River. As such, the eastern Mississippi Territory actually 
became a more enticing area for migrants seeing land in the wake of the War 
of 1812. Indeed, post-War treaties such of the Treaty of Fort Jackson in 1814 
forced many Native Americans off their ancestral homes and offered new 
opportunities to US settlers. Coupled with the distance from the local 
government, still based around the Natchez District, the opportunities for 
development in what would become Alabama are evident.  
As well as the outbreak of war, 1812 also saw significant developments in the 
statehood campaigns of both the East and the West sides of the Territory. 
George Poindexter, formally acting as the Territory’s delegate to Congress but 
informally acting on behalf of the Natchez District, had previously declared 
that he, “felt it my incumbent duty to resist with firmness the attempt to divide 
the territory,” and subsequently set about petitioning Congress to admit the 
Territory as one.141 In a significant milestone both for Poindexter and for the 
Territory, a Bill for the admission of the Mississippi Territory into the Union 
as one passed the House of Representatives in December 1812. Coming off the 
back of a memorial to Congress which declared that the inhabitants of the 
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Territory “respectfully and solemnly protest against the contemplated division 
of this Territory or any diminution of its original limits,” the Enabling Bill 
proposed to Congress only partially respected those requests.142 It proposed 
that the Territory would be admitted as one, but that the Territory’s 
constitutional convention, “shall enter into an ordinance, forever irrevocable, 
that so soon as the population, east of the river Tombigbee, and west of the 
state of Georgia, shall amount to sixty thousand free [white] inhabitants, the 
said territory shall be divided into two separate and independent states.” A 
further caveat ordered that the new state would only be entitled to one member 
of the House of Representatives until a petition took place, thus condemning 
Mississippi to a few years of existence as a second-tier state.143 In many ways, 
the Bill suggests something of a half measure, not truly addressing any of the 
major issues within the Territory. Indeed, as Hamilton succinctly notes, the 
Bill was rejected by the Senate after having passed through the House of 
Representatives, suggesting that the Senate agreed that the proposal was 
inadequate.144 
However, there were more complex reasons behind the Senate’s rejection of 
the plan, as evidenced by a number of further petitions from inhabitants of the 
Territory, largely relating to requests for an extension to the deadline for 
payments for land. This was a sign of the increasing hardship felt by the 
Mississippi Territory around the outbreak of the War of 1812. One petition, 
signed by, amongst others, Cowles Mead and Ferdinand Claiborne, noted that 
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“the long restrictions on commerce, and many other Local and incidental 
causes, preclude every hope of preventing… lands from reverting to the 
Public.” Much like Dinsmoor’s earlier use of the term “Citizen”, the use of the 
term “Public” suggests an understanding that the Territory’s inhabitants were 
fully fledged citizens – there is certainly a concept of public ownership here, 
albeit one that planters and politicians were keen to avoid land falling into the 
hands of.  It should be noted that, despite the fact that many of the undersigned 
were notable politicians, they describe themselves as being “principally 
employed in the pursuits of agriculture.”145  That extension, in itself, is perhaps 
unremarkable, but other petitions on similar issues requested far more 
longlasting outcomes – in short, the extension of the deadline became an 
extension of the Territorial period. Two weeks after the first, another memorial 
was sent to Congress, noting that, although the inhabitants of the Territory 
were proud and loyal Americans, they were displeased that the federal 
government had deemed it necessary to impose limitations on commerce 
within the Territory. The memorialists, all representatives from the Western 
territory, noted that “their constituents do and have annually paid up to two 
thirds of the Territorial Revenue, and that the “peculiar situation” of the 
Territory left it highly susceptible to the worst effects of war. They declared 
that their “Table has been more than ever crowded with petitions for the relief 
of debtors”, and that they had granted a further fourteen month stay of 
execution, due to the poor economic climate. With that in mind and, they 
believed, with the backing of the majority of the people, they requested that 
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Congress should not “pass any Law for the admission of the Mississippi 
Territory into the Union on the footing of a State,” until either the Territory 
reached 60,000 inhabitants, or the People of the Territory requested it. The 
irony, of course, was that Poindexter, acting as the Territory’s representative to 
Congress, had already requested and introduced an Enabling Bill to push 
statehood through.146 Similar petitions were posted throughout December 
1812, with one acknowledging that sentiments had indeed changed in 1812 – 
while the majority of inhabitants had previously supported a statehood 
campaign, they now believed the majority would be in favour of 
postponement, if “the Sense of the people were now ascertained”.147  
These petitions make it clear that there was a stark contrast between private 
and public interests for individuals such as Mead (speaker of the House of 
Representative at the time), Claiborne, Daniel Beasley (representative of 
Jefferson County), and Samuel Postlethwaite (son in law of William Dunbar, 
representative of Adams County and board member of the Bank of the 
Mississippi). Even if many of the other signees were planters first and 
foremost, it remains significant that so many would put their private interests 
before the Territory’s future. While many of the concerns of the Territory’s 
economic climate here may well have been valid, it remains significant that 
local politicians and planters sought to go against the intentions of the 
Territorial government, particularly George Poindexter as delegate to 
Congress, in order to attempt to delay statehood.  
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It is evident that land played a key role in Mississippi’s road to statehood, not 
just in terms of migration and settlement, but in the business interests of 
planters. Statehood and autonomy for Mississippi had been present in debates 
since the Territory’s inception, so to see so many representatives of the 
Territory request a cancellation of an Enabling Bill is a stark change. 
Historians such as Hamilton have attributed the failure of Poindexter’s bill to 
uncertainty over the division of the Territory, but it is clear that economic 
uncertainty, and the threat that that had for the private interests of influential 
inhabitants, also played a role. The Senate’s own report on the Bill stated that 
the relevant committee “had not been able to form a conclusive opinion on the 
subject… The embarrassed situation of the land titles in that territory, the want 
of numbers of its population, and the great division that exists among the 
inhabitants in relation to the question of its being made a state have induced 
the committee to report” that the Bill would be delayed until the next 
session.”148 Ultimately, the clash between public and private interests 
discussed here shaped the later history of the Mississippi Territory, just as the 
disputes between the networks of the Territory dictated the first half of the 
period.  
A further wrinkle in Poindexter’s designs for statehood in 1812 came from the 
confusion surrounding the annexation of West Florida. When the region came 
into the ownership of the United States, it was divided, with only a small 
portion allocated to the Mississippi Territory, and the rest to the Orleans 
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Territory.149 While this theoretically boosted the population of the Territory, it 
in fact only caused a further headache for Governor Holmes. While, in 
organizing the region, Holmes declared “the laws of the Mississippi Territory, 
and the ordinances and acts of Congress relative thereto, are in force within 
said County,” his more private correspondence with Harry Toulmin, the judge 
with jurisdiction over the eastern Territory, suggested something less 
certain.150 Only a month and a half after his proclamation, he wrote: 
The act of Congress annexing the County now called Mobile County to 
this Territory is so very defective that I find it impossible, consistent with 
my authority, to extend to the inhabitants the full benefit of the laws 
without the aid of the Territorial Legislature. I do not think I can legally 
authorize a Court to be held by the County Justices, as all the places for 
holding Courts in the Territory are designated by law…. I do not feel 
myself authorized (as yet) to exercise authority in any part of the Country 
but that to which Governor Claiborne has extended the laws and authority 
of his Territory.151 
This was, in part, a military matter, as the town of Mobile would not be 
occupied by American forces until 1813, but for the purposes of this study, it 
also helps to demonstrate the extent to which citizens of the eastern Mississippi 
Territory did not enjoy the same rights and privileges as those in the West. As 
Rothman argues, the regional clash between east and east was “tinged with a 
whiff of class conflict, with the westerners representing the wealthy plantation 
districts along the Mississippi River and the easterners speaking for the poorer 
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population of yeomen farmers and poorer planters.”152 The ways in which new 
areas of the east were incorporated into the Territory evidently reinforced the 
two tiered system that appears to have existed within the Mississippi Territory, 
dividing the rich from the poor and the east from the west.  
From 1812 until 1815, statehood debates faded away behind the more pressing 
concern of the War of 1812 and Creek Wars. As has already been noted in this 
and the previous chapter, the economic impact of the War had a stark impact 
upon the Territory, and the statehood debates rising out of the conclusion of 
the conflict were not the same as those before it. The demographic shifts in the 
wake of the War have already been documented in this chapter, and they had a 
profound effect upon the statehood debate. Whereas the Western Territory had 
been campaigning for entry into the Union as a whole and the Eastern Territory 
had been calling for a division, in 1815 each camp’s position entirely reversed. 
In the wake of the War of 1812, inhabitants of Madison County and the 
Tombigbee District began to campaign for a united territory, whereas those in 
the West wanted to divide the Territory.153 The impact of the aforementioned 
demographic shifts upon the intentions of the respective sides of the debate. In 
a memorial to Congress in 1815, the Territorial Legislature reiterated its desire 
for statehood irrespective of the size of the population, in part due to the 
loyalty to the Union it had showed during the War of 1812. It further observed 
that: 
 The Mississippi Territory, though extensive in limits and having some 
very fertile lands, will not admit of a very great population. Vast tracts of 
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country lying Within its limits are not habitable by reason of its sterility, 
and on that account, the population of this Territory must ever be vastly 
inferior to that of some of the states already in the Union. Your 
Honorable body are aware that most of the burdens incident to the 
Government of a large state, will necessarily fall upon one that is small. 
While your Memorialists see much good that would result from the 
admission of the Territory into the Union, with its present limits, they 
anticipate much evil from its division, and would look to such an event as 
most calamitous.154 
This may sound as though the Territory Legislature was reiterating the same 
claims as it was previously, but this time, support for the Bill was not universal 
amongst Western politicians. Indeed, as Hamilton notes, the entire delegation 
from Adams County, the largest, oldest and most established County in the 
State, voted against this resolution.155 This was a significant step in the 
statehood process, but also reveals the real motivations of local politicians. For 
all that those campaigning for statehood argued that Mississippi and its 
inhabitants displayed, “a patriotism, and feeling an attachment to the Union” 
which they believed to be equal to any other in the nation, politicians were not 
willing to simply accept any motion for statehood.156 Evidently, their own self-
interest outweighed their desire to gain entry to the Union, and they would 
only support a statehood campaign which supported their own interests. They 
had wanted admission to the Union as a whole, but although that was looking 
increasingly possible and likely by 1815, they suddenly changed their minds 
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once they saw the increasingly promise and prosperity in the Eastern Territory. 
In short, politicians only wanted statehood if the conditions suited their own 
private interests. Indeed, Rothman takes this further by suggesting that 
Westerners had transitioned into supporting a division once they realised that 
division would grant the South two additional senators, which would assist it 
in maintaining its political influence and rights. This is in keeping with the 
suggestion that Mississippi’s planters were the ones driving politics and 
expansion, as it would give them more political power in future debates over 
slavery, though they may not have realised it at the time. 157 From the research 
undertaken in this thesis, it’s not clear whether or not Mississippian politicians 
genuinely saw the South as a wider region, but the Territory’s political history 
is littered with the presence of individuals from the wider South, and from the 
interactions between Cato West and W.C.C. Claiborne in 1800 onwards, 
through the Burr Conspiracy and into the War of 1812, there was a certain 
spirit of cooperation between Mississippi, New Orleans, Tennessee and the rest 
of its bordering states.  
Ultimately, though there were further debates on the topic in 1816 and 1817, 
the fate of the Territory rested in the hands of the United States Senate. As it 
had in 1812, the Senate opposed admitting the Territory as a whole, perhaps 
assisted by the fact that William Lattimore, the Territory’s Representative to 
Congress, was a Westerner and would now lobby for division rather than full 
admission. Eventually, a Bill authorizing the division of the Territory passed in 
March 1817 and the western half of the Territory was permitted to conduct a 
Constitutional Convention. The Eastern Territory was reorganised as the 
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Alabama Territory and would join the Union two years later. While the 
intricacies of the Constitutional Convention will be touched upon in the 
conclusion of this thesis, the process of campaigning for statehood, as well as 
the other issues explored in this chapter, reveal a great deal about political 
loyalty and identity in the later Territorial era. This later period can be 
characterised less by party political wrangling, and more by planters asserting 
their authority over the Territory. It is less a story of party loyalty, and more a 
story of loyalty to the Union, or a lack of it. The land disputes encapsulated by 
the Nicholas Gray case study present a disjuncture between the local and the 
federal, whereby local planters sought to subvert the rulings and land sales of a 
federally-appointed official for their own purposes. This was not a new clash 
however – whereas the federal and the local worked relatively well together in 
political terms, the early Territorial era was marked by feuds between federal 
officials and local inhabitants over Native American policies.  
Thus, this chapter has demonstrated the importance of land to the history of the 
Mississippi Territory, both in terms of migration and settlement, and in terms 
of public policy and politics. It has further highlighted how the fate of the 
Mississippi Territory was dictated by the local elite; planters who would put 
their own economic success over their commitment to the wellbeing of the 
Mississippi Territory. While the case of The Bank of the Mississippi in the 
previous chapter suggested a burgeoning sense of patriotism and a desire to 
improve the Mississippi Territory economically, this chapter has instead shown 
that the Territory’s elite were much more interested in their own gains. The 
case of Nicholas Gray shows that local elites wanted land acquisition to be 
handled not by the federal government, but in their own interests, ensuring 




valuable land went to important planters who could maximise profits. 
Furthermore, the multiple campaigns for statehood demonstrate that elites in 
the West, in the Natchez District, only wanted Statehood if it could ensure 
their own political power. Although the dimensions of political debate had 
shifted away from “Republican” versus “Federalist” in the later Territorial era, 
it’s clear that pragmatism and personal business interests still dictated politics. 
Thus, even on the eve of Mississippi’s admission into the Union, it is 
impossible to portray the Territory as a burgeoning site of American identity 
and patriotism. The Territorial era was supposed to prepare the Territory to 
enter the Union as active participants, with its inhabitants as fully fledged 
American citizens, but it instead only served to increase the power of local 
elites, who then saw statehood as an opportunity to expand the region’s power. 
Taken as a whole, the experience of the planter and local politician in the 
Mississippi Territory up to the eve of statehood is a fascinating study of local 
power on the frontier of the Early Republic. Whereas at the start of the period, 
politicians were wielding informal and discretionary powers in order to subvert 
political frameworks and assert their own authority, by the later 1810s, they 
were actively engaged with traditional, formal and institutional powers in 
attempts to control the future of the region. In different terms, planters played 
Territorial cards in Federal games and Federal cards in Territorial games, all 
with a view to form their own power structures which would enable them to 
dictate the political and economic future of Mississippi. In circumnavigating 
the complex web of difficulties in the region, from Native powers, foreign 
governments, new and old settlers, the Federal Government and the mysticism 
of the ideology of the Revolution, planters shaped a unique heritage within the 




Mississippi Territory. By focusing in on the intricacies and challenge of their 
Territorial experience, this thesis has illuminated the ways in which hybrid 











In 1798, the Mississippi River was the edge of the United States of America, 
and the Mississippi Territory was a distant, romantic locale (at least in the eyes 
of travel writers such as William Darby and Samuel Brown). Yet, by 1812, the 
United States had moved on. No longer was Mississippi a western frontier, and 
nor was it a destination. The further the frontier was pushed beyond 
Mississippi, the less likely it would be that new settlers would be attracted.. As 
has been demonstrated across this thesis, planters assumed more and more 
control as the Territorial era progressed, in terms of politics, the economy and 
society – dominating lands, institutions, and positions of authority, particularly 
in the western regions of the Territory.  
That power ended up concentrated in these hands ought not to detract from 
what this thesis has sought to demonstrate: that Mississippi’s Territorial Era 
was characterised by diverse factions and forces which competed over the 
region’s future. Only gradually did early optimism, opportunity, and rivalry 
fade to be replaced by a system dominated by planters in positions of authority. 
The Territory was founded in a conservative, Federalist, moment, with heavy 
restrictions on liberty and democracy, but the inhabitants of the Territory 
attempted to subvert the Governor’s authority by demanding a representative 
government, the right to vote, and more of the liberties offered to citizens of 
the United States, creatively deploying the rhetoric and labels of the Early 
Republic. In many ways then, the early years of the Mississippi Territory 
showed signs of optimism. Though the founding government was restrictive, 
many local politicians displayed an apparent desire to align with the American 




political system in order to drive through progressive reforms, opening the 
Territory up as a site for the development of a republican (and Republican) 
spirit, which would in itself act as an enticing prospect for white migrants and 
potential settlers – the presence of slavery within the Territory helped entice 
wealthier white settlers even more However, what had started at as a seemingly 
genuine move for more democracy and transparency between the Governor, 
the Legislative Assembly, and the inhabitants of the Territory, largely 
descended into a distinctive kind of partisan politics. Politicians became more 
interested in scoring political points over rivals than making genuine 
improvements for the Territory and its white population. Significantly, though, 
the party system developing in Mississippi was inherently  local, utilising the 
labels of the national political parties, but fighting local battles over local 
issues. It was this, perhaps rather than any other factor, which gave the early 
Mississippi Territory only a veneer of American spirit and nationalism. Real 
interests and ambitions hove into view when exposed by episodes of tension or 
controversial issues such as the Burr affair, showing more complex attitudes 
towards the parties and federal power and politicians. 
Alongside the burgeoning partisan politics of the early Territorial Era, public 
and private enterprises failed and flourished in equal measure, highlighting the 
intrinsic links between politicians and planters in the Territory. Both Jefferson 
College and The Bank of the Mississippi offered opportunities for 
improvement, in terms of culture, education and economics. Jefferson College, 
a distinctly Republican endeavour, was proposed at a time of strength for the 
supposed Jeffersonian Republicans of the Territory. Quasi-Federalists had 
been in decline since the collapse of Sargent’s administration, and those 




pertaining to be Republicans held many positions of power in the Territory, 
seemingly enough to push such ventures through. Yet that promise crumbled 
under the weight of deep partisan divides among “Republicans” in the 
Territory, highlighting the self-serving nature of politics in this era. If a 
proposal did not directly support a politician’s, or his family’s, individual 
goals, it would not be supported. Jefferson College failed due to an inability to 
find consensus among politicians, who looked out for their own fortunes 
before those of the wider region. It serves not only to highlight the pragmatism 
of local politicians and an absence of party political loyalty, but also to 
demonstrate that, from an early point, the Territory’s politicians served 
themselves and their localities first, and the wider population second. Though 
the Territory had the potential to act as a promising destination for migrants, 
the inability to establish such institutions was a significant limiting factor. 
The Bank of the Mississippi, however, was an altogether more successful 
venture by Mississippi’s elite. The gap of several years between the decline of 
Jefferson College and the rise of the Bank of the Mississippi implies a period 
of stability within the Territory, yet the nation was embroiled in the War of 
1812 throughout. Any sense of stability may well have been brought about by 
the arrival of the fourth permanent governor, David Holmes, which seemed to 
reduce the hostilities between rival political factions. However, the success of 
the Bank suggests a maturity that had not previously been seen amongst the 
Territory’s elite. Indeed, as much as Holmes may have been responsible for the 
region’s newfound harmony, the Bank itself was a contributing factor. Whilst 
the College was a distinctly Republican venture, the Bank of the Mississippi 
was certainly a Federalist one, albeit after the heyday of the Federalist Party 




proper. Despite that, the enterprise of establishing the Bank united the elite of 
the Mississippi Territory. Whereas in the early 1800s, individuals could not see 
past their differences or bear to see a rival faction flourish, the founders of the 
Bank acknowledged the need for a wide range of expertise. For example, 
“Republican” planters admitted the Territory’s merchants, traditional 
“Federalists”, had the necessary economic experience help the Bank prosper. 
Thus, where Jefferson College had failed, the Bank succeeded. Furthermore, 
the Bank of the Mississippi, particularly in the latter years of the War of 1812, 
helped to bring the Territory closer to the Union. When specie payments from 
New Orleans stalled, the Bank turned to Northern banks for support, thus 
simultaneously making the Territory dependent on the Union in a way it hadn’t 
before, and also demonstrating the expertise and sophistication of the 
Territory’s banking system to the Union, being the only Southern bank to 
continue operations throughout the War of 1812. 
However, for all that the Bank demonstrated an increased level of 
sophistication from the merchant and planter elite of the western Territory, the 
arrival of such infrastructure certainly limited opportunities for others. As the 
elite became more aware of the commercial opportunities present within the 
Territory, there was a perceived need to ensure that those opportunities were 
maximised. Thus, attractive land became harder and harder for new migrants to 
acquire. This later Territorial era saw land, settlement, politics and economics 
become intertwined even more than they had been previously. The increasingly 
business-savvy elite, having already overcome party-political differences, now 
saw the opportunity to drive policy and expansion in the Territory and even 
further westward. They came to dictate the interactions between Territorial 




officials and Native Americans, prospering off the draconian terms of a 
multitude of post-war treaties, and even began to dictate who could purchase 
the land acquired in those treaties. In this way, as the Bank of the Mississippi 
had pulled the Territory closer to the Union in economic terms, it also helped 
to create a disjuncture between federal officials and planters, who had their 
own intentions when it came to land sales. At no point was this more obvious 
than in the Nicholas Gray affair, which saw increasingly violent interactions 
between local officials and federal representatives, each of whom were seeking 
to shape the landscape of the Territory, both politically and geographically. As 
the planter elite became increasingly belligerent in ensuring the right people 
acquired the right land in the Territory, the fallacy of the optimism of 
migration was revealed; the Territory was not a land of opportunity, where 
migrants could build new lives for themselves. Instead, it was becoming 
increasingly conservative, designed around maximising the business 
enterprises of the elite.  
Furthermore, as political discussion and debate turned increasingly towards 
statehood in the later years of the era, migration, settlement, economics and 
politics all became inextricably linked. As the regular petitions from 
Tombigbee residents demonstrate, migrants into areas of the Territory beyond 
the Natchez District were becoming increasingly isolated and dissatisfied by 
their lack of agency and political representation. As the population threshold of 
70,000 came increasingly into focus, the progression of the Territory into 
statehood became dependent on population growth, either through migration or 
through internal demographic growth. For much of the era, becoming a state 
was talked about as an opportunity to be seized for the Territory, one that 




would help establish the region as an economic and political power in the Deep 
South. Yet as the debates progressed and, significantly, migration caused 
demographic shifts amongst the population, western politicians’ intentions 
became more evident. The campaign for statehood was less about a desire to 
improve the territory on a National level, and more about consolidating in the 
hands of the politicians of the wealthy wider Natchez District. Western 
politicians’ shift from encouraging entry into the Union as one whole state to 
blocking that in favour of division highlights the extent to which their own 
personal gains were prioritised over those of the Territory. While the 
suggestion that they did so in order to ensure the South had additional senators 
in Congress must be entertained, it seems strange that they would only 
consider that on the eve of the Territory achieving statehood. Indeed, 
throughout this thesis, it has been shown that there was a lingering rivalry 
between Mississippi and its border states, with little obvious embracing of a 
Southern identity any more than a national one.  
This thesis has also demonstrated how other federal and territorial actors 
shaped the culture of the region. Individuals such as surveyors and land office 
officials have previously been seen as facilitators of American expansion, but 
this thesis has highlighted that their roles were even more significant. These 
men were shapers and vectors of American identity in the Mississippi 
Territory. From Andrew Ellicott and Isaac Briggs to Nicholas Gray, surveyors 
and land commissioners arguably had a greater impact upon the borders of the 
Republic than has previously been acknowledged in political histories. These 
individuals were not simply bureaucrats enabling planters and local politicians 
to shape the land around them, but active participants in the Territorial process, 




with their own ideologies and intentions. While this thesis has argued that 
disputes between planters and land officials was a proxy for the wider dispute 
between local and Federal governments and systems, future work might 
consider these surveyors in their own rights. As we have seen, Isaac Brigg’s 
difficulties in surveying the Mississippi Territory, and his subsequent 
resignation, had vast ramifications for the progress of the Territory. By 
resigning his position, Briggs delayed the organising of the Territory into lots, 
postponing the successful settlement of the region and disrupting the economic 
and demographic progress of the Territory. While the consequences of Briggs’ 
actions may have been incidental, the knock-on effect is evident. The delay it 
caused resulted in the Territory stagnating. It resulted in the disaffection with 
the federal government present during the Burr Conspiracy, and ultimately, it 
facilitated the increased power wielded by Federal officials such as Nicholas 
Gray.  
Where Briggs’ actions were motivated by personal dissatisfaction, Nicholas 
Gray’s were entirely motivated by opportunism, and both had a profound 
impact upon the Territory. Gray effectively sought to profit off the land hunger 
and demand for land in the wake of the numerous Treaties which had opened 
up vast swathes of land in the Northern Mississippi Territory after the War of 
1812 and the Creek Wars. By selling land in advance of it legally being 
available, to people that Gray himself chose, Gray made a lasting impression 
upon the landscape of the Territory, literally and metaphorically. In doing so, 
Gray prevented planters and local politicians, including Robert Williams, the 
former Governor, from dictating who should acquire which plots of land. In 
theory, Gray’s process of restricting the power of plantation owners should 




have been a positive for the inhabitants of the Territory, and especially for new 
migrants, but there was nothing egalitarian about either policy. Whether Gray 
was attempting to secure a larger legacy for himself, or simply attempting to 
secure a significant fortune, he undoubtedly played a role in shaping land 
acquisition in the later Territorial era. It was the bureaucrats and 
commissioners who dictated the land they could, or could not, purchase. 
Additionally, the processes that Briggs, Gray and their counterparts oversaw 
limited the opportunities of earlier migrants, who had hoped to acquire land by 
squatting. As the final chapter demonstrated, those individuals could only hope 
to survive by taking land, improving it, and selling it on for profit. In this way, 
poorer migrants became transient, moving around the Territory in order to 
survive. Thus, they were never able to form lasting communities, contributing 
to the sense that it was only the elite, and the bureaucrats, who were able to 
shape communities, networks and identities within the Mississippi Territory. 
Ultimately, both Briggs as a surveyor and Gray as a commissioner, though 
their motivations were different, both came to shape identity and loyalty in the 
Mississippi Territory. The previously misunderstood, or overlooked, aspect of 
the territorial process and experience further highlights how pragmatic early 
American migration truly was.  
The issues of land, migration and settlement helped to shape the emerging 
geography and social topography of the Mississippi Territory. However, the 
political networks that forged the laws, and consequently the culture, of the 
region also defined the region. As the first three chapters of this thesis 
demonstrated, one of the major issues in understanding the networks that 
existed across this era is one of nomenclature. Although local politicians were 




quick to self-identify as either Republicans or Federalists, conveniently 
aligning with the national political parties, it has been shown that historians 
cannot take their words at face value, for two major reasons. Firstly, there were 
no distinct Federalist or Republican parties, instead being multiple smaller 
factions and networks all claiming to be the true representatives of the national 
parties. Secondly, even if one could divide individuals into two broad political 
schools, it has been proven that those individuals would abandon any party 
political loyalty in favour of self-interest.  
The trend to define individuals in the Territory as Federalist or Republican is 
understandable, as networks were broadly defined by their support or 
opposition to the Territory’s respective governors. Thus, the larger, macro 
studies of the region which tend to discuss economic matters in the Deep South 
can often overlook the nuances of Mississippi’s unique political system. Yet, 
in addition, purely focusing upon local politics can cause oversights in 
themselves, as the networks of the Territory transcended politics, crossing into 
personal enterprise and, significantly, familial ties. Furthermore, Mississippi’s 
distinct cultural heritage was evidently a major factor. As was demonstrated in 
the first chapter, the original partisan networks were defined by their 
relationship to the old Spanish government.  Support or opposition to the 
former Spanish Governor Miguel Gayoso helped to define the early party 
politics of the Mississippi Territory. His American supporters, particularly in 
the form of Anthony Hutchins, the first patriarch of what would become the 
Green-West dynasty, formed in rivalry to Gayoso’s detractors, who would later 
align themselves with Winthrop Sargent, the first American governor, 
therefore branding themselves as Federalists despite their tenuous connection 




to that national party. The unique conditions of Mississippi’s transition from 
Spanish to American ownership, including the three years between the Treaty 
of San Lorenzo in 1795 and the arrival of Sargent in 1798, cannot be ignored 
when considering the shaping of identity in the Mississippi Territory. Many of 
the major historical works referred to in this study have identified a wider 
Southern culture established by ambitious planters and politicians, but it is 
overly simplistic to ignore the unique circumstances present within the 
Mississippi Territory which shaped the politics, economy and culture of the 
Old Natchez District and beyond. 
The transition from Spanish to American government was a difficult one. 
Central to it was another federal official, Andrew Ellicott, around whom much 
of the early political debate formed. Though his role was to survey the 
boundaries established by the Treaty of San Lorenzo, he took a much more 
active role in trying to establish American rule in the region, which impacted 
upon the networks already forming for and against Governor Gayoso. Rather 
than political parties or networks becoming affiliated with policies and 
ideologies, in the Territory they became attached to people. Thus, those who 
supported Ellicott against Spanish rule naturally transitioned into becoming 
supporters of Sargent. Likewise, those who distrusted Ellicott and who had 
benefitted from Spanish governance leant the other way, joining Hutchins, 
Cato West and others opposed to Sargent’s administration. Thus, it is apparent 
that, right from the Territory’s inception, patronage and local networks of 
kinship and business, not political belief, defined partisan lines. Furthermore, 
this highlights the importance of the individual to the networks of the 
Territory. Individual officials such as Andrew Ellicott were far more influential 




in the political history of the Territory than has previously been supposed. The 
roles of these early Federal officials went far beyond that which was defined 
by Congress, and shaped networks of political belief throughout the Territory’s 
existence.  
Honing in on the Sargent Administration, this thesis demonstrated that utilising 
party political labels became an important tool of resistance for individuals 
such as Cato West and the rest of the Committee of 1799. Inhabitants of the 
Territory who had previously supported Ellicott and shifted into supporting 
Sargent quickly appropriated the moniker of the Federalist Party in order to 
curry favour with the new governor, whereas their opponents searched for an 
identity with which to resist him. It would be unfair, however, to suggest that 
resistance to Sargent came simply because of who he was. Sargent’s 
administration also provides a useful case study to explore the limitations of 
Federalism on the fringes of the Republic. Sargent took a similar approach in 
Mississippi as he had to his role as Secretary and Acting-Governor of the 
Northwest Territory. He ensured the franchise was restricted, introduced 
proscriptive penal laws and sought to deny the Territory’s right to progress 
beyond the first stage of Territorial government. Rather than being a problem 
unique to the Mississippi Territory, Sargent’s trials and tribulations speak to a 
wider issue in the historiography of the Early Republic, as the Federalist Party 
faltered in the election of 1800 not just in the cities of the Eastern Seaboard but 
on the frontier and in the backwaters, where their ideas fell on deaf years. 
Natchez may have been home to merchants who naturally favoured the 
Federalist Model, but beyond the small borders of the Natchez District, 
planters and farmers had little time for urban elites from the North bringing in 




regulations that limited their autonomy. It was this, as much as anything else, 
which Cato West and the Committee of 1799 opposed. Indeed, their turn 
towards Jeffersonian-Republicanism in response was less out of a belief in that 
political system, and more to do with opposition to the Federalist model.  
Thus, Cato West’s turn to Republicanism was borne out of opportunism, not 
idealism. While the Republican Party was certainly more in keeping with 
planter ideology on the frontier than their Federalist counterparts, this study 
has demonstrated that West’s turn to the party, in the form of W.C.C. 
Claiborne and his allies in Congress, was an expedient one, and a formative 
moment for the Mississippi Territory. While Sargent and the Federalists were 
quick to dismiss the Territory’s inhabitants as “running wild in the recess of 
government,” it is evident that a burgeoning recognition of American identity 
did exist within the Territory.1 Even if the turn to Republicanism was a 
pragmatic one, the Committee of 1799’s actions of resistance were 
sophisticated and, in large part, took inspiration from the legacy and rhetoric of 
the American Revolution. They also, as has already been mentioned, 
demonstrated that they learned from their surroundings and from both their, 
and others’, experiences. Just as they had learned to negotiate with Governor 
Gayoso, West and his faction negotiated with Congress to subvert Sargent, 
clearly exploiting the growing divide between Federalists and Republicans in 
the Federal Congress. Although this has not been identified in the 
historiography, it is not an entirely new observation – the analysis of 
 
1 Claiborne, Mississippi as a Province, Territory and State, p.205 




contemporary newspapers from the era in chapter two of this thesis highlights 
the extent to which this was well known at the time. 
As has been detailed across this study, the historiography of the Mississippi 
Territory has tended to rest upon categorising the factions that developed 
during the Sargent Administration as being Federalist and Republican, 
replicating the model of the wider United States political system. However, by 
undertaking a far more local study of the political networks of the Mississippi 
Territory, this thesis has demonstrated that such an approach is far too 
simplistic. Although, in the era of Sargent’s and Claiborne’s administrations, 
there were theoretically two main recognisable networks, these do not simply 
align with the national parties, even if the networks themselves claimed they 
did. Indeed, as the third chapter demonstrated, it is a stretch to refer to two 
main parties due to the multitude of disagreement arising out of different areas 
of the wider Natchez District. Ultimately, the terms Federalist and Republican 
had divergent meanings, and this thesis has identified a number of features 
distinct to Mississippi’s political networks that help to differentiate the system 
from the national party system but also to highlight the unique nature of the 
Territory. In so doing, it has demonstrated the limitations of nationalism and its 
impact upon identity in the Territory, a feature that might warrant revisiting in 
other locales.  
Mississippi’s political networks were primarily defined by patronage and 
geography. Across the Territorial Era, familial ties, whether by blood or 
marriage, are identifiable as being key reasons for parties and networks 
forming and dissolving. The most notable example of this is the Green-West 
faction, which initially formed in the 1790s under the patronage of Anthony 




Hutchins. One of Hutchins’ daughters, Mary, married Abner Green, whose 
sister married Cato West. Furthermore, the enduring influence of the Green-
West faction continued after West’s decline due to the fact that Cowles Mead 
later married Mary Green, thus joining the Green-West faction despite his prior 
links to the Claibornes. Local politicians in the Territory did not join a faction 
because of any great political belief, but because their family were affiliated 
with that faction. Thus, rather than being identifiable by political belief, 
networks were identified by individuals, as characterised in the editorials from 
Natchez’s newspapers explored in the second chapter. Those writings make it 
clear that, despite not being large organisations, the factions and networks 
around the Territory had a degree of cultural or popular notoriety, and that key 
figures and features were instantly recognisable to inhabitants. The 
appropriation of the national political party labels thus became a useful tool for 
new inhabitants to identify the parties. Mississippi’s factions had no names, 
and individuals like Cato West and William Dunbar will have meant little to 
new settlers and immigrants, so the appropriation of the Federalist and 
Republican monikers became a vital tool of recruitment for local party politics, 
even if the parties themselves bore limited resemblance to those titles.  
Furthermore, this dependence on family and local relationships meant that 
factions were tied to localised areas around the Territory. In the early period, 
Greenville was home to the Green-West faction, the proto-Federalist merchant 
faction were based in Natchez, and the Claibornes, or more establishment 
“Republicans”, were based in the capital, Washington. Indeed, as the era 
progressed and the Territory grew, politics retained a geographical focus. This 
geopolitical twist almost entirely defined the statehood debate, with the East 




and West of the Territory divided over whether or not the Territory should be 
split in two for statehood. As such, Mississippi’s political history was shaped 
by these regional hubs, and desires to see improvement in localised areas often 
trumped desires for improvement across the Territory, and they were also 
demonstrated to outweigh political loyalty. Jefferson College, and the failure to 
establish it, exemplifies this fact. While it was an undoubtedly Jeffersonian-
Republican venture, the Claibornite Faction and the Green-West faction, both 
of which pertained to be representatives of the Republican faction, failed to 
reach consensus on where it should be based, and jeopardised the future of the 
institution. Indeed, despite founding the Mississippi Society for the 
Dissemination of Useful Knowledge, the proto-Federalist faction also failed to 
support a venture that would have been in keeping with the intentions of that 
organisation when it came to threaten an area of public land within the 
boundaries of Natchez itself. There are two significant conclusions to be drawn 
here. Firstly, that local networks were more significant in a political sense than 
party affiliation and, secondly, that local political networks and loyalties 
regularly trumped the needs of the Territory or, in a wider context, loyalty to 
the United States as a whole. 
By failing to agree on a site for Jefferson College, the Claibornites and the 
Green-Wests clearly demonstrated where their loyalties lay. Despite the fact 
that both sides highlighted the benefits that the College would bring, often 
repeating Republican-style messages, neither would concede any ground in the 
debate over where the College should be built. Despite the fact that the Board 
of Trustees was made up of members of every major political faction in the 
Territory, no consensus could be reached. Neither the Green-Wests nor the 




Claibornites were therefore interested in bringing a distinctly Republican 
institution to the Territory. It would have helped to educate future politicians, 
acting as an incubator for the Republican Party in the Territory, but this was 
clearly of less significance to the Territory’s faction than the prestige of their 
towns playing host to the institution itself. Their willingness to sabotage the 
College to score points against their political rivals is highly representative of 
their positions across the early Territorial period. Furthermore, going beyond 
the political networks of the Natchez District, both the case of the College and 
the wider debate over the future statehood of the Territory demonstrated that 
factions and political parties were unwilling to put the future of the region first. 
They were unwilling to push for an institution such as the College if it wasn’t 
in their interests but, more pertinently, they were unwilling to enable the 
transition to statehood at the expense of their political power and authority. 
Indeed, as the final chapter showed, they were only willing to advance to 
statehood if the conditions (whether it be admission as a whole or as two 
states) would enable them to maximise their authority. Thus, the thesis as a 
whole has demonstrated that local power and authority, as well as political 
point scoring, were more important to the networks of the Mississippi Territory 
than both the national political parties and the future of the Territory itself. 
In addition, even when the spotlight of national attention was fixed upon the 
Territory, local parties did not demonstrate genuine loyalty the federal cause. 
The case study of the Burr Conspiracy offered a vital insight into the flimsy 
nature of national loyalty in Mississippi, as well as showing us how fluid 
factions could be within the Territory. At the very basic level, it demonstrated 
that, even a few years after the Jefferson College affair, the “Republican” Party 




was still fractured. Importantly, the dispute between Robert Williams and 
Cowles Mead demonstrated how local party networks responded to the arrival 
of an outside Republican as their governor. The open rebellion of Mead, 
Ferdinand Claiborne and George Poindexter against the Republican Governor, 
despite that faction also purporting to be Republican, reflected that Mead and 
his company were not Republicans at all. It also showed that their desires for 
personal power and authority outweighed the need for stability amongst the 
“Republican” factions of the Territory. Furthermore, the Burr Conspiracy 
highlighted the complicated nature of loyalty to the Republic within the 
Territory. It exposed the limitations of support for the Federal Government, 
particularly in response to perceived Spanish belligerence on the frontier and 
from West Florida, and demonstrated that inhabitants were more willing to act 
in defence of their own, private land than they were to defend their Union.  
Yet, there were signs of development in some areas across the era. As the 
1810s progressed, networks evolved, ventures became bipartisan, and the lines 
between political groups began to blur. This was not entirely organic, but as a 
consequence of a noticeable shift in the ideology of planters. “Republicans” 
and “Federalists” alike began to realise that their political rivals could offer 
partnerships which would boost their own private business interests. Whereas 
individuals and factions were unable to come together to found Jefferson 
College, the Bank of the Mississippi was far more successful. The members of 
its founding Board are evidence of this – even a citizen as divisive as former 
Governor Winthrop Sargent was rehabilitated into the community thanks to his 
business expertise, and was chosen as the inaugural founder. The Bank 
demonstrates that political allegiances came second to business expertise for 




planters in the Territory; so-called Republicans realised they needed the 
specialist knowledge of the merchants of Natchez, and vice-versa. In bringing 
their expertise together, the Bank came to be one of the most stable in the 
history of the nineteenth century American South, and endured through the 
War of 1812 when all others in the region failed. The Bank enabled planters 
and merchants to access new customers and markets, expanding the economic 
enterprises of the Territory and, thanks to the acquisition of specie payments 
from the North, brought the Territory’s economy closer to that of the Union 
itself. The Bank of the Mississippi was undeniably one of the major successes 
of the Territorial era, and it facilitated much of the regional expansion into the 
West that has been so well documented in the historiography, arguably 
achieving what political correspondence had not. Thus, with regards to their 
private interests, planters in the Territory began to see the benefits of a closer 
relationship between the Territory and the Federal Government, even if they 
were still unwilling to give up political power to bring the Territory into the 
Union. This is emblematic of the experience of the planter in the Mississippi 
Territory. Planters played up to the Federal Government when it suited them 
privately, and resisted it when it threatened their local systems of power. 
Ultimately, this thesis has proven the importance of casting a local lens upon 
the enterprises of planters and politicians on the fringes of the Early American 
Republic in under to understand the shaping of politics and identity in the 
South. By focusing on local communities and networks, it has proven that the 
Mississippi Territory helps us to understand how it was possible for planters to 
develop unique, hybrid forms of power, and how they were able to maintain 
them within an increasingly present national framework. It has shown that 




experiences of westward migration and of life in Mississippi were not dictated 
by federal politicians such as Thomas Jefferson, but local planters doubling as 
politicians, by local federal agents ranging from Indian Agents to Land 
Surveyors, and by Native American nations and poor farmers operating in the 
grey areas between the systems of power that politicians and planters tried to 
enforce. 
The need to focus on some of the more minor characters bearing the early 
Republic and settler colonialism westward has also emerged. Far away from 
New York, Boston and Washington, local politicians and planters exploited the 
power vacuums caused by the Territorial system and made a lasting impact 
upon the American West. While it is true that, compared to the eastern states, 
the Mississippi Territory was a backwater, it was by no means bereft of 
political talent. The burgeoning factions of the Territory reinvented themselves 
regularly, evolving as the political climate shifted, and proved their ability to 
make genuine contributions to the Federal Government. Individuals such as 
Cato West successfully subverted Federal ordinances and Federal officials in 
order to shape the region in their own vision. They existed within the power 
vacuums that were prevalent across the American West, and prospered by 
playing a clever game; they bore the hallmarks of Republicanism and spoke 
the language of loyalty to the Union, but actively exploited the distance 
between themselves and the Federal Government in order to create their own, 
unique brand of American identity. This project has not intended to glorify 
these individuals, many of whom were slaveholders, and nearly all of whom 
were self-serving in their ambitions. By focusing on the local experiences of 




these individuals, this project has illuminated our understanding of identity and 
society in the Mississippi Territory. 
The Mississippi Territory was undoubtedly transformed in the nineteen years it 
spent in the Territorial system, but it shaped the Territorial system just as much 
as it was shaped by it. Mississippi’s local politicians identified the weaknesses 
and ambiguities of the system, and acted accordingly, building their own 
networks of power and authority where the Ordinances left them undefined. 
They were not always successful, and often sabotaged themselves and their 
quest for authority and autonomy, by refusing to settle or compromise. 
However, their actions defined the region for years to come.  The American 
Territorial experiment succeeded in that it transformed Mississippi from a 
Spanish colony to an American state within twenty years, with a fully-fledged 
constitution and a defined system for clearing and cultivating land, having 
forced countless Native Americans off their land and homes. However, the 
state it created was American only on its own terms, its leaders 
uncompromising on its entry into the Union. It was not the Federal 
Government, nor the Union itself, which shaped identity on the in the 
Mississippi Territory, but the individuals who lived and governed there, 
accessing and deploying a new political language and a new institutional 
framework. The Mississippi Territory was established by a Federalist 
government, designed by a Jeffersonian-Republican vison, but it was shaped, 
compromised, and cultivated by the local politicians and planters who lived 
within it.  
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